University of South Carolina

Scholar Commons
Theses and Dissertations
1-1-2013

Economic Agreements and Interstate Conflict: A Policy
Substitution Model of Coercion
Matthew Daniel-Marion Shaffer
University of South Carolina

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd
Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Shaffer, M. D.(2013). Economic Agreements and Interstate Conflict: A Policy Substitution Model of
Coercion. (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/1793

This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you by Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS AND INTERSTATE CONFLICT: A POLICY
SUBSTITUTION MODEL OF COERCION
by
Matthew Daniel-Marion Shaffer
Bachelor of Science
Susquehanna University, 2002
Master of Arts
American University, 2007

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in
Political Science
College of Arts and Sciences
University of South Carolina
2013
Accepted by:
Katherine Barbieri, Major Professor
Harvey Starr, Committee Member
Kirk Randazzo, Committee Member
Matthew Fuhrmann, Committee Member
Philip Arena, Committee Member
Lacy Ford, Vice Provost and Dean of Graduate Studies

© Copyright by Matthew D. Shaffer, 2013
All Rights Reserved.

ii

DEDICATION
To Kati, steadfast in spite of distance and lapse of time – just as she promised, and more
than I deserve.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I owe far too much to far too many for their help and support in completing this
project. While I cannot begin to repay in full the debts I have accumulated with these
individuals, I hope this small token of my gratitude and appreciation will suffice as my
first payment. Completing my dissertation would not have been possible without the
excellent training and mentorship of my dissertation committee – Katherine Barbieri,
Harvey Starr, Kirk Randazzo, Matthew Fuhrmann, and Phil Arena. Special thanks are
due to Katherine Barbieri for her valuable feedback and willingness to work with me
through all circumstances on my dissertation. Just as important as that, however, is her
advice on professionalization, academia, and positioning myself to make a policy
difference. In a similar vein, Harvey Starr served as my entrée into the true world of
political science and knowledge generation through multiple courses on research design
and international relations. I had a total of two international relations courses under my
belt in my undergraduate and master’s program before coming to South Carolina.
Needless to say, his patients and assistance in helping me learn core concepts and
theories was invaluable.
I owe an enormous debt to Kirk Randazzo for, first, teaching me almost
everything I know about research methods and, second, listening to my frustrations,
concerns, and doubts through graduate school. He frequently made good on his promise
to “not make it easy” for me. I would be truly disappointed if he had failed to live up to
this promise. Matthew Fuhrmann’s constant optimism and encouragement on my various

iv

projects were greatly appreciated at times when I tried desperately to downplay my
research. I am again in incredible debt to Phil Arena, who must have the patience of a
saint to help me through various iterations of my formal model. His contributions were
invaluable in helping make my dissertation as technically sound as possible.
I am also indebted to the Department of Political Science at the University of
South Carolina for funding and institutional support that allowed me to complete my
PhD. Thanks are due to those in the department that graciously provided me feedback
and assistance along the way. From the day I set foot on campus, Dan Sabia helped me
in every way possible to grow and develop as a teacher and scholar. Likewise, Roger
Coate, Jill Frank, and Robert Angel provided invaluable insight into critical thinking and
classroom instruction that should be due every PhD student. Methodologically, David
Darmofal and Lee Walker were of incredible help on multiple occasions. Lastly, allow
me to thank Brenda Stevens, Tamara Gordon, Debby Tiemeyer, Pamela Mauldin, Tyler
Bledsoe, and Janis Leaphart for their support over time. My first assignment as a
graduate assistant was supporting the administration office, which allowed me to learn
the critical contribution these individuals contribute to the department. Further, it is
challenging to find a more cordial, friendly group to work with anywhere.
My colleagues and friends are equally represented in this document through their
thoughts, ideas, and support. Nadia Jilani, Ashley Murph-Schwarzer, Brian Warby,
Michael Martindale deserve special note as members of the Dissertation Working Group,
which provided invaluable feedback for early stages of the project. Beyond that, these
individuals, along with Douglas Page, Alan Tauber, Charles Wu, T.J. Kimmel, Ally
Reckendorf, and numerous others pushed me to do better, helped me to put things in

v

perspective, and restored my sanity through various mechanisms. Outside of my
graduate program, several family and friends deserve mention for their support and
seemingly genuine interest in what it is I did while at South Carolina. My parents, Dan
and Jane, instilled in me the love of learning from an early age. While they may not have
understood my decision to get a PhD, they certainly supported me through thick-and-thin.
Likewise, Josh Anderson, Anthony Marshall, Becky Marshall, Josh Singleton, John
Watson, and Penny all provided incredible respite from the daily barrage of insecurities,
concerns, fears, and troubles that accompany graduate school. Their unfailing support,
which I called upon time and time again, can never be repaid. I do not think they know
just how valuable their help was through this and many other times.
Lastly, and unquestionably most importantly, my wife Kati made this
achievement – to include the dissertation and graduate school – possible for me.
Someday I hope to understand the degree of selflessness and patience it takes to say “ok,
let’s do it” when confronted with a spouse who wants to go to graduate school. She was,
and continues to be, an unwavering source of encouragement at times when I doubt my
abilities, choices, or goals. Her willingness to leave a career, watch me leave my career,
move to a state she had never been to, and put up with the demands of a student is beyond
my comprehension. While I can never truly understand her sacrifice for my dreams, and
likely can never return it kind, I hope she understands the depth of love and devotion I
have for her and that while the dream is mine, I live it for her.

vi

ABSTRACT

Economic integration agreements – also called preferential trade agreements or
regional trade agreements – have dramatically expanded in scope since World War II.
While the proximate goal of economic integration is to increase commercial exchange
between member states, there are strong reasons to believe agreements affect security
relations as well. In particular, by increasing interdependence between member states
through trade and investment, economic agreements increase the opportunity cost of
coercion. However, they simultaneously marginalize commercial ties between agreement
members and the outside world and exacerbate relative gains concerns through trade
diversion. Hence I argue that while conflict between agreement members likely abates, it
may become more likely between members and non-members.
Furthermore, in considering the impact of economic agreements on security
relations, I take a broad view of the interstate conflict process that includes multiple
coercive strategies. Specifically, I consider how agreements influence the use of
economic sanctions and military force as substitutable coercive strategies in disputes.
Using the logic of policy substitution, I develop a formal bargaining model capturing a
state’s decision between sanctions and military force. I draw several implications from
the formal model. First, asymmetric trade relations between agreement members results
in the use of military force by dependent states and economic sanctions by autonomous
ones. Second, symmetric trade relations between agreement members result in economic
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sanctions. Finally, members and non-members of agreements are more likely to use
military force in disputes.
I evaluate these arguments using statistical test of dyad years from 1970 to 2001.
Ultimately, I find the influence of agreements is highly contextual and based on
economic relationships between states. Conditional support is found for the idea that
economic agreements reduce conflict between members and increase it with nonmembers provided certain economic conditions exist. However, other economic
relationships can actually increase conflict between states in the same agreement.
Furthermore, I do not find support for the argument that economic agreement members
substitute economic sanctions for military force as strategies in disputes. Conditional
support does exist for a substitution effect between members and non-members, however.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Economic integration agreements – also called preferential trade agreements or
regional trade agreements – are powerful foreign policy tools for many states. By
lowering commercial barriers, agreements increase trade and investment among member
states. As a consequence, the number of extant agreements now numbers over twohundred individual arrangements with many more in various stages of negotiation. The
proliferation of agreements is accompanied by increasing complexity. Many economic
agreements now incorporate external trade policy harmonization and factor mobility in
addition to standard trade liberalization. In addition to increasing commercial exchange,
states also gain from agreements by increasing their bargaining power in multilateral
negotiations and signaling political commitment to particular policies. Economic
integration, therefore, appears to be a cornerstone of commercial policy for states.
Rhetoric from scholars and politicians alike further suggests that commercial
integration is as valuable for peace and security as it is for economic prosperity. In the
late nineteenth century, Vilfredo Pareto advocated customs unions as pacifying
mechanisms in Europe (Machlup 1992, 146). John Maynard Keynes echoed this
sentiment after World War I, believing that integration had the potential to tie European
states together politically and prevent the devastation of war (Keynes 1920, 249). French
minister Robert Schuman, when advocating for the European Coal and Steel Community,
firmly believed in economic cooperation as a means to peace:
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“By pooling basic production and by instituting a new High Authority, whose
decisions will bind France, Germany and other member countries, this proposal
will lead to the realization of the first concrete foundation of a European
federation indispensable to the preservation of peace.” (Schuman 1950)
Yet economic agreements do not exist in a vacuum. Economic integration can
profoundly affect the welfare of non-member states by altering trade patterns and
investment decisions. Regional economic agreements – by necessity – are discriminatory
institutions that incorporate a discrete number of states to maximize economic gains. By
doing so, economic agreements may implicitly cordon off areas of the global economy
and foster acrimonious commercial relations. In a process called trade diversion, for
example, trade shifts from more- to less-efficient producers due to the unequal removal of
trade barriers and tariffs (Viner 1950, 43; Krugman 1993, 384-385). Indeed, the concern
over the trend in regional trade agreements prompted then Director General of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) Supachai Panitchpakdi to comment:
"[Regional integration] threatens the primacy of the WTO, and foreshadows a
world of greater fragmentation, conflict, and marginalization, particularly of the
weakest and poorest countries." (Panitchpakdi 2002)
Furthermore, economic integration involves strategic decisions about which states
are included and excluded from membership. Often these decisions are made based on
security goals. Many states integrate economically to resist aggressive states or
particularly strong threats they may face. For example, the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC), with a stated goal of developing a common market, was created in part due to
concern over the Iran-Iraq war. As Saudi Arabia’s Interior Minister Prince Nayif ibn
Abd al-Aziz indicated during one of the organizations meetings in 1982:
“Undoubtedly, the GCC has made great progress in all fields in a short period of
time. Undoubtedly, the security field which all of you represent here is of
paramount importance in the cooperation of GCC member states.” (Ramazani
1988)
2

Given that economic agreements are both a component of an overall security
strategy for some states and impact the economic power of states, it is prudent to consider
the overall impact they have on conflict between nations. This project, in turn, examines
the relationship between economic institutions and interstate conflict in order to evaluate
their ability to generate peace. Specifically, I look to inform the following question: Do
formal economic integration agreements influence interstate conflict?
While informed by a broad literature on trade and conflict, many issues
concerning the broader security implications of economic agreements have yet to be
addressed. In particular, I consider three important aspects of economic agreements and
commercial relations in general that receive comparatively little attention. First, where
contemporary studies of economic interdependence and conflict assume the gains from
trade are valued equally, I attempt to contextualize economic relations between states by
considering more carefully the structure of commerce. Economic agreements vary in
terms of scope and depth, for example, in ways that likely influence their pacifying
effects. Likewise, asymmetrical relations between agreement members (or nonmembers) may further color their interactions. Second, I consider the seemingly
contrasting effect economic agreements have on intra-agreement and extra-agreement
relations. While the economic effects of agreements may increase interdependence
between members, thereby potentially pacifying relations, it may simultaneously reduce
it with states excluded from the agreement. Consequently, states forming economic
agreements may face a tradeoff between intra-agreement peace (i.e., between member
states) and extra-agreement conflict (i.e., between members and non-members).
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Finally, I consider more carefully the causal mechanisms behind the influence of
commerce on conflict. In particular, I evaluate the belief that economic sanctions can
substitute for military force as coercive policies. In many ways economic agreements
provide a natural test for this oft-held belief. States in an economic agreement implicitly
signal their economic interdependence and the salience of trade relations with other
member states. Given this, if economic sanctions truly substitute for military conflict,
agreement members are theoretically the best positioned to substitute sanctions for
military force.
In this project, I specifically argue that economic agreements influence the
relative utility of coercive policies among those states both included in and excluded
from membership. Economic agreements foster greater intra-agreement interdependence
by increasing trade, promoting investment, and providing intangible benefits to members.
This, in turn, likely encourages the use of economic sanctions to address conflicts
between members instead of military force. On the other hand, the process of economic
integration likely reduces or limits interdependence between members and non-members
of agreements. Economic sanctions are likely less effect, promoting the use of military
force to address conflicts. Consequently, while some relationships reduce overall conflict
and violence, others may actually increase it by limiting the effective use of alternatives
like economic sanctions.

1.1

Layout of the Dissertation
My dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 synthesizes the commercial and

institutional effects of economic agreements with their political implications per the
extant literature. In Chapter 3, I develop a theory of economic agreements and interstate
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conflict. My argument is relatively straightforward. Economic agreements increase
economic interdependence between member states while simultaneously reducing
relative interdependence with non-member states. This process has different implications
for intra- and extra-agreement relations. Interdependence between agreement members,
first, is likely a facilitator of peaceful intra-agreement relations. The marginalization of
ties between members and non-members, however, likely exacerbates tensions and
increases extra-agreement conflict.
The implications of my theory, however, go beyond simply the initiation of
conflict and extend to the means by which states pursue conflict. To this end, I develop a
formal bargaining model considering a state’s choice between economic sanctions and
military force to coerce adversaries. The model begins with a challenger demanding
concession from a defender, who then either accepts or rejects. Given the defender
rejects the demand, the challenger then decides whether to use economic sanctions or
military force to compel the defender to acquiesce. My analysis of the model indicates,
somewhat intuitively, that states select the policy with which they are best suited to
compel the defender. States in a dominant economic position are more likely to use
economic sanctions while more dependent states are more likely to use military force. In
terms of my argument concerning economic agreements, the implications once again are
different for intra- or extra-agreement relations. Interdependence between members of
the same agreement likely increases both the effectiveness of economic sanctions and
cost of military force, encouraging the use of the former. When members engage in
conflict with non-members, however, economic sanctions are less likely to be effective
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given the lower degree of interdependence. The result could be elevating military force
to a first-best option when conflicts arise.
I test the implications of my theory and formal model using a multi-method
approach. Chapter 4 describes in detail a research design which allows me to
appropriately capture the complex details of economic agreements and their influence on
both conflict and the strategies states employ. In Chapter 5, I examine the effect of
economic agreements and the trade relationships they influence on the onset of both
economic sanctions and military force between two states in the same economic
agreement. I also offer an extended illustration of some plausible causal mechanisms in
my analysis using the relationship between Uganda and Kenya, both members of the East
African Community. I conduct a second large-n analysis in Chapter 6 testing my
argument that economic agreements exacerbate conflict between members and nonmembers as interdependence is limited. I evaluate the onset of economic sanctions and
military force based on economic agreements and trade relationships between two states
where either only one is in an agreement or both states are in separate agreements. In the
concluding chapter, I summarize my argument and consider the policy implications of
my analysis.

1.2

Defining Formal Economic Agreements
Before proceeding with my analysis, however, a brief definition and discussion of

formal economic agreements is warranted. A formal economic agreement as I use it
refers to any institution removing barriers to commercial exchange with discrete
membership. In general, this is broadly similar to the conventional use of regional trade
agreements. The World Trade Organization defines a regional trade agreement as a

6

territory that maintains separate tariffs or regulations for a “substantial part of the trade of
such territory” (WTO 1994, Article XXIV). In practice, the concept is stretched
somewhat by the states that employ such arrangements such that a “substantial part” of
trade is not in fact covered by agreements (an issue I address empirically). Two key
factors therefore define my use of economic agreements. First, the arrangement must in
some way reduce barriers to commerce between states so as to increase economic
interactions between members. Second, membership in the agreement must be discrete
and non-universal. That is, global institutions like the WTO and its predecessor the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) are not considered in my theory or
analysis. While the GATT and WTO reduce barriers to commerce, their nearly universal
membership provides a baseline of economic openness in the world. My use of
economic agreements, to this end, captures institutions that go beyond global standards to
capture unique, discrete relationships between groups of states.
Economic integration agreements also vary in scale and scope. Balassa (1962)
first developed a comprehensive economic theory of integration as a process. He
identifies five stages of integration in increasing order from free trade agreements to
customs unions, common markets, economic unions, and total political integration.
Subsequent authors have modified Balassa’s taxonomy for particular nuanced purposes
(see Crowley 2001 for a summary of taxonomy). Each level is differentiated by
additional layers of policy convergence and depth of integration. In the most basic, the
distinction between levels is the mix of negative and positive integration initiatives,
where negative integration is simply the removal of barriers and not the creation of new
mechanisms. Shallow agreements, such as free trade agreements, focus largely on
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negative integration by removing impediments to trade. Deep agreements, in contrast,
remove barriers as well as creating common initiatives. Customs unions, for example,
incorporate free trade and the harmonization of external trade policies. Consequently, the
taxonomy I adopt in my analysis takes into account the incremental depth of economic
integration. A summary of the levels of integration and the policies they imply I use in
my analysis, based largely on Balassa’s original taxonomy, are included in Table 1.1.

1.3

The Political Salience of Economic Agreements
Understanding how economic agreements influence conflict between states is

important given trends in the global economy today. As noted, economic agreements are
incredibly popular tools of commercial policy for states in the contemporary world
economy. Starting from a base of almost zero following World War II, the number of
extant integration agreements grew to include well over two-hundred unique
arrangements. It is not an exaggeration to say that, with only a few exceptions, every
state in the world today is party to at least one economic agreement. Agreements are now
also more diverse in membership, broader in scope, and increasingly deep. While most
early agreements were restricted to European states, the proliferation of new states
following decolonization encouraged participation in the developing world. Figure 1.1
illustrates the popularity of economic agreements by plotting the cumulative number of
economic agreements in force from 1950 to 2011. Evident in Figure 1.1 is the
exponential growth of agreements since the end of the Cold War. Between 1992 and
2011, states formed between ten and eleven agreements annually on average. The fifteen
agreements added in 2011 indicate the popularity of economic agreements is unlikely to
wane in the coming years.
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The quantitative increase in economic agreements has also complicated
commercial relations between states. Crisscrossing and overlapping agreements create a
more complex system of trade regulations for businesses to navigate. As Bhagwati
(1995, 2008) famously noted, there now exists a “spaghetti bowl” of trade deals that
subject the same commodities to different tariffs, quotas, and rules of origins. The
ultimate result of such dynamics may, on one hand, expand commerce given the lower
barriers to trade. On the other hand, the complexity Bhagwati notes may stymie global
trade by creating a chaotic system of competing preferences that increases uncertainty
and suboptimal outcomes. Indeed, Baldwin (1993) argues that the mere creation of a
trade agreement between a discrete number of states encourages the formation of other
agreements. States concerned about competition from the new agreement may seek to
form agreements to compensate for this implicit market discrimination. Hence,
agreements have a domino effect where agreements are formed in defensive fashion.
Consequently, given their popularity and potential to influence global commerce,
economic agreements are an important topic of consideration in international relations
today.
In addition to the economic consequences of agreements, it is important to
understand their influence as part of state’s overall security strategies. While the direct
economic benefits of economic integration agreements are the most obvious motivation
for their popularity, a number of political incentives underlie most arrangements. Indeed,
some go as far as to state the fundamental motivations of all economic agreements to be
political. In the words of Ali El-Agraa:
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In reality, almost all existing cases of economic integration were either proposed
or formed for political reasons even though the arguments put forward in their
favor were expressed in terms of possible economic gains. (El-Agraa 1997, 34)
Perhaps the most basic political motivation to form an economic agreement is to
underpin a broader security arrangement. Schiff and Winters (1998), notably, identify
several security-based motivations for regional integration. First, states may seek
economic integration to politically bind member states. As the anecdotal quotes at the
beginning of this paper indicate, policymakers often turn to economic agreements to
achieve security goals. European integration, as noted, was pursued largely for security
goals. Likewise, Argentina and Brazil sought economic integration to quell tensions
between the two countries and focus on democratic consolidation (Schiff and Winters
1998). Former U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull also advocated economic integration
as a means to pacify interstate relations (Hull 1948). Second, although the main goals of
agreements are economic in nature, many also include a component addressing external
security and foreign policy threats. The South African Development Coordination
Conference (SADCC) was formed in 1980 specifically to reduce states’ material
dependence on South Africa. By doing delinking their economies from South Africa,
member states (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania and
Zambia) sought to both resist pressure from South Africa and actively combat the
Apartheid regime by economically isolating the country. The Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) likewise was formed in 1967 to resist external powers. Of
particular concern to ASEAN founders was the factious regional economy that opened
them to manipulation by the competition between the United States and Soviet Union.
Consequently, one of ASEAN’s core objectives is “… [to] ensure [states] stability and
security from external interference in any form or manifestation…” (ASEAN 1967). It
10

is important to subject the beliefs of policymakers to empirical evaluation given the
relatively common belief economic agreements are instruments of peace between states.

1.4

Contributions
My research makes several noteworthy contributions to both the scholarly study

of political science and potential public policy. First, I contribute to and expand the body
of literature on economic interdependence and conflict. In some ways my analysis is a
critique or refinement of the mainstream belief that interdependence has a linearly
pacifying effect on interstate conflict. The assumption made by most studies linking
interdependence with peace is that trade exclusively results in positive gains. That is, the
only way interdependence can increase conflict is if little interdependence exists. Such
an assumption may not be warranted, however, as it captures only the vulnerability of
states to disruptions in trade. While both states may be vulnerable, one may be more
sensitive to disruptions such that it is less able to adapt policies to minimize damage from
the disruption (Keohane and Nye 1977; Richardson and Kegley 1980). Indeed, if the
terms of trade decidedly favor one state in the trade relationship, it is unlikely they view
interdependence similarly.
My argument lends support, most importantly, to the belief held by Barbieri
(1996, 2002), Grieco (1988, 1993), and others that the structure of trade relations is an
important determinant of their influence on conflict. That is, I consider more so when
and in what ways economic relations influence conflict and not simply if they do so. This
line of inquiry has implications for policymakers as well. On one hand it directly informs
decisions to pursue close economic relations between states as a pillar of or compliment
to security policy. This is particularly useful for economic agreements primarily pursued
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for security goals (e.g., the European Coal and Steel Community). It is also helpful for
security agreements that contain an economic component. While the military alliance
may intend to draw states closer together, it is possible economic frictions brought on by
openness and competition could drive them apart. On the other hand, it broadly informs
trade and economic policy by highlighting the potential political consequences of
economic policy decisions. That is, economic agreements that do not specifically touch
on security goals may nonetheless impact foreign policy decisions.
Second, my analysis addresses a generally neglected area of international
relations. Specifically, how might the existence and operation of limited-membership
international institutions influence states excluded from membership? While copious
research explores integration and conflict between members, relatively little considers
how institutions affect non-members. State decisions to seek integration are strategic
choices that necessarily exclude certain parties. It follows, therefore, that institutions
may have as profound consequences for non-members as they do members. I provide a
piece of this puzzle in my analysis.
Third, I consider the empirical validity of policy substitution in conflict scenarios.
Sanctions have long been posited as means to prevent deadly conflict. Woodrow Wilson
firmly believed in the power of economic pressure to avoid conflicts like World War I:
“A nation boycotted is a nation that is in sight of surrender. Apply this economic,

peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will be no need for force. It is a terrible
remedy. It does not cost a life outside the nation boycotted, but it brings pressure
upon the nation that, in my judgment, no modern nation could resist.” (Hufbauer,
Schott, and Elliot 1990).
His sentiment is carried out in practice by notably the United States, which uses sanctions
more often than any other country as a tool of foreign policy. However, while economic
sanctions have long been posited as alternatives to war, few studies bring empirical
12

results to bear. While sanctions may be alternatives to war, it is equally valid that they
are utilized in different foreign policy roles that do not warrant the use of military force.
Furthermore, the majority of sanctions literature is rightly focused on their effectiveness
and consequences. Understanding the consequences of sanctions, however, requires an
understanding of the circumstances in which states employ sanctions. That is, the
effectiveness of sanctions may be conditioned on the type of engagement. Sanctions may
be more or less effective depending on whether they are used to avoid conflict or not. If
they are indeed substitutable policies, economic agreement members are the most likely
group to do so given their formal interdependence and ready-made institutional
mechanisms. This contribution has important consequences for policy in particular,
given the popularity of economic sanctions as conflict resolution tools today. I consider
in this analysis some of the conditions under which economic sanctions are more or less
likely to be adopted by states.
Overall, my research addresses the political ramifications of one of the most
noteworthy trends in international political economy over the past fifty years. Economic
agreements have expanded in scope and scale such that nearly every economy in the
world is now formally linked to at least one other. Relatively little scholarly attention has
been paid, however, to the broad security consequences of agreements. Through my
dissertation, I address this gap and help inform trade and economic policy by considering
how the structure of economic relations influences conflict behavior. If it is the case, as I
argue, that economic agreements reduce conflict among members but increase it with
non-members, states entering into economic agreements face a tradeoff between intraand extra-agreement security. Understanding this tradeoff will ultimately help states
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determine the linkages between economic and security policy, thereby helping improve
efforts in both arenas.
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Table 1.1: Levels of Economic Integration
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Figure 1.1: Growth in Economic Agreements 1950 – 2011
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CHAPTER 2
ASSESSMENT OF RELEVANT LITERATURE: INTERDEPENDENCE, CONFLICT, AND
THE FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS
The research question I put forward is firmly grounded in the literature on
economic interdependence and conflict, but also includes other research areas, given the
formal nature of economic agreements. That is, economic agreements are international
organizations that carry a temporal aspect related to the codified nature of association
between member states. I proceed in this chapter as follows. First, I review and
synthesis the extant literature on economic interdependence and conflict. Second,
stemming from the interdependence and conflict debate, I evaluate the use of economic
sanctions as a tool to achieve foreign policy goals and their substitutability with military
force as coercive options for states. Third, I consider the political motivations and
consequences of economic agreements from primarily a neo-functionalist perspective.
Fourth, given the literature on economic interdependence and conflict, I explore the
economic and political consequences of economic agreements for member states. Fifth,
given the discussion of prior research, I contextualize the extant literature on economic
agreements and interstate conflict. Finally, I consider gaps in this extant literature as it
relates to my particular research question.

2.1

Economic Interdependence and Conflict
Economic agreements are naturally institutions designed to increase commercial

interaction between member states. As such, their influence on conflict is primarily
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informed by the broad literature on economic interdependence and conflict. Connections
between commerce and conflict span centuries and are most often associated with
enlightenment philosophers. In particular, Immanuel Kant believed economic
interdependence reinforced legal systems and socialized states to prefer cooperation
rather than conflict (1991 [1795]). Empirical assessments of Kant’s general claims,
however, assume more varied causal mechanisms. The line of inquiry most in line with
Kant’s original thoughts holds that trade may pacify states through a socialization process
that encourages the acquisition of resources through exchange rather than conquest
(Keohane and Nye 1977; Rosecrance 1986; Hegre 2000). Economic interdependence,
furthermore, improves communication and conflict mediation mechanisms such that
conflicts between interdependent states are resolved peacefully (Mitrany 1965; Haas
1964; Stein 1993; Doyle 1997). War is, therefore, not required between interdependent
states, as they have alternative means of acquiring resources and resolving disputes.
The most developed branch of the liberal peace holds that trade between nations
confers tangible, material gains that provide incentives to avoid conflict. Eliminating the
flow of goods and services between states potentially sacrifices gains in aggregate
welfare. Trade therefore reduces conflict through opportunity costs insomuch as trade is
disrupted by war (Polachek 1980, 1992; Dorussen 1999; Russett and Oneal 1997; 1999a;
1999b; 2001; Benson 2004). The opportunity cost argument is criticized on several
grounds, however. Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer (2001) argue that opportunity costs are
insufficient to deter conflict. Using a bargaining model, the authors demonstrate that
opportunity costs simply increase the demand a challenger makes. That is, if the
defender derives benefits from its economic relations with the challenger – and the
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challenger is aware – it simply demands more in pre-war bargaining. Interdependence,
therefore, is subsumed in the bargaining process (Garzke, Li, and Boehmer 2001, 400).
Second, Barbieri and Levy (1999, 2004) challenge the fundamental assumption of
studies linking trade and conflict by testing whether conflict actually does disrupt trade.
Although data availability limits their sample to seven dyads, the authors find little
evidence to support the notion that war interrupts trade flows. There is ambiguous
evidence that trade drops initially in response to war and no evidence to suggest that war
inhibits future trade. In a later work the authors describe more fully the logic of trading
with enemies in times of war, including systemic relative gains concerns, the alienation
of neutrals in warring states, and dependency on trade taxes for war efforts (Barbieri and
Levy 2004). Anderton and Carter (2001) present a rebuttal to Barbieri and Levy,
however, by focusing on the impact of major power wars on trade. They find evidence
that major power wars – and non-major power wars to a less extent – do reduce trade
between combatants. Studies considering the impact of war on trade suffer from several
problems, however, including data availability, limited sample size, and selection bias
(Barbieri and Levy 2001). Consequently, the exact impact of military conflict on trade is
ambiguous at best.
Two additional veins of research explore economic exchange beyond trade
relationships. One specifically considers capital flows between states as inhibitors of
conflict. Foreign direct investment (FDI) provides tangible benefits to states by
increasing physical and human capital stocks which, in turn, are jeopardized through
interstate conflict (Souva 2002; Souva and Prins 2006; Gartzke 2007). Furthermore, FDI
provides private information that reduces uncertainty in the bargaining stages of war-
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initiation (Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 2001). Threats made by interdependent states are
more credible given the potential losses they may incur. A final strain of research by
Brooks (1999) argues that the geographic diffusion of production, expansion of
multinational corporations, and shift to knowledge-oriented economies renders conquest
ineffective in capitalizing on economic assets. Simply put, states cannot utilize what they
conquer because of fractious production chains, the intangible nature of economic value
based in knowledge, and disciplining role of corporations.
While the preponderance of studies conclude that economic interactions reduce
conflict, a dissenting body of research finds the opposite effect of trade on conflict. The
counter-argument to the liberal peace holds that asymmetric patterns of exchange
encourage states to view commercial flows in terms of relative gains. A state achieving
greater wealth or increased productivity from an economic agreement may translate its
new-found advantage into military power to be used against the other (Barbieri 1996,
2002; Gilpin 1981; Gowa 1994; Grieco 1988; Grieco 1993). Furthermore, a state may
simply develop concern about the extent to which they depend on a rival for economic
viability. Reliance on another state for goods and/or markets is in and of itself a form of
dependence exogenous to relative gains concerns. Although levels of trade may be
relatively equal, each state is still vulnerable to disruptions in the relationship. Rather
than interdependence, economic integration may foster simple dependence or the
perception thereof in both states (Barbieri 1996, 2002; Mansfield and Pollins 2001, 836;
McMillan 1997, 41). Consequently, vulnerabilities implied by dependency may
encourage more aggressive actions in the security arena to compensate for strategic
imbalances (Gilpin 1981; Liberman 1996; Mearsheimer 1990; Mearsheimer 1994).
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Alternatively, Crescenzi (2003a, 2003b) argues that the constraining influence of
interdependence depends on each state’s the exit costs. States that have many alternative
options for import or export are not truly interdependent, as they can easily avoid the cost
of conflict as it manifests in lost trade. Asymmetric exit costs tend to yield limited
conflict, as the weaker state lacks bargaining leverage. Symmetrically low exit costs are
most likely to escalate to militarized conflict.
Empirically, Barbieri (1996; 2002) argues that the salience of bilateral trade
relationships and the symmetrical nature of dependence in these relationships are
important determinates of conflict. Salience is defined as the importance of a bilateral
trading relationship relative to others for two states in a dyadic relationship. Symmetry is
the equality of dependence for states in a dyad. She finds through a large-n study that
high interdependence, measured by the interaction of salience and symmetry, actually
increases the likelihood of interstate conflict. Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig (2008) argue
that countries more open to global trade are more prone to conflict due to the lower
opportunity costs of any one trade relationship. The more numerous and diversely
distributed the trade ties of a given state , the less valuable any one connection is relative
to the others. Consequently, states with open markets incur less pain from the severing of
any one trade tie. The reduced opportunity cost of conflict both decreases the pain of war
and reduces the effectiveness of economic sanctions, since states may easily adopt by
shifting from one trade partner to another.

2.2

Foreign Policy Substitution and Sanctions as Coercive Tools
The third and somewhat underdeveloped mechanism by which economic

interdependence promotes peace is the possibility that economic interdependence
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increases the effectiveness of alternative conflict resolution mechanisms. In other words,
policies short of war may be substituted as a coercive means to achieve foreign policy
goals as economic interdependence can increase the their effectiveness, thereby obviating
the need for war. The essence of policy substitution is that states may pursue foreign
policy goals using several different means. States possess a menu of options with which
they may address foreign policy issues (Most and Starr 1984 and 1989; Starr 2000).
Different situations (causes) will often tend to result in different policy responses
(outcomes) across both nations and time despite similar foreign policy objectives. For
example, responses to a perceived security threat by a state range from increased defense
spending, to securing allies, or preemptive war among others. The exact policy option
adopted is determined by various factors both internal and external to the state. CioffiRevilla and Starr (2002) further refine policy substitutability and its application to theory
and empirical testing in compliment to opportunity and willingness. Specifically, policy
substitutability is a second-order causal mechanism to the larger framework of
opportunity and willingness (Cioffi-Revilla and Starr 2002, 232). In other words, policy
substitutability is a decision-making process stemming from the ability and desire of a
state to act. A critical component of foreign policy substitutability, furthermore, is in the
relative comparison of instruments to one another (Most and Starr 1984; Baldwin 1985,
121-122; Most and Starr 1989). Within the universe of potential responses to conflict,
particular alternatives are more attractive compared to others based on the ability of states
to inflict harm and withstand retaliation (Starr 2000, 132; Cioffi-Revilla and Starr 2002,
232; Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 2001, 400; Stein 2003, 118). Consequently, policy
substitution can shed light on the process of conflict within the context of cost/benefit
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analyses. Foreign policy substitution is also strategic in nature. States will implement
particular policies in part influenced by their expected outcome and chances of success
(Clark and Reed 2005).
Of particular interest in the economic interdependence and conflict debate is the
potential use of economic sanctions as substitutes for military force. Economic sanctions
may be used to selectively harm the economy of another state if interdependence is
sufficiently high. In this way, economic sanctions can be tools of coercion in which the
sender state disrupts the flow of trade or capital in an effort to change an undesirable
policy in the target state (Wallensteen 1968; Baldwin 1985; Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot
1990; Drezner 2003). Likewise, sanctions can simply be used as tools to punish the
target for an action or policy (Nossal 1989, Drezner 1999). The success for failure of
economic sanctions, given this motivation, is directly related to the structure of economic
relations between contending parties (Baldwin 1985, 189-195; Baldwin 1993; Whalley
1996; Mastanduno 2003, 176; Morrow 2003, 91; Stein 2003). Sanctions are particularly
likely to succeed when used by relatively strong states against the relatively weak, as the
latter is more dependent on the former for economic viability (Hirschman 1981).
Economic sanctions may also substitute for military force insofar as
interdependence enhances states’ ability to send costly signals. In particular, Garzke, Li
and Boemer (2001) argue that severing mutually valuable commercial ties enables
interdependent dyads to credibly signal resolve in conflict. Private information is
therefore revealed concerning the disputant’s willingness to fight. Similarly, Verdier
(2004) argues that sanctions are important purveyors of private information from the
sender state to the target state. They may signal a sender state’s disapproval and/or its
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resolve to see an offensive policy of the target state reversed, preferably without the use
of military force (Drezner 2003; Garzke, Li and Boemer 2001; Morgan and Schwebach
1997). Economic sanctions and military threats may also generate audience costs insofar
as leaders are punished for backing down from international confrontations (Fearon 1997;
Schwebach 2000; Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 2001; Morgan and Schwebach 1997;
Lektzian and Sprecher 2007). Sending an economic sanction, in other words, may force
leaders to pursue an aggressive policy vis-à-vis the target or risk being punished.
Despite their relative popularity, the ability of economic sanctions to generate
meaningful costs through these mechanisms, and therefore succeed as signals of policy, is
questionable. First, the ability of states to tailor sanctions to specific dimensions reduces
their overall impact and weight. Indeed, Lektzian and Sprecher (2007) argue that
sanctions are designed in such a ways as to minimize the cost imposed on senders. The
result, which they demonstrate empirically, is that sanctions often carry relatively little
sunk or audience costs and result in a higher probability of military conflict overall.
Second, when the field of available policy options is expanded to include military force,
the audience cost value of sanctions is tenuous. Insofar as the potential cost of military
confrontation (i.e., casualties) exceeds the potential cost of economic sanctions, the sunk
and audience costs generated will typically be lower for sanctions than military force. As
Fearon (1997) notes, “signaling anything less than total commitment leads to the
inference that the defender will surely not fight” (75). Taking these two points together,
sanctions may be seen by defending states as signals of the challenger’s weakness simply
because they are not military threats (Hufbauer 1998). Sanctions may therefore be
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viewed as foreign policy “on the cheap,” when military force is too expensive and
diplomacy too frail (Hufbauer 1998; Schott 1998; Schwebach 2000).
This is not to say that economic sanctions are completely devoid of an ability to
signal resolve to defending states. The true signaling power of economic sanctions may
lay in the ability of the challenger to demonstrate the harm it can inflict on an opponent.
That is, by imposing costs on a defending state, the challenger communicates its ability to
disrupt political or economic systems in the target. Hence, the signal is not necessarily
one of intention or resolve, but of ability and capacity. Jervis (1970) argues that signals
(or what he calls indices) are more successful when the “statements or actions …carry
some inherent evidence that the image projected is correct because they are believed to be
inextricably linked to the actor’s capabilities or intentions” (18). Consequently,
economic sanctions can be effective signals of the challenger’s capabilities in two ways.
First, strong economic sanctions can demonstrate the degree to which the challenger is
able to disrupt the defender’s economy and government by severing commercial ties.
Second, the strength of sanction can signal the degree of resolve and domestic support for
coercive actions (Lektzian and Sprecher 2007). By implication, weak sanctions can
signal the opposite effects – namely the inability to harm and a lack of domestic support.
The mechanism behind the signaling value in this way, however, is identical to the
compellence or punishment argument. Specifically, sanctions are successful to the
degree the challenger can harm the defender. The success or failure of economic
sanctions, therefore, likely rests on their ability to inflict some degree of economic
damage on the target state.

2.3

Evaluating the Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions
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Turning to the actually effectiveness of sanctions, it is important to understand
that success rates are strongly influenced by the goals states attempt to achieve and how
success is defined. First, it is possible leaders that impose sanctions are primarily
motivated by domestic political gain. Sanctions may be a mechanism by which
governments demonstrate strong leadership or sympathy to domestic constituencies to
gain political support in elections or for particular policies (Drury 1998; Kaempfer and
Lowenberg 1988 and 1992; Mundo 1999; Whang 2011). Evaluating whether sanctions
compelled a target to change policy, in these instances, is likely of little use given it was
not their primary goal. Beyond this, however, sanctions may fulfill two objectives for
states. First, sanctions may be a punitive measure against a target for actions or policies
of which the sender disapproves (Nossal 1998). Punitive sanctions also serve a deterrent
function, as they are in part meant to demonstrate the potential cost of objectionable
policies in an effort to dissuade future transgressors (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot 2007).
Second, sanctions may be used to compel states to change particular policies or
behaviors.
The effectiveness of punitive and compellent sanctions is a topic of heated debate.
The canonical empirical work on sanctions – Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot (1990; 2007) –
finds that they are successful in approximately one-third of cases (158). Once again,
however, success is dependent on the sender’s goals, as over one-half of sanctions
succeed when they require only a modest policy change by the target. Likewise, Petrescu
(2010) finds that sanctions may be an effective deterrent to future actions. In her
analysis, she considers the likelihood that a state participates in a future military dispute
given they were sanctioned in a previous military dispute. Using statistical analysis, she
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finds that a state is indeed less likely to become involved in military disputes if they are
sanctioned in a previous dispute. In contrast, Pape (1997) reevaluated the original work
of Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot (1990) using a more stringent definition of success.
Ultimately, he argues that sanctions are only successful in compelling policy change 5%
of the time once military actions and ambiguity over concessions are taken into account.
Drezner (2003), however points out that previous conclusions about the
effectiveness of economic sanctions were drawn without taking the threat of sanctions
into consideration. Using a game theoretic model, he illustrates that target states are
more likely to acquiesce to the sender state’s demands before sanctions are actually
imposed. Citing a previous study by Elliott and Richardson (1997), he notes that in
economic sanctions dealing with U.S. trade policy, threats were successful about 56% of
the time as compared to implemented sanctions which were only successful about 33% of
the time. It could be argued that the threat of economic sanctions is a more useful policy
tool than actual implementation; however, implementation is a necessary procedure
without which the threat loses credibility (Lindsay 1986).
The sanctions debate now generally rests on identifying the conditions under
which sanctions can and do work. Tsebelis (1990) models a two player game in which
the sender has the choice to sanction or not and the target is given the choice to continue
its policy or comply with the sender state’s demands. Tsebelis provides six scenarios in
which he considers different assumptions, all of which converge to the same equilibrium.
Tsebelis finds that strategies of target and sender depend on the payoff of the opponent
rather than their own payoff. This suggests that leaders in the sending state are interested
in punishing the target even at their own cost and that the target is interested in violating
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even at its own cost. Eaton and Engers (1992) suggest that the resolve of the sender and
target should be the determining factor in whether sanctions are successful. They create
two models, one in which the sanction demand has a shadow of the future, and one in
which the demand is a onetime event. They find that sanctions and threats are more
likely to be successful when expectation of future interaction exists. Smith (1995) builds
upon Eaton and Engers’ work by specifically incorporating the threat of sanctions into
the model. He finds that the success of sanctions affects whether or not a nation chooses
to sanction, suggesting that sanctions are indeed meant to succeed despite their seeming
ineffectiveness. Drezner (1999) attempts to model the effects of conflict expectation on
economic statecraft. He finds that as concerns over relative gains and reputation
increase, a state’s decision to utilize sanctions increases as well. Drezner also shows that
as opportunity costs rise for the target and decline for the sender, the more economic
sanctions will be used and the more effective they are likely to be.
Game theoretic models of this nature are complimented by numerous empirical
studies. One set of studies considers the characteristics of the sending and receiving
states in determining sanctions success. Overall, sanctions are more likely to succeed
when utilized against close trading partners, friendly nations, and democracies due
largely to the vulnerability of these states to costs (Allen 2008; Jing, Kaempfer &
Lowenberg 2003). Other studies focus on the characteristics of the sanction itself in
compelling policy change in targets. Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott (2007) argue that a
combination of international cooperation and high costs to the target should bolster a
sanctioning state’s success rate, although others find against this claim (Martin 1992;
Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1998; Miers and Morgan 2002; Bapat and Morgan 2009).
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Beyond this, targeting ruling elites or employing multiple strong sanctions at the dispute
outset over incremental increases over time increase the probability of success (Morgan
and Schwebach 1996; Allen 2008). Finally, Ang and Peksen (2007) focus on the nature
of the dispute itself by arguing that states’ perceptions of the issues involved affect
sanction outcomes. In particular, the greater the difference in salience between the
sender and the target, the more likely a sanctions episode will end in success for the
sender. To a certain degree, this backs up a game theoretic model by Hovi, Huseby and
Sprinz (2005) in which they, “demonstrate that a target country will yield to imposed
sanctions only if it initially underestimated the impact of sanctions, miscalculated the
sender's determination to impose them, or wrongly believed that sanctions would be
imposed and maintained whether it yielded or not.” Consequently, given the extant
literature, the effectiveness of sanctions is an issue of strategic conditions as much as
economic circumstances.

2.4

Economic Institutions in Integration Theory
The second related body of literature on the commercial peace focuses upon the

institutional aspects of organizations. Integration and regime theory argue that
international institutions accrue benefits to member states that justify their creation and
maintenance. As a consequence, individual states choose to become members of
international organizations by adhering to formal, documented guidelines of association.
In many ways, this is what distinguishes the potential effects of economic integration
agreements from simple economic interdependence. Consider first the motivations
behind the creation of international institutions. In the most basic sense, international
institutions are responses to problems beyond the grasp of individual states (Mitrany
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1965). Common problems create demands for technocratic responses that should provide
better overall outcomes for members. In this way, international institutions are highly
pragmatic tools at the outset (Haas 1958; 1964). The likelihood that organizations will
benefit member states is largely a function of the linkages between them. Both Deutsch
(1957; 1968) and Nye (1971), in particular, argue that integration must be preceded by an
increase in overall transactions between potential members of economic unions.
International organizations may both reflect and foster interactions and interdependence
between member states.
A second body of integration literature looks into the state to find motivations for
cooperation. Domestic constituencies in favor of integration may facilitate greater
international cooperation through several mechanisms. In particular, elites play critical
roles in the integration process. The socialization of elites – particularly within the
bureaucracy – in the integration area enables both the realization of mutual gains and
transmission of common values (Haas 1958; Deutsch 1968; Nye 1971; Wolf 1973;
Moravcsik 1991; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998; Stone Fligstein, Sandholtz, and Stone
Sweet 2001). Likewise, shared values and ideology facilitate integration between states.
Strong ideological systems, in particular, insulate the integration process from potential
detractors and enable states to take short-term losses (Nye 1971). Institutional
mechanisms are also important in primarily a pragmatic sense. Mansfield, Milner, and
Pevehouse (2007) specifically apply their analysis to economic agreement formation and
find that a greater number of “veto players” with the opportunity to derail trade
negotiations reduce the likelihood of agreement formation. Hence, domestic politics can
profoundly influence economic integration.
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Overall, the creation and maintenance of international institutions is dependent in
large part on their ability to bestow benefits on member states. Indeed, Keohane (1984)
argues that institutions reduce transaction costs, limit uncertainty, and provide
information that reduces the chances of members reneging on commitments. All of these
elements provide incentive to joint and sustain international cooperation through a
codified framework. Such benefits are particularly likely to be realized in economic
regimes owing to the potential for mutual gains (Lipson 1984; Axelrod and Keohane
1985). Ultimately, cooperation in one area of policy – such as trade – “spill-over” into
new functional areas that require expanded bureaucracy and integration (Haas 1964).
Consequently, integration tends to beget integration in the neofunctionalist perspective.
The success or failure of integration is not guaranteed by extent of
interdependence or interaction between member states, however. Indeed, disintegration
can occur under several circumstances. Perhaps the most intuitive reason for stagnation
or disintegration is the inability of some institutions to address the distribution of gains.
To some extent, states are concerned with the distribution of gains from both national
power (Mearsheimer 1994; Grieco 1988; Grieco 1993) and economic equality
perspectives (Nye 1971). Symmetrical gains, therefore, increase the likelihood
integration will succeed. Domestically, Deutsch (1968) in particular identifies some of
the conditions under which disintegration occurs. These include the rise of new political
groups, recalcitrant elites or the failure of values to mesh, lack of domestic reform, and
failure by domestic elites to adjust to the new political climate.
Also informative in the success or failure of integration, with particular respect to
economic institutions, is the literature exploring political power and commercial
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exchange. In particular, several works expound on this internal integrative process as it
relates to commercial exchange by linking the distributional effects of trade to political
power shifts. Following Stolper-Samuelson’s classic theorem, industries in which a state
is abundantly endowed will gain from external trade while poorly endowed industries
will suffer. The political effects of this redistribution in economic power resonate
through class cleavages. Those controlling the abundant factor will tend to gain over
those with the less abundant factor (Rogowski 1987; Midford 1993). Broadly based class
or industry cleavages may emerge depending on the mobility of factors, with high
mobility across industry leading to class cleavages and low mobility to industry cleavages
(Hiscox 2001). In turn, those gaining from trade will look to capitalize, while those hurt
by trade will tend to lobby for exclusions and rollbacks.

2.5

Commercial and Political Consequences of Economic Agreements
In the most basic sense, economic agreements remove barriers to exchange

between member states which, in turn, increase intra-agreement welfare. By removing
barriers to trade, economic integration agreements have been shown to increase trade
between members. Using gravity models to estimate a “normal” level of trade in absence
of agreements, a robust economic literature has shown that economic integration
agreements do indeed increase exchange between members (Carerre 2006; Egger et al
2008). In particular, Baier and Bergstrang (2007), using sophisticated statistical
instrumental variable models accounting for endogeneity, find that economic agreements
more than double trade between two member states after ten years. Second, the
integration of markets and lowering of barriers facilitated by economic agreements
implicitly broadens the markets of member states. This is analogous to an exogenous
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increase in the size of domestic markets that may provide significant economies-of-scale.
Larger markets created by economic agreements may increase foreign direct investment
(FDI) into member states as corporations look to exploit newly realized economics of
scale (Joumotte 2004). Corporations seeking to avoid the de facto discrimination of a
limited economic integration agreement may find FDI an attractive alternative.
Consequently, economic agreements also tend to attract multinational corporations (Chen
2009). Third, economic agreements encourage industrialization in developing states
when shared by either developed or large developing states (Puga and Venables 1998).
Economic agreements may also confer several political benefits on member
states. First, economic agreements may facilitate domestic reform and lock-in policy
commitments. Insofar as economic integration agreements are “sticky” or difficult to
undo, accessing to a group binds domestic policy (Whalley 1996). Furthermore,
successive governments face constrains when considering “surprise” policies to the
detriment of externally oriented actors in the state (Fernandez and Portes 1998; Schiff
and Winters 1998). In this way agreements can be credible signals of policy intentions.
Second, the larger market conferred by an integration agreement may afford member
states more bargaining weight in multilateral negotiations. Whalley (1996), for example,
contends that newly independent Eastern European states following the Cold War
pursued as series of limited economic agreements as bargaining leverage vis-à-vis the EU
(72). Third, economic integration agreements may underpin broader security
arrangements. Schiff and Winters (1998), notably, identify three security-based
motivations for regional integration – quelling domestic unrest, binding member states
together politically, and creating institutions to balance against external threats.
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Finally, states seek economic agreements to lock-in access to important export or
investment markets. Market-access motivations are generally defensively oriented with
the aim of preventing exclusion or responding to other regional trade agreements. States
excluded from one agreement may seek inclusion or creation of an alternative
arrangement to ensure alternative markets (Baldwin 1993, 1997, 2006; Fernandez and
Portes 1998). During the interwar years, for example, Germany scrambled to secure
exclusive resources through regional agreements in response to English trade
arrangements (Eichengreen and Frankle 1995, 96). The ultimate effect may be a
“domino” effect where constituencies in excluded states seek defensive regional
arrangements in response to de facto market discrimination and fears of trade diversion
(Baldwin 1993). Broader multilateral liberalization may be detrimentally effected
insomuch as states have less incentive to add additional members to a regional grouping
(Krugman 1993; Bhagwati and Panagariya 1999). Alternatively, regionalism may be a
stepping stone on the way to broader agreements and inter-region cooperation. The
reduced number of units in multilateral negotiations and information conveyed by
regional openness may encourage broader liberalization (Baldwin 1993; Baldwin 2006).
That economic integration agreements are universally desirable, however, is a
topic of debate in economics scholarship. Initially, limited economic integration was
unequivocally encouraged as a stepping-stone to broader liberalization (El-Agraa 1997).
Viner (1950), however, identified the potential negative externalities of regional
economic integration. While he notes that agreements reduce internal barriers to trade
and increase the implicit size of the domestic market, both of which tend to benefit the
member state, Viner also identifies the possibility of agreements to limit international
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trade (Viner 1950). States joining an agreement may implicitly gain from protection if
the RTA-wide tariff is higher than the state tariff (Viner 1950, 48). Indeed, economic
agreements are inherently discriminatory in that they liberalize only specific geographic
areas, thereby disadvantaging excluded states in some fashion (Bhagwati 1993). Indeed,
agreements may create strong incentives to raise external trade barriers to maximize
internal welfare gains (Krugman 1991, 1993; Findlay and Panagariya 1994; Pomfret
1997, 200-201; Schiff and Winters 1998).
Because of the tendency for many RTAs to accommodate internal trade and
restrict external trade simultaneously, trade flows may shift from non-members to
members of an agreement. Trade diversion, as it is called, occurs in the context of an
agreement when exchanges of goods are shifted from more- to less-efficient producers
due to the unequal removal of trade restrictions (Viner 1950; Krugman 1991; 1999;
Findlay and Panagariya 1994; Pomfret 2001). That is, eliminating trade barriers to select
states (i.e,. agreement members) may reduce their real cost of goods compared to states
who do not receive the same reduction in trade barriers. This process was first identified
by Viner (1950) and subsequently expanded upon by numerous authors (Krugman 1991;
1999; Findlay and Panagariya 1994; Pomfret 2001). Figure 2.1 depicts a hypothetical
process of trade diversion according to Viner (1950). Imagine three countries called
Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie. Assume Alpha imports wheat from Bravo and Charlie based
exclusively on price. Furthermore, it has a 20% tariff on both countries. Bravo and
Charlie export wheat for $1.10 and $1.00 a bushel respectively. With the tariff applied to
both states, it is easy to see that Alpha imports wheat from Charlie given its lower price
($1.20 compared to $1.32). Suppose now that Alpha and Bravo sign an agreement that
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eliminates barriers to the wheat trade. As a result, Bravo can export to Alpha at a total
cost of $1.10. Charlie, however, is still assessed a tariff of 20% maintaining its total
export cost at $1.20. Consequently, Alpha shifts its trade from Charlie to Bravo despite
its relative inefficiency.
Consequently, members of an RTA may achieve welfare gains at the expense of
the external world as intra-RTA trade displaces exports from non-member states (Schiff
and Winters 2003, 189). Empirically, numerous studies either using gravity models to
predict baseline levels of trade or case studies identify trade diversion across several trade
agreements (see Schiff and Winters 2003, 190 for a review, as well as Bayoumi and
Eichengreen 1995; Eichengreen and Frankel 1995; Baldwin, Forslid, and Haaland 1996;
Yeats 1997; Gupta and Schiff 1997; Chang and Winters 2002; Magee 2008; MartinezZarzoso, Felicitas, and Horsewood 2009).
Trade agreements also incentivize protectionism among agreement members visà-vis the external world which potentially compounds the issue of trade diversion. First,
depending on the agreement type, barriers between members and non-members may
actually increase once agreements are signed (Viner 1950). Furthermore, both Krugman
(1991; 1993) and Schiff and Winters (1998) show formally that agreement members have
strong incentives to raise external barriers and generate trade diversion as a welfaremaximizing strategy. As an example, Brazil lobbied heavily for the inclusion of
extensive information technology trade liberalization in Mercosur negotiations, but
subsequently opposed a similar potential multilateral agreement (Schiff and Winters
2003, 72). Higher external barriers may be part of a state-led strategy of insulating infant
industries to build industrial capacity by specifically limiting external trade (Pomfret
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2001, 352; Foroutan 2000). Despite the fact that it is bad economic theory, trade
diversion may be good politics. Constituencies within agreement members that benefit
from trade diversion have strong incentives to maintain and accelerate the process
(Winters 1996; Olarreaga and Soloaga 1998). Furthermore, independent of observed
trade effects, diversion worsens the terms of trade for non-members as they are forced to
lower prices to remain competitive (Schiff and Winters 2003; Chang and Winters 2002).
A similar process occurs with respect to investment. Economic integration can also
divert investment from non-members to members by firms seeking access to the
relatively larger market created by the agreement. Baldwin, Forslid, and Haaland (1996),
in particular, find that the European Single Market Program diverted investment from
European Free Trade Area countries.
Economic agreements may also affect the distribution of power between domestic
constituencies. In particular, economic integration agreements may formalize and
institutionalize many of the mechanisms advantaging the trade-endorsing class.
Insomuch as the formation of an economic integration agreement reflects a bargaining
process between two states, the negotiated arrangement likely solidifies those parties on
which domestic political support rests (Grossman and Helpman 1995). In other words,
many agreements by design cater to (at least potentially) powerful constituencies. This
effect is reinforced if members can secure exclusions from the removal of barriers, as in
relatively shallow agreements, or protection with joint external barriers, as in customs
unions (Olarreaga and Soloaga 1998). Commercial agreements then create binding
policies for states that, if violated, risk retaliation from other members of the agreement
and punishments by market forces (Whalley 1996; Fernandez 1996; Schiff and Winters
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1998). Consequently, many agreements have strong forces that discourage their easy
recall. Power tends to shift from the “losers” in liberalization, or those in importcompeting industries facing more competition, to the “winners” created by liberalization,
which generally include competitive export industries.

2.6

The Commercial Institutional Peace
The first theoretical connections between formal economic integration and

conflict were made by turn-of-the-century European scholars. Vilfredo Pareto, speaking
at European Peace conferences in both 1889 and 1900, advocated customs unions as a
means to achieve peace on the continent (Machlup 1992, 146). John Maynard Keynes
echoed this sentiment after World War I, believing in the ability of integration to
politically bind European states (Keynes 1920, 249). European politicians also believed
firmly in the ability of economic integration to prevent the wars witnessed in the first half
of the twentieth century.
Empirically, research indicates trade agreements succeed in reducing conflict.
Mansfield and Pevehouse (2000) first explored the connection between preferential trade
agreements (PTAs) and conflict. The authors argue that preferential trade agreements
(PTAs), which encompass the entire range of possible economic arrangements, reduce
militarized interstate disputes between states by increasing trade, facilitating investment,
and providing forums for conflict resolution. Using a large-N analysis with an interaction
between PTA membership and absolute bilateral trade, Mansfield and Pevehouse
ultimately find that PTAs reduce conflict only as trade between member states increases.
Subsequent works have expanded the theoretical framework to account for more
particular causal mechanisms. Bearce (2003) and Bearce and Omori (2005) test three
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potential causal mechanisms behind the pacifying influence of economic integration –
trade interdependence, elite interactions, and conflict resolution forums. Ultimately, they
find a stronger role for the latter two in reducing conflict.
Several additional works disaggregate the category of PTA to account for
institutional variation. First, Haftel (2007) specifically addresses how institutional
variation across economic integration agreements influences conflict. He argues that
institutions incorporating broader scopes of activity and more regular meetings of elite
politicians reduce conflict. Ultimately, he finds support for his argument using a limited
sampling of agreements existing during the 1980s and 1990s. Second, Vicard (2011) also
considers the heterogeneity of trade agreements in his analysis. He argues that shallow
agreements that do not require political coordination (i.e., partial scope or free trade
agreements) do not constrain conflict. He does not account, however, for the extent of
economic interaction between members created by the economic agreement itself.
Finally, Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer (2001) explore the effect of monetary and capital
interdependence on conflict between states. Specifically, common currency
arrangements, including pegged exchange rates and joint currency areas, are posited to
reduce conflict by signaling policy intentions and increasing the cost of conflict.
Through statistical analysis, the authors find that joint currency arrangements pacify
while pegged arrangements, which represent a degree of asymmetry in commercial
relationship, tend to increase the possibility of conflict between states.

2.7

Opportunities in the Extant Literature
The current literature exploring the commercial institutional peace, while

important first steps, do not fully address the potential influence of economic integration
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on conflict tendencies. First, the majority of the current literature places all economic
agreements into the “black box” of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). In reality,
economic agreements differ greatly in scale and scope. There is a vast difference, for
example, between NAFTA and the European Union in both stated and realized goals.
Furthermore, those works that do account for institutional design make linear
assumptions such that an increase in the depth/scope of an agreement yields more peace.
There is no a priori reason, however, to believe that the influence of agreements is
uniform or even linear across all types. In the extreme, some agreement types may
encourage peace while others conflict. This is particularly important given the noted
potential of international commercial exchange to influence domestic power dynamics
(Hiscox 2001). For example, asymmetrical agreements, which are more common in
shallow institutions (Fernandez 1996, 8), may encourage domestic forces to look on such
arrangements as detrimental in the short- or long-term.
Second, the current literature considers primarily bilateral trade and its influence
of conflict. Consequently, empirical studies to date interact the presence of an agreement
with bilateral trade as the primary driver of conflict within commercial agreements (with
the exception of Vicard, who does not use any interaction terms). However, the utility of
economic agreements is not necessarily limited to bilateral interactions. Greece, for
example, may not trade as much with Portugal as with Italy. They still may be dissuaded
from engaging in conflict with Portugal, however, if it risks expulsion from the EU and
losing preferential trading rights with Italy. Given the diverse influences integration, a
more comprehensive analysis of costs is warranted.
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A third potential contribution to the literature on economic integration and
conflict is less a criticism than an extension of existing works. Much of the integration
literature to date rightfully addresses intra-group dynamics, or how member states
interact with one another. Formal economic integration, however, impacts not only intramember relations, but also relations with the external world. Trade diversion and the
incentives agreement members have to raise external barriers likely influence the
decision-making calculus of states excluded from the agreement. In short, looking only
at trade diversion, conflict may actually be more likely between agreement members and
non-members owing to the reduced importance of extra-agreement trade. In other words,
formal economic integration marginalizes the external world. This is likely to be
exacerbated to the extent that regionalism begets regionalism in a “falling domino”
fashion. That being said, while barriers may reduce trade, they provide strong incentives
to invest in an agreement area to avoid implicit discrimination. Consequently, while it is
likely that agreements influence relations between members and non-members, the exact
nature is difficult to determine.
A fourth and final shortcoming of the commercial institutional peace literature is a
broader criticism of conflict literature and a potential area of improvement. Conflict
studies are extraordinarily well versed at predicting when war does not take place.
Democracies, highly developed states, economically interdependent states, and allies tend
not to engage each other militarily. While this is no doubt an important avenue of
research, such studies say little about what states actually do. “War” and “not war” are
generally explored without consideration given to alternative means of conflict
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resolution. If states have a strong motivation to avoid war, by what means do they
resolve interstate conflicts?
Economic integration agreements provide a unique “natural experiment” of sorts
whereby alternative conflict resolution mechanisms gain effectiveness. In other words,
policies short of militarized conflict can be substituted to achieve foreign policy goals
(Most and Starr 1984, 1989). In particular, sanctions – either positive or negative –
should be more effective, and therefore employed more often, between economic
agreement members. First, economic interdependence between member states, realized
or otherwise, may increase the effectiveness of non-violent coercion. Second,
institutional structures are more likely to survive bouts of sanctioning given the ability of
such tools to be tailored to specific situations. Third, the formal organization offered by
an economic agreement may allow for coordinated action. Finally, the bargaining power
and market potential of an economic agreement may increase the appeal of positive
sanctions. The observable outcome of this dynamic may be increased sanctions usage,
both positive and negative, by agreement members corresponding to decreases usage of
militarized conflict.
Questions about the effect of agreements on conflict and the substitutability of
foreign policies – either separately or jointly – cannot be addressed without carefully
considering the relationship between economic and security relations. In this project, I
pursue a framework that carefully considers the overall impact economic agreements
have on international relations. Economic agreements can have impacts well beyond the
states immediately involved in it. Consequently, I include not only intra-agreement
dynamics in my analysis, but also the extent to which agreements impact the broader
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regional and global economy. Likewise, the multitude of foreign policy options available
to states requires a careful analysis of alternatives and their strategic interplay. It is
important to appropriately model the relationship between economic sanctions and
military force – both theoretically and empirically – in order to truly understand how
states pursue the conflict process. In the following chapter, I present a framework that
addresses these factors. Conflict between states is in part a consequence of their
economic relationship. Specifically, formal economic agreements influence the salience
of trade ties in ways that affect the relatively utility of economic sanctions and military
force in resolving disputes. Ultimately, therefore, conflict behavior is in part a
consequence of the policy options made available by economic circumstances and
relations between states.
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Without Economic Agreements

Prices With Alpha-Bravo Economic Agreement

Figure 2.1: An Illustration of Trade Diversion
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CHAPTER 3
ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS AND INTERSTATE CONFLICT:
DISPUTE INITIATION AND POLICY SUBSTITUTION
While the extant literature on interdependence suggests a strong role for
commercial institutions in reducing conflict, the economic processes they promote are
multifaceted and complex. This complexity in turn suggests a more nuanced and
comprehensive view of economic agreements in shaping state behavior. First, economic
agreements are highly heterogeneous in depth and scope. Different levels of economic
integration incorporate policies that may exhibit unique and non-linear influence on
interstate conflict. Second, economic agreements do not exist in a vacuum and, indeed,
may have strong influences on commerce beyond intra-agreement ties. There are
important reasons to believe the formation of an economic agreement influences strategic
relationships with non-member states. Finally, one of the posited causal mechanisms
behind the pacifying effect of economic interdependence is the substitutability of
economic sanctions for military force. Only a handful of studies, none of which address
economic agreements specifically, consider the relationship between war and economic
sanctions as policy options (see Clark and Reed 2005 for a noteworthy exception). In
principle, economic agreements provide the ideal circumstances with which to observe
the use of militarized and economic conflict. Members of economic agreements establish
clear or formal commitments to increase interdependence and exchange. Within this
context, sanctions are more likely to convey meaningful information to dispute
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participants that should obviate the need for military conflict. Agreements, therefore,
provide an opportunity to evaluate these claims.
Below, I develop a theory that embraces the complexities of economic agreements
and how they influence conflict between members and non-members. Economic
agreements confer material benefits on member states that, in turn, alter their relationship
with those within and outside the agreement. The nature and extent of material benefits,
furthermore, are dependent upon the structure of economic relations between states in the
agreement. This is determined by the institutional mechanisms present in the agreement
and the natural trade patterns between states as determined by geography, population,
development, and other factors. Furthermore, in order to evaluate the ability of economic
agreements to engender peace, the complete range of interactions between states must be
taken into account. While agreements may reduce tensions between members, the
economic forces it sets in motion may stimulate or exacerbate tensions between members
and non-members.
I examine the relationship between economic agreements and interstate relations
(or conflict) by using a combination of verbal and formal theory. First, I consider a
variety of theoretical arguments about the impact of economic agreements on the
initiation of conflict. I use the term “conflict” in this section to refer to policy
disagreements between states that are sufficient enough to compel some degree of
coercive action. Following the theoretical review, I develop a formal bargaining model
using the logic of policy substitution to explore the means by which states engage in
conflict. While agreements influence whether states initiate conflict, they also influence
the tools states use as coercive instruments. Consequently, in discussing the bargaining

46

model, I frequently refer to coercive policies as the phenomenon being explained. I draw
hypotheses from both a non-formal model of conflict and a formal bargaining model for
empirical testing in subsequent chapters about how economic agreements influence
conflict.

3.1

Economic Agreements and Interdependence
In the most basic sense, economic agreements foster institutional ties that promote

economic interdependence between member states. First, economic agreements tend to
increase trade between members by virtue of lower barriers to trade (Carerre 2006; Baier
and Bergstrang 2007; Egger et al 2008). Second, the integration of markets facilitated by
economic agreements provides significant economies-of-scale that may attract foreign
direct investment (FDI) into member states (Joumotte 2004; Chen 2009). Third,
integration agreements foster informal trade networks between members that increase the
salience of all ties in the agreement. In other words, while a particular bilateral trade
relationship may be unaffected by an economic agreement, states may still derive utility
from the agreement by trading with other members. Fourth, in a formal sense, economic
integration creates joint economic institutions and draws states into coordinated economic
management. Fifth, agreements are often “sticky” or difficult to rescind without
suffering consequences from members states and markets in general. In this way
commercial agreements act as constraints on decision-makers and bind domestic policies
to more open orientations and remove uncertainty (Whalley 1996). Consequently, we
might expect members of economic agreements to attach greater salience and weight to
intra-agreement connections given the potential benefits.
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As such, the extensive benefits and linkages states derive from membership in an
economic agreement foster greater economic interdependence between members.
Interdependence, in turn, is more than simply the sum of exchange between two states
(Baldwin 1980; Keohane and Nye 1977; Crecenzi 2003). Keohane and Nye (1977) are
noteworthy in their development of the concept of interdependence in international
relations. In particular, the authors further define the power aspect of interdependence as
a function of how quickly states respond to changes in the relationship (sensitivity) and
the extent to which a state is affected by the change (vulnerability). As tariffs, quotas,
and regulations within agreements fall, the total amount of bilateral trade between
members likely increases as states realize comparative advantages, economies of scale,
and increased efficiency from production (Viner 1950; Johnson 1999). States in
agreements may also attract more foreign direct investment owing to the relatively larger
market area the agreement creates. Investment decisions by businesses are highly
sensitive to the uncertainty and political risk generated by conflict (Chan and Mason
1992; Kobrin 1982). Increased investment resulting from membership can thus link
states to agreement members. This holds true even if the investment flows from a thirdparty, non- member to an agreement member, as the investment may be to gain access to
the preferential trade area.
States in economic agreements, by virtue of greater commercial exchange and
reliance on intra-agreement ties, are likely to be more vulnerable to disruptions stemming
from conflict between member states. It may also be the case that members of
agreements are more sensitive to disruptions, as the codified trade network facilitated by
the formal agreement enables states to more rapidly disseminate losses from a particular
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bilateral conflict over the intra-agreement trade network. Likewise, foreign direct
investment can generate vulnerability interdependence that is costly to break in the case
of interstate conflict (Rosecrance and Thompson 2003). Economic integration also
implies expectations about future commercial relationships and benefit (Mansfield and
Pevehouse 2000). Hence, interdependence between member states is a combination of
realized and anticipated commercial gains.
While economic agreements likely increase interdependence between members, it
may also influence relationships between members and non-members. In particular,
lowering barriers between members may unilaterally reduce the salience of a member
state’s trade ties with the external world. Considering a member state’s aggregate trade
flows, agreements may have two distinct influences. On the one hand, the total amount
of trade a particular state conducts may increase as a result of exchanging more with
fellow agreement partners. Lower barriers, in other words, may simply increase the
amount of trade already taking place between two agreement members. On the other
hand, flows may actually shift such that members conduct more trade with others in the
agreement and less with non-members without necessarily increasing the total value of its
trade portfolio. In the former case, the member grows more reliant on international trade,
in general, and on member states, in particular, given the localized increase with
agreement partners. In the latter case, members’ reliance on international trade (i.e., its
total level of national trade) remains unchanged, but dependence on agreement members
as a whole increases given the shifting trade patterns.
Consider the first scenario where an agreement member’s trade with other
members increases without affecting its ties with non-members. The overall implication
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is likely the reduced salience of trade outside the agreement area. Increased trade among
all members within an agreement dilutes the relative importance of each tie with nonmember states.1 Shifting or expanding sources of imports and markets for export from
non-members to members necessarily decreases the importance of those ties. As
agreement members rely on each other for a greater portion of their overall trade
portfolio, they rely less on states outside the agreement. Furthermore, the mere
expectation of greater exchange among member states should reduce interdependence
between members and non-members. States that sign agreements signal both the
importance of their commercial relationship and the desire to see it develop further. In
other words, states seek economic agreements to lock-in and enhance access to markets
they view as important and critical for future development (Whalley 1996; Fernandez and
Portes 1998; Schiff and Winters 1998). The more states look to the agreement for future
commercial relations, the less important non-members become. Reductions in the
salience of trade relationships applies to non-members as well. While members are
drawn to their agreement partners, non-members are likely to identify their long-term
commercial interest with other states given the implicit barriers they face to exchange
with the agreement. The salience of non-member ties with agreement members,
therefore, is similarly impacted by the process of economic integration.
Consider now the second scenario where increased intra-agreement trade comes at
the expense of trade with the external world. This process, known as “trade diversion,”

1

It also follows that agreements with many members dilute the relative importance of each trade tie
between agreement members. As more states are incorporated into the group, the relative importance of
each bilateral partnership may decrease. However, agreements carry institutional ties (i.e., formal
membership) that links between members and non-members do not possess. To the extent these links can
be leverage by the group to punish or coerce an individual member, even non-salient trade ties between
agreement members can be considered “important.”
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exacerbates the marginalization of trade relationships between members and nonmembers. Economic agreements are inherently discriminatory in that they liberalize
specific geographic areas and exclude others (Bhagwati 1993). Furthermore, economic
agreements may simply shift trade flows from non-members to members without
increasing aggregate trade flows. This process (trade diversion) was first identified by
Viner (1950) and subsequently expanded upon by numerous authors (Krugman 1991;
1999; Findlay and Panagariya 1994; Pomfret 2001). Figure 3.1 depicts a hypothetical
process of trade diversion according to Viner (1950). Imagine three countries called
Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie. Assume Alpha imports wheat from Bravo and Charlie based
exclusively on price. Furthermore, Alpha has a 20% tariff on both countries. Bravo and
Charlie export wheat for $1.10 and $1.00 a bushel respectively. With the tariff applied to
both states, we expect that all else being equal, Alpha would import more wheat from
Charlie given its lower price ($1.20 compared to $1.32). Suppose now that Alpha and
Bravo sign an agreement that eliminates the tariff barrier on wheat. Now, Bravo can
export to Alpha at a total cost of $1.10. If Charlie is still assessed a tariff of 20%, with a
total export cost at $1.20, Alpha is likely to shift its trade from Charlie to Bravo despite
Bravo’s relative inefficiency.
Trade agreements also incentivize protectionism among agreement members visà-vis the external world, which potentially compounds the issue of trade diversion. First,
depending on the agreement type, barriers between members and non-members may
actually increase once agreements are signed (Viner 1950). Furthermore, both Krugman
(1991; 1993) and Schiff and Winters (1998) show formally that agreement members have
strong incentives to raise external barriers and generate trade diversion as a welfare-
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maximizing strategy. As an example, Brazil lobbied heavily for the inclusion of
extensive liberalization in information technology during negotiations on Mercosur, but
subsequently opposed a similar multilateral agreement (Schiff and Winters 2003, 72).
Higher external barriers may be part of a state-led strategy of insulating infant industries
to build industrial capacity by specifically limiting external trade (Pomfret 2001, 352;
Foroutan 2000). Despite the fact that it is bad economic theory, trade diversion may be
good politics. Constituencies within agreement members that benefit from trade
diversion have strong incentives to maintain and accelerate the process (Winters 1996;
Olarreaga and Soloaga 1998). Furthermore, independent of observed trade effects,
diversion worsens the terms of trade for non-members as they are forced to lower prices
to remain competitive (Schiff and Winters 2003; Chang and Winters 2002).
A similar process occurs with respect to investment. Economic integration can
divert investment from non-members to members by firms seeking access to the
relatively larger market created by the agreement. Preferential trade agreements are
particularly attractive to investors because they provide businesses admission to the entire
area. By investing in Ireland, for example, Intel’s products gained access to the entirety
of Europe through the European Economic Area. Countries that do not enjoy such
access, like some Eastern European and Balkan states, that otherwise would have been
competitive with Ireland may have been disadvantaged by their lack of access. Indeed,
Baldwin, Forslid, and Haaland (1996) find that the European Single Market Program
diverted investment from European Free Trade Area countries. Consequently,
agreements can disrupt investment flows in a similar pattern to trade.
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The overall implication of trade diversion or the threat thereof is likely, all else
being equal, to produce sharp reductions in interdependence between members and nonmembers of agreements. The material shift in trade flows away from non-members to
members affects bilateral interdependence in two ways. First, less trade occurs between
members and non-members, thereby reducing the extent of commercial exchange.
Second, non-members constitute an even smaller portion of their trade portfolio. In the
first scenario, trade between members and non-members is unchanged and
marginalization is due largely to growth in the denominator (the member’s overall trade
portfolio). In the second scenario, trade diversion marginalizes member and non-member
ties by reducing the numerator (the member’s trade with the non-member) and holding
the denominator constant. Consequently, members are likely less vulnerabile to
disruptions in trade with non-members, given the reduced salience of those ties.
Economic agreements influence both short- and long-term commercial relationships,
thereby influencing interdependence by potentially reducing the long-run gains available
to both business and government.

3.2

Implications for the Initiation of Interstate Conflict
By altering interdependence between states, economic agreements likely

influence their propensity to engage in conflict. The net effect of these influences,
however, differs depending on whether the agreement encompasses one or both states in
a political conflict. Increased interdependence between two states in the same agreement
likely reduces the onset of violent interstate conflict. Conflict between members and
non-members, however, is likely exacerbated to the extent interdependence is limited or
diminished by the agreement.
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3.2.1

Conflict Between Agreement Members
Conflict between members of the same agreement – whether through economic or

military means – is likely to be relatively costly insofar as it jeopardizes commercial
exchange and the future of the agreement. Insofar as states materially gain from the trade
fostered by membership in the agreement, any political action that aims to sever or limit
the resultant ties reduces the welfare of agents involved in trade. The opportunity cost of
conflict is born by several actors in this scenario. Governments incur a cost in terms of
lost revenue. While agreements are likely to limit the tariff revenue states gain from
commerce with other members, states still gain tax revenue from increased economic
activity. Sanctions, which are specifically designed to disrupt commerce between states
as a means of compellence, and war may suspend or eliminate bilateral flows of goods
and capital.2 Industries or firms dependent on external sales, in turn, risk substantial
losses from conflict that ultimately limits the government’s ability to extract revenue.
FDI flows may also be affected by conflict, as the risk generated by disputes may
discourage investment or promote in divestment. States lose overall economic activity
and tax revenue as a result, thereby reducing the likelihood of conflict (Souva 2002;
Souva and Prins 2006; Bussmann 2010). Potential losses in tax revenue, therefore, may
encourage states to avoid conflict with particularly important economic partners.
Perhaps more important, however, are the actions of the externally-oriented
businesses themselves. Insofar as they depend on other agreement members’ markets for
sales, businesses face substantial risk from trade disruptions with said member. In the

2

Barbieri and Levy (1999) challenge this assumption by showing that the effects of war are temporary and
less severe than typically assumed. While using a sample of six individual cases, their findings are
potentially problematic for conflict studies. My analysis, while potentially affected by this, considers the
cost of conflict beyond the opportunity cost argument and takes a broader view of interdependence.
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most basic sense, conflict can be viewed as a barrier to trade that threatens the welfare of
exporters in an economy (Mansfield and Pollins 2001). Just as an increase in tariffs
jeopardizes the gains of exporters (through retaliatory tariffs), conflict between
agreement members risks harming the extant trade relationship. Industries or
constituencies facing this challenge are more likely to press leaders to maintain openness
(Magee 1980; Rogowski 1989; Grossman and Helpman 1994). In particular, exportoriented entities faced with such losses are likely to either lobby politicians to avoid
conflict or withdraw support for those that do engage in conflict. In either circumstance,
politicians dependent on the support of business have incentives to avoid disruptions to
the trade relationship (Magee, Brock, and Young 1989; Grossman and Helpman 1994).
Economic agreements are particularly likely to embolden domestic constituencies
given their institutionalized nature. First, agreements are more likely to encourage
domestic businesses to export more goods by lowering barriers between member states.
Agreements are by definition arrangements that promote economic openness between a
discrete set of states. The openness they foster encourages the accumulation of economic
and political power by actors invested in international commerce (Schiff and Winters
1998). In general, relatively more competitive industries will benefit from expanded
export markets while relatively less competitive industries will suffer from increased
competition (Viner 1950). Competitive export-oriented firms will tend to thrive, while
import-competing firms will tend to suffer. Resources tend to shift from the “losers” who
suffer from liberalization to the “winners” (Rogowski 1987; Midford 1993). Such
policies expand the range and number of businesses dependent on other agreement
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members’ markets for commercial viability, in turn increasing the potential pressure on
politicians to avoid conflict.
In addition, agreements are by definition arrangements that promote economic
openness between a discrete set of states. The institutional structures of economic
agreements are likely to be affected by conflict. For example, the 1969 Football War
between El Salvador and Honduras brought a premature end to the Central American
Common Market. Likewise, security tensions between Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania
exacerbated economic tensions that resulted in the termination of the East African
Community. Consequently, conflict between two agreement members may put at risk the
entire arrangement, including ties with third-parties. On the one hand, agreements may
be unsustainable after conflict due to the distrust it may generate. On the other, fellow
agreement members may sanction the aggressor in the conflict, thereby denying it further
access to the special economic area.
Economic integration, as far as it generates interdependence or the perception of
it, makes conflict in any form more costly. Governments sacrifice tax revenue from
externally-dependent firms. Exporters suffer losses from conflict that encourages them to
pressure politicians for peaceful relations. Lastly, conflict between two agreement
members may end the entire agreement or otherwise result in the sanctioning of the
aggressor, thereby denying it access to the entire preferential trade area. My first
hypothesis is thus stated as:
H1: Economic agreements decrease the likelihood of conflict between member
states.
3.2.2

Conflict Between Members and Non-Members
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As I have argued, economic agreements decrease the salience of members’
external trade ties. Increased trade between members within an agreement dilutes the
relative importance of each tie with non-member states. Furthermore, shifting sources of
imports and markets for exports from non-members to members necessarily decreases the
importance of those ties. As agreement members rely on partner states for greater
portions of their trade portfolio, they correspondingly rely less on outside states for
commercial viability and overall trade. Economic interdependence between members
and non-members is likely reduced as a result of shifting commercial relationships. The
more states look to agreement members for future commercial relations, the less
important non-members become. Reductions in salience, while not necessarily uniform
in magnitude, apply to both members and non-members when long-run gains from trade
are considered. While the former obviously are drawn to their agreement partners, the
latter are expected or must find ways to identify their long-term commercial interests
with other states given the implicit barriers they face to exchange with the agreement.
Indeed, trade agreements tend to spur additional trade agreements by states looking to
“lock in” preferential markets (Baldwin 1993). The salience of non-member ties with
agreement members, therefore, is similarly impacted by the process of economic
integration.
The marginalization of economic ties between economic agreement members and
non-members influences conflict behavior by reducing the opportunity cost of both
sanctions and military force. One of the important reasons interdependence reduces
conflict is the forgone benefits states incur by engaging in combat (Polachek, 1980;
Doyle 1997). By diversifying trade partners, or even emphasizing certain ties over
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others, states necessarily decrease dependence on any one source. Agreement members
therefore suffer less by initiating conflict with non-members by virtue of their more
salient ties with other agreement partners. The notion that trade deters conflict is also in
part based on a long-term expectation that future trade relations will be hurt by war
(Doyle, 1997; Oneal & Russett, 1997). By erecting an implicit barrier between members
and non-members, economic agreements marginalize the future utility of trading
relationships in ways that similarly impede their deterrent effect. This holds for both
members and non-members as the agreement signals intentions of future trading
relations.
Economic agreements may also lower the cost of conflict by providing member
states alternative markets for products. Crescenzi (2003a; 2003b) argues that states
facing lower “exit” costs – or a greater ability to replace lost trade – are less constrained
in conflict. Economic agreements, in turn, may lower the exit costs for member states by
providing established trade networks. When engaged in conflict with a non-member
state, members of an economic agreement may be able to leverage intra-agreement trade
ties to replace trade lost due to conflict. Likewise, Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig (2008)
argue that decreases in systemic trade costs, part of which is associated with barriers,
reduce the multilateral impact of bilateral conflict. That is, lower systemic trade costs
allow states to shift trade to other nations, thus reducing the negative externalities of
conflict. Consequently, as economic agreements reduce trade costs for members, the
ability of members to leverage intra-agreement ties to absorb excess trade affected by
hostilities with non-members reduces the overall cost of those conflicts. Given the
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overall marginalization of ties between members and non-members, the deterrent effect
of integration is likely restricted.
The marginalization of salient trade ties between members and non-members,
while limiting the deterrent effect of interdependence, does not in and of itself indicate
the start of acrimonious relations or an increase in conflict. However, economic
agreements may also produce security externalities that exacerbate relative gains
concerns and strategic vulnerabilities between members and non-members. First,
economic agreement members benefit from their association with an exclusive
commercial area. Members gain wealth and productive capacity stemming from
increases in intra-agreement trade that generally do not privilege the excluded state.
Trade increases domestic economic efficiency in the aggregate, as producers are able to
acquire materials at lower cost and export at higher rates. Increases in domestic
efficiency, in turn, free resources for use in military applications (Baldwin 1985;
Hirschman 1981; McKeown 1984; Root 1984; Gowa and Mansfield 1993). That is,
states that achieve greater wealth and productive capacity from trade may, in turn,
convert their commercial advantages into military power to be used against excluded
states (Gowa 1995). Trade can therefore alter the distribution of power and capabilities
between partners, allies, and rivals (Gowa and Mansfield 1993; Mansfield and Pollins
2001). By extension, economic agreements that promote freer trade increase the
efficiency with which domestic resources can be utilized by member states, thereby
adding to their potential military capabilities and aggregate power.
Second, the process of trade diversion may actually transfer gains from nonmember states to member states. Trade in this capacity may be viewed as a zero-sum
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game where members gain at the explicit expense of non-members. While trade
diversion has clear welfare consequences in the economic sense for all states involved,
the more important dynamic for conflict behavior is the material shift in trade. Consider
again the relationship depicted in Figure 3.1 both before and after an economic agreement
is formed. Once an agreement is formed, the trade linkage between Alpha and Charlie is
severed and results in a clear loss for Charlie, given it no longer exports to Alpha.
However, while it clearly suboptimizes trade, it is not clear that Alpha suffers any
absolute losses from trade diversion. Indeed, Alpha obtains goods at a lower cost with
liberalization that may result in aggregate gains from increased efficiency. Agreement
members, therefore, likely experience increases in aggregate economic activity while
states excluded from economic agreements are more likely to experience absolute
declines in trade or terms of trade. Consequently, trade diversion may imply relative
losses for excluded states and corresponding gains for agreement members. Given the
strong incentives agreement members have to increase trade barriers to the external world
(Viner 1950; Krugman 1991; Krugman 1993; Schiff and Winters 2003), the simple
possibility of diversion may influence state behavior. In other words, the fear of trade
diversion, marginalization, and associated relative losses may be as compelling as the
realization of loss. The codified nature of economic integration signals that losses will
continue for those outside the agreement.
Increased efficiency and the effects of trade diversion stemming from economic
agreements can therefore foster asymmetrical economic relationships between members
and non-members in ways that encourage conflict. Member states gain strategic
advantages through increased economic efficiency and insulation from the cost of

60

conflict with non-member states. As economic agreements are inherently discriminatory
(Bhagwati 1993), the strategic gains member states enjoy do not extend beyond the
borders of the agreement. Security externalities may therefore manifest such that nonmember states are more strategically vulnerable. Relative losses resulting from trade
diversion compound this effect, as it represents a direct relative gain for member states
and loss for non-member states. Vulnerabilities are compounded if agreements exclude
states from particularly important or strategic markets or resources. For example, both
Britain and Germany pursued economic agreements in the interwar period to lock-in
strategic markets and exclude the other from gaining footholds which ultimately fueled
distrust and aggression (Eichengreen and Frankle 1995, 96). Indeed, after German
victories in Europe, Bidwell and Upgren (1941) expressed concern over German
economic power from the United States’s perspective:
“By exercising coordinated control over Europe's vast purchases, Germany might
monopolize the foreign trade of certain of the republics, by bilateral agreements
and bulk purchases, so as practically to exclude United States' goods. Further, we
may expect that German economic power would be utilized to influence to our
disadvantage unstable political situations whenever they appeared.” (Bidwell and
Upgren 1941, 285)
Strategic imbalances may in turn encourage both members and non-members to
take more antagonistic stances. Acute vulnerabilities may compel non-member states to
adopt more aggressive policies in the security arena to counteract perceived weaknesses
and strategic imbalances (Hirschman 1981; Gilpin 1981; Grieco 1988; Grieco 1993;
Gowa 1995; Mearsheimer 1990; Mearsheimer 1994; Barbieri 1996; Liberman 1996).
Furthermore, relative losses experienced by non-members may outweigh the potential
gains from trade for excluded states. That is, non-members may view whatever
economic linkages they have with member states as sources of vulnerability or
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dependency rather than ones of mutual gain. In such cases, the pacifying effect of
economic exchange may short-circuit such that conflict is less costly overall. On the
other hand, member states may press their new-found economic advantages on nonmember states. Being less vulnerable, members may make bolder demands of nonmembers in conflict scenarios knowing the latter risks more through conflict.
Paradoxically, however, greater demands implicitly narrow the range of acceptable
solutions to both parties which, in turn, increases the likelihood of violent conflict
(Morrow 2003). This dynamic between members and non-members leads me to my
second hypothesis:
H2: Economic agreements increase the likelihood of conflict between members
and non-members of the agreement.

3.3

A Policy Substitution Model of Coercion
In addition to simply increasing the occurrence of conflict, however, economic

agreements and the processes they set in motion also change the nature of conflict
between states. One of the posited causal mechanisms supporting the liberal peace holds
that economic interdependence enables the use of non-violent conflict resolution
mechanisms – particularly economic sanctions – to substitute for war (Drezner 2003;
Garzke, Li and Boemer 2001; Morgan and Schwebach 1997; Morgan, Palmer, and Miers
2000; Verdier 2004). Insofar as economic agreements promote commerce and
interdependence between member states, implications can also be drawn about the type
or conduct of conflict between states. Indeed, members of economic agreements appear
(on the surface) to be better suited to substituting economic sanctions for violent conflict
given the formal nature of their agreement.
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In evaluating the influence of economic agreements on conflict, I adopt a policy
substitution framework in the spirit of Most and Starr (1984; 1989; 2000) and specifically
applied to interdependence by Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer (2001). The essence of policy
substitution is that states may pursue foreign policy goals using several different means.
States possess a menu of options with which they may address foreign policy issues.
Economic interdependence expands the options for conflict resolution by enabling the
effective use of economic sanctions as either a tool of punishment or as a costly signal
(Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 2001, 400).
Economic integration agreements are structural characteristics shaping the menu
of conflict management options available to states in this framework. Overall, states that
enter into agreements expect increases in interaction and revisions in bilateral economic
salience. Agreements not only serve as vehicles to promote commercial exchange, but
also signal commitments to particular policies and patterns of exchange. Consequently, a
degree of sensitivity and vulnerability is inherent within the agreement itself, but also
increases as economic interdependence is realized (Keohane and Nye 1977). Material
benefits conferred by such relationships, or the perception thereof, fundamentally alter
the decision-making calculus within states. Within the universe of potential responses to
conflict, particular alternatives are more attractive compared to others based on the ability
of states to inflict harm and withstand retaliation (Starr 2000, 132; Cioffi-Revilla and
Starr 2002, 232; Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 2001, 400; Stein 2003, 118). Using this
approach, I develop a bargaining model approximating the decision-making process as a
challenger state chooses between economic sanctions and militarized conflict to coerce
others. While alternative gradations of coercion are possible, this simplified framework
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models two of the more prevalent and costly mechanisms used by states to influences
others.
The general model representing the escalation of coercive tactics, depicted in
Figure 3.2, employs two nations – “Challenger” (C) and “Defender” (D). Nature first
selects the Defender’s type from a distribution such that it is weak with probability  or
strong with probability 1  . Weak Defenders acquiesce to all the Challenger’s
demands while strong Defenders acquiesce only to weak demands. While the Defender
is fully aware of its type, the Challenger has only a belief based on nature’s probability
draw. Strength in this general model simply refers to the ability of the defender to resist
the coercive tactics of the initiator. The order of play is depicted in Figure 3.2 and begins
with the Challenger determining exactly the size of concession to demand from the
Defender by selecting   0,1 . Following this, the Defender either resists or
acquiesces. If the Defender acquiesces, the game ends with the Challenger receiving x
and the Defender 1-x. Should the Defender resist, however, the Challenger must decide
to use either sanctions or war as a coercive tool. If the Challenger attacks the Defender
with military force, the target collapses with probability

if weak and

if strong, where

  . Furthermore, both states incur a non-zero cost  and  respectively reflecting
forgone trade, investment, and economic activity associated with warfare. If the
Defender collapses, the Challenger receives the entirety of the good less the cost of war
(1 ) while the Defender receives nothing, but suffers the cost of war ( ). If the
Defender does not collapse, however, it wins the contest and the payoffs are reversed
such that the Challenger incurs the costs ( ) with no positive payoffs and the Defender
retains the good in question (1 ).
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Likewise, economic sanctions carry a non-zero cost for both Challenger and
Defender of  and  respectively reflecting the forgone gains from trade, investment,
and other economic activity. I assume the costs of war are strictly more severe than
sanctions (   and    ). Defenders fold under the weight of sanctions with
probability  if weak and  if strong, where   0,1 is a constant reflecting that
economic force is strictly less likely to result in the Defender’s collapse than military
force. Consequently,  

and   . If the Defenders collapses, the Challenger

receives the whole payoff less the cost of sanctions (1-  ). The Defender, in turn,
receives the cost of sanctions - and no payoffs. Successful Defenders, however, do not
collapse and receive (1-  ) and the Challenger only the negative cost of the sanction ( ). Regardless of target type or mechanism employed, the game ends once the
Challenger employs any form of coercion.
Given this setup, in the advent of economic coercion, the Challenger’s generic
payoff is  1  1   0       and the Defender’s  0 
1   1    1     . The corresponding utilities for the use of military
force for Challenger and Defender are

  and 1 

  respectively. Being

uncertain of the Defender’s strength, however, the Challenger must base its decisions on
the expected utilities of both outcomes. The expected utilities for the Challenger are
      1      and  !"#$    1     .
3.3.1

Equilibria
I solve the preceding model using perfect Bayesian equilibria that assumes all

players are sequentially rational based on their beliefs throughout the game (Morrow
1994). Using this process, the critical decision is the Challenger’s choice between using
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military force and economic sanctions. Given the utilities identified in the prior section,
the Challenger chooses economic sanctions when the following condition (labeled ξ for
convenience) holds:3

ξ = p≤

(θ c − γ c ) + ( q − λ q )
( q − q )(1 − λ )

If ξ is satisfied, the Challenger prefers to use economic sanctions rather than
military force to coerce the Defender. If ξ is not met, meaning  breaches the threshold
value, the Challenger prefers military force.
Two properties of ξ are particularly important in understanding the use of
economic sanctions or military force. First, the value of ξ decreases as  %  . In other
words, if the cost of economic sanctions approaches the cost of military force, there are
fewer values of p that warrant the Challenger using economic sanctions. This makes
intuitive sense, as situations in which sanctions are highly costly to the Challenger
without improving the odds of success are unlikely to yield economic coercion. Second,
if λ if sufficiently low – meaning the Defender is very unlikely to collapse from
economic sanctions – fewer values of p satisfy ξ. This once again makes intuitive sense.
If sanctions are very unlikely to compel policy change in the Defender, there is no value
of p for which the Challenger will impose sanctions.
Figure 3.3 graphically illustrates these two properties by plotting the threshold
below which the Challenger opts for sanctions (ξ) against the sanctions effectiveness
expressed as a percentage of the effectiveness of military force (λ). The four lines in the
graph are four cases of γc each expressed as percentages of θc. As the figure indicates,
sanctions must be at least as effective as they are costly in order to render them viable
3

Proofs all of calculations are contained in the appendix.

66

policy alternatives for the Challenger. As might be expected, sanctions that are generally
ineffective (between 20% and 40%) can still be viable policy options for a Challenger if
inexpensive (20% the cost of military force). As the cost of sanctions grows, however,
the Challenger is less willing to choose them given that they are less effective than
military force. If sanctions are highly costly (80% the cost of military force), the
Challenger demands sanctions be relatively likely to collapse the Defender.
There are a finite number of proposals the Challenger considers depending on the
value of ξ. First, if p ≤ ξ indicating economic sanctions are preferred, the Challenger
proposes either a relatively large value of , denoted & , or a relatively small value
denoted & where & '   ( and & '   ( respectively. Overall, the Defender
acquiesces to  with certainty and to  only when it is sufficiently weak. I   ) f,
indicating the Challenger prefers military force, the corresponding values of * and *
are * '

 ( and * '

 ( respectivley.

If the Challenger proposes either & or * , the Defender acquiesces regardless of
type, as it can do no better by resisting. The challenger may gamble and make a bold
demand (& or * ), however, if it believes the defender sufficiently weak. Specifically,
the Challenger issues the bold demand & only if it believes the Defender weak, signified
by the equation below (labeled p̂e for convenience):

pˆ e = p ≤

γc +γd
λ (q − q ) + γ c + γ d

Likewise, the Challenger issues the bold demand * in conjunction with military
force when the following (labeled p̂m ) holds:
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pˆ m = p ≤

θc + θd
q − q + θc + θd

The equations for p̂e and p̂m indicate an item of particular interest concerning the
Challenger’s choice regarding which demand to make. Both equations indicate that the
higher the cost of conflict, the lower the values of p̂e and p̂m . In other words, if
 ,  ,  , #  increase (holding



constant), fewer values of either equation justify

the Challenger gambling by issuing a bold demand. This makes intuitive sense, as the
more costly the choice to coerce, the less likely the Challenger is to do so.
Given this setup, four equilibria follow given combinations of ξ and p̂e and p̂m .
Table 3.1 summarizes the equilibria as a function of the Defender’s strength and
associated threshold conditions. In the first equilibrium, the Challenger prefers economic
sanctions to military force. This preference may reflect several possible situations.
Defenders may be particularly vulnerable to economic sanctions such that  % ,
meaning sanctions can be employed effectively. Alternatively,  may be particularly
costly, in turn encouraging the use of military force as a policy strictly more likely to
compel the Defender to acquiescence. The choice of sanctions in this model may also
indicate a combination of these two factors. Likewise, the Challenger is sufficiently
convinced of the Defender’s strength to warrant the lesser demand & . As with the
choice between sanctions and military force, this may be due to several factors, the most
straightforward of which is a relatively high likelihood that the Defender is strong and
will resist economic sanctions. The cost of sanctions, alternatively, may be relatively low
such that the Defender is likely to resist the Challenger’s demand. That is, if sanctions do
not inflict sufficient harm on the Defender (or Challenger), they are unlikely to compel
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the Defender to submit. As per the setup of the model, both Defender types acquiesce if
the Challenger issues a weak demand. The Challenger also opts for economic sanctions
in the second equilibrium for similar reasons. In this situation, however, the Challenger
believes the Defender is weak enough to issue the bold demand & . The second
equilibrium can result from relatively high costs for either the Challenger or Defender
 +  . Again, per the Defender’s type, it acquiesces if weak and resists if strong in
the second equilibrium.
The next two equilibria reflect situations where the Challenger prefers military
force to economic sanctions. This may be because sanctions are either too costly or
unlikely to succeed in collapsing the Defender. As  %  , the Challenger is more likely
to view military force as the utility maximizing strategy given the relative cost and
increased likelihood of collapsing the Defender. If  - p̂m , indicating the Challenger
believes the Defender relatively strong, it makes the weaker demand to which both types
acquiesce. If   p̂m , however, the bold demand is issued that only the weak Defender
accepts. The intuition behind the choice of demand parallels the prior discussion on
economic sanctions. Relatively high costs for either Challenger or Defender  +  
reduce the incentive for the latter to resist.
The equilibria discussed above reveal several interesting relationships relevant for
evaluating the influence of economic agreements on interstate conflict. First, higher costs
of sanctions or military force for either a Challenger or Defender decreases the likelihood
that either policy comes to fruition. That is, the more costly a coercive action is the less
likely the Defender is to resist demands and force the Challenger to impose sanctions or
to use military force. Second, the Challenger is less likely to use economic sanctions as
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 %  . Consequently, as the cost of sanctions approaches the cost of war – as might be
expected in highly interdependent relationships – Challengers prefer military force.
Third, Challengers are more likely to use economic sanctions as they increase in
effectiveness (i.e., as λ increases).
Understanding the empirical implications of the model is therefore directly related
to the cost of sanctions, their effectiveness, and the relationship between the two
parameters. The cost and effectiveness of sanctions, in turn, is a direct reflection of a
state’s ability to meaningfully disrupt trade flows with others while limiting self-imposed
damage (Hirschman 1981; Wallensteen 1968; Baldwin 1985; Drezner 1999; Drezner
2003; Allen 2008; Jing, Kaempfer & Lowenberg 2003). This suggests important aspects
of the relationship between the cost and effectiveness of sanctions – or the relative
relationship between ,  and  . The cost of sanctions is directly related to the
economic harm the Challenger can inflict upon the Defender. In order for harm to befall
the Defender, however, a meaningful trade relationship must exist between the states
such that both will be hurt if action is taken. In turn, it may be possible (or likely) that 
and  vary in tandem. However, while  and  may move in the same direction, it
does not follow logically that the rate of movement is identical between the two. While
the cost of sanctions may increase between Challenger and Defender with the degree of
trade, either party may be more vulnerable to disruption. One state may be more
vulnerable if it is more reliant on the other for imports or exports as a proportion of their
total economy or has relatively few trade alternatives (Hirschman 1981; Crescenzi 2003a;
Crescenzi 2003b). Such may be the case when sanctions are imposed by large economies
on relatively small one, as the former is better able to reorient production and trade to
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account for losses (Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot 2007). Likewise, trade in sensitive
products may result in asymmetrical vulnerability. Despite having a larger economy, it
can be argued the United States was more vulnerable to disruptions levied by the 1973 oil
embargo that other developed countries.
The same logic suggests the effectiveness of economic sanctions is directly
related to the Defender’s cost of sanctions. That is, while  and  may not move in
lockstep, it is likely that the probability of the Defender collapsing from economic
sanctions is closely related to the cost of sanctions such that  increases (decreases) as 
increases (decreases). Sanctions that are highly costly to the Defender are also likely to
be highly effective in compelling policy change (Hirschman 1981; Baldwin 1985).
Indeed, it is often the case that states involved in sanction episodes – both Challenger and
Defender – weight the opponent’s potential costs and payoffs relatively heavily (Tsebelis
1990).
Given the relationships between the cost of conflict to both parties and the
effectiveness of sanctions (  , ,  ,  . and λ), the influence of economic
interdependence and agreements on the type of conflict witnessed between agreement
members is likely conditioned on the relative economic position of states involved in the
dispute. To help interpret these effects, Figure 3.4 plots the simulated probability of
particular actions by the Challenger given the economic (inter)dependence of Challenger
and Defender.4 Each panel plots the thresholds associated with particular strategies by

These graphs were generated using simulated data. Cost parameters  and  are drawn from a uniform
distribution between 0 and 0.5 and a mean of 0.25.  and , are derived by multiplying  and 
respectively by a parameter drawn from a uniform distribution, thereby creating two variables with
exponential distributions between 0 and 0.5 with means of 0.125. This ensures  and  and correlated
with but distinct from  and  . λ is derive in a similar fashion by multiplying  by another uniformly
distributed variable, again ensuring correlation. Finally,
4
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the Challenger according to the particular parameters of interest in calculating ξ , p̂e and
p̂m . The y-axis the probability of the Challenger adopting particular strategies, i.e.

economic or military coercion and the associated decisions to make bold or weak
demands.
Consider first the top panel of Figure 3.4 that plots the use of economic sanctions
or military force by the Challenger. In this figure, the area above the line reflects the
values of p for which the Challenger uses military coercion as given by ξ . The area
below the line, in turn, indicates values of p that lead to the use of economic coercion.
The two key concepts necessary to understanding this calculation – the effectiveness of
sanctions (λ) and the difference between the Challenger’s cost of war (  and sanctions
( . Note first that the effectiveness of sanctions, λ, has a relatively mild, but
nonetheless significant effect on the Challenger’s decision between economic and
military coercion. Challengers are more likely to use economic coercion as the
effectiveness of economic sanctions increases given positive influence of λ. Differences
in the cost of military and economic coercion, however, have a much stronger influence
on the Challenger’s choice. As    increases, the area underneath the line expands
indicating the Challenger is more likely to prefer economic sanctions over military force.
Intuitively, this condition could be fulfilled if either the cost of military coercion is
sufficiently high or the cost of sanctions sufficiently low. If military coercion is too
costly, in other words, the Challenger may attempt “foreign policy on the cheap” by using

and

are drawn from uniform distributions with means of 0.25 and 0.75 respectively (standard

deviations of 0.05).

ξ , p̂e and p̂m

are then calculated according to their respective formulas.
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economic sanctions. Likewise, if economic sanctions are inexpensive, Challengers may
utilize them more frequently.
The bottom left panel depicts the Challenger’s decision to make the weak or bold
demand once it has decided to use economic coercion. Recall that all Defenders
acquiesce to the weak demand & while only weak Defenders acquiesce to the bold
demand (& . Consequently, the Challenger’s decision to make the bold demand results
in the possibility it will impose economic sanctions if a strong Defender resists. The area
above the lines in this panel reflect the range of p values for which the Challenger issues
the bold demand & . First, increases in the effectiveness of sanctions (λ) and their cost to
the Defender ( ) increases probability the Challenger issues the bold demand – and
therefore risks imposing economic sanctions. Of these two parameters, λ appears to be
the stronger influence on the Challenger’s decision, although both exhibit noteworthy
pressure on the bold/weak demand dynamic. The logic behind both elements is relatively
straightforward. If sanctions are either highly costly to the defender or effective relative
to military force, the Challenger is more confident the Defender is weak and will
acquiesce. Second, as the Challenger’s cost of sanctions (  increases, the probability
the Challenger issues the bold demand decreases. Costly economic sanctions encourage
weak demands while inexpensive sanctions encourage bold demands. Taking these three
elements together, the most likely scenario whereby sanctions are used is between a
Challenger insulated from costs and a Defender highly sensitive to the cost of sanctions.
Likewise, sanctions are least likely to be observed between an insulated Defender and
vulnerable Challenger.
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Finally, the bottom right panel plots the Challenger’s decision to make the weak
or bold demand once it has decided to use military force. Again, all Defenders acquiesce
to the weak demand *  while only weak Defenders acquiesce to the bold demand
(* ). The area above the lines in this panel reflect the range of p values for which the
Challenger issues the bold demand * and risks having to use military force. The effect
of both the Challenger and Defender’s cost ( and  respectively) have nearly identical
influences on the decision between bold and weak demands. As the cost of military force
increases for either Challenger or Defender, the probability of the Challenger making the
bold demand decreases. This is to be expected with respect to the Challenger’s costs, as
more costly actions are likely to encourage more conservative behavior.
The impact of the Defender’s costs, however, is somewhat counterintuitive, as we
might expect increases in cost to encourage acquiescence. However, consider the
bargaining scenario I lay out. Challengers set bold demands equal to * '
weak demands equal to * '

 ( and

 ( . The Defender’s cost of conflict, therefore, enters

equally into both demands. Differentiating the two demands is the probability the
Defender will collapse given military force given by

if weak and

if strong (where

  ). Consequently, when the Defender faces high costs of conflict (and therefore
vulnerable to coercion given my setup), the Challenger can gain nearly as much by
making the weak as the bold demand without risking loss in conflict. In other words,
vulnerable Defenders who stand to suffer in conflict can be effectively leveraged without
making bold demands.
To further develop the implications of my model, Figure 3.5 considers the
interplay of the model’s parameters by displaying how economic relationships and
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interdependence influence the Challenger’s choice of coercive policies.5 The vertical
axis represents the Challenger’s level of economic dependence (the main driver of
 and   while the horizontal axis represents the Defender’s dependence (the main
driver of ( and 1 . Four quadrants indicate the economic relationship between the two
parties and the coercive strategies that are likely preferable. Note first that
interdependence is insufficient to determine whether the Challenger prefers economic or
military coercion. Rather, the choice of economic or military coercion is instead
primarily a function of the difference in costs (1   ) as discussed previously.
Important implications regarding the likelihood of observing military or economic
coercion (i.e., the likelihood of the Challenger issuing bold demands) can be gleaned
from the model, however. Quadrant I in the top left is characterized by a relatively
dependent Challenger and independent Defender. In this scenario, the Challenger lacks
the economic leverage to make sanctions effective as it is commercially dependent on the
Defender. Consequently, economic sanctions are least likely in this case while military
force is possible. Contrast this with quadrant IV in the bottom right. Here the Defender
is dependent on the Challenger and possesses a high cost of conflict. The Challenger,
however, is relatively autonomous with a low cost of conflict. Given the disparity in
cost, sanctions are likely more effective and relatively less costly for the Challenger,
overall increasing the likelihood they will be employed. Military force, however, is still
possible in this dynamic.
Quadrant II reflects two states that are economically interdependent. As such,
both experience high costs from conflict. As Figure 3.5 demonstrates, increases in both
the Challenger and Defender’s cost of war discourage the use of military force. Hence, if
5

The implications in Figure 6 are based off the same calculations that derived Figure 5.
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both states are economically vulnerable, military force is least likely between
interdependent states. Economic sanctions, while possible, are no more or less likely to
be imposed than in other scenarios. Finally, quadrant III compliments quadrant II by
considering two states with little economic interdependence. Military force is more
likely to be used in this scenario given the relative independence of states. Defenders
cannot be economically leveraged given their insulation. Challengers, on the other hand,
suffer relatively little from engaging in military coercion. Again, sanctions are no more
nor less likely to be imposed per the results of the formal model.
3.3.2

Implications
In applying this to economic agreements, consider first the relationship between

two states in the same agreement. Economic agreements tend to promote trade and
investment between members, signal long-term commitments to liberal economic
policies, and otherwise draw member states together such that economic interdependence
increases. It is likely the case, as a result, that both economic sanctions (γ) and military
force (θ) prove more costly for Challengers and Defenders. As a result, disputes between
agreement members are likely to result in acquiescence by the Defender given the
potential cost to both parties. Or putting this in the language of my model, increased
interdependence reduces the range of values for p̂e or p̂m for which the Challenger is
willing to gamble by issuing a bold demand. This lends additional weight to Hypothesis
1 discussed in the previous section.
That said, this suggests a more nuanced approach to conflict by the parties
involved rather than a wholesale rejection of conflict between members of economic
agreements. The economic interactions fostered by economic agreements may promote
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either interdependence or simple dependence between member states. Dependence and
asymmetrical commercial relations can manifest through several possible mechanisms.
First, some agreements (notably shallow ones) are often particularistic in the sense they
do not fully liberalize trade relations. Partial scope agreements in particular may not be
reciprocal in that they often require more opening measures by a subset of states in the
agreement. Very often these agreements are designed to improve market access for less
developed countries. For example, the African, Caribbean, Pacific – European
Community agreement (APC-EC) signed in 1963 and expanded in 1975 provides
seventy-nine developing states with market access to European Community states for
certain goods. The United States and Australia hold similar agreements within their
respective spheres of influence (Whalley 1996, 5-6).
Second, even if agreements are reciprocal in nature, asymmetries may develop as
certain states accrue a disproportionate share of benefits. Relatively economically strong
states in agreements are often able to leverage their influence to the perceived detriment
of the other members (Fernandez 1996). For example, Kenya proved the dominant state
in the East African Community (which also contained Uganda and Tanzania) for most of
its history. Given its port access and relatively developed infrastructure, Kenya was able
to shift community policies to advantage its own firms through foreign direct investment
and preferential trade terms (Nye 1963; Stock 2004, 445; Shilling 2005). Consequently,
economic agreements can entrench the commercially central state and augment its
economic leverage.
If economic agreements promote asymmetrical commercial relations, the
implication for the type of conflict initiated by the dominant state is a tendency towards
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sanctions. Asymmetrical relations between agreement members push the dominant and
peripheral states in opposite directions in Figure 3.5. The dominant state tends towards
quadrant IV, where the cost of sanctions is relatively low but the potential effectiveness
high. Consequently, economically dominant agreement members are better positioned to
use economic sanctions as a first-best coercive policy, leading to a third hypothesis:
H3: Less economically dependent agreement members are more likely to use economic
sanctions against other members as a tool of coercion.
More economically dependent agreement members, however, are pushed towards
quadrant I. Sanctions are both costly and ineffective given their weaker commercial
position. The cost of sanctions encourages dependent states to pursue other tactics as a
first-best option. This is likely for two reasons. First, the more dependent state in the
dyad cannot credibly use sanctions to compel the less dependent one due to its vulnerable
position. Any economic punishment the dependent state visits on the less dependent state
can be trumped by more forceful sanctions from the latter. Sanctions, therefore, are less
likely to succeed when used by the more dependent state. This effect is likely
compounded by the less dependent state’s greater ability to use the trade network fostered
by the agreement to divert trade lost through sanctions to other agreement members. As a
result, dependent states may pursue military force as a first-best – or only – option to
coerce other agreement members.
Second, the relative economic vulnerability of states in agreements may
encourage them to frame exchange in terms of relative gains. Any relative gains that the
dominant state accrues, furthermore, may be used against the dependent state in the form
of military power. The codified nature of agreements compounds this problem by
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signaling the persistence of relative losses. More dependent states, therefore, may view
trade with less dependent states in a more negative light and attach less significance to it
if sacrificed. Vulnerable states, therefore, face both higher costs from imposing sanctions
given their relative dependency while simultaneously perceiving reduced costs of military
action given relative gains concerns. Likewise, sanctions employed against more
dependent members by those less dependent may be less likely to succeed given the
negative influence of relative gains. Consequently, the relative difference in cost
between military and economic coercion (1   ) is likely lower for dependent
agreement members vis-à-vis less dependent ones. As a result, dependent agreement
members are more likely to use military force as a coercive tool:
H4: More economically dependent agreement members are more likely to use military
force against other members as a tool of coercion.
Agreements that promote symmetric commercial relations between members
likely reside in quadrant II in Figure 3.5. Commercial exchange between member states
increases interdependence in that both states derive benefits from their relationship. It is,
therefore, more likely that any form of coercion is costly for both states. The effect of
interdependence between symmetric agreement members on economic sanctions is
ambiguous, as the Challenger and Defender’s cost of sanctions (γ2 and γ3  work in
opposition. With respect to military force, however, increases in the cost of military
force ( and  ) both reduce the likelihood of observing military force. Given this, an
additional hypothesis is stated as:
H5: Symmetrically dependent agreement members are less likely to use military force
against other members as a tool of coercion than asymmetrically dependent members.
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Consider now relations between members and non-members of economic
agreements. Recall that economic agreements marginalize the salience of member state
ties with the external world as they tend to rely on intra-agreement trade for higher
potions of their trade portfolio and economic activity. This is compounded to the extent
trade diversion takes place, as it represents a direct and material shift in trade patterns
away from non-members. Membership in an economic agreement is a signal of intent to
pursue closer ties with particular states, which in turn may reduce the long-term salience
of member/non-member relations. Consequently, states likely grow less interdependent
as a result of economic agreements.
The broad implication of marginalization is to push members and non-members
towards quadrant III in Figure 3.5. Interdependence is reduced to the extent trade ties are
marginalized by the economic agreement. Economic agreements may also give risk to
relative gains concerns and strategic vulnerabilities between members and non-members
in ways that encourage states to view extant trade ties negatively, thereby reducing the
overall cost of conflict further. While sanctions are likely low-cost, a lack of
interdependence between Challenger and Defender limits the ability of economic
sanctions to compel policy change. Economic agreements, by either materially affecting
trade or altering the context within which it occurs, limits interdependence between
members and non-members of agreements. Economic sanctions, when used between
members and non-members of agreements, may fail to convey either the punishment or
costly signal required to be successful. When engaging in conflict, therefore, the more
effective option for states on opposing sides of an economic agreement may be the use of
military force. Given this dynamic, my final hypothesis is stated as:
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H6: Economic agreements increase the likelihood of militarized conflict between
members and non-members.
The hypotheses I have discussed in this chapter concern both the initiation of
conflict and the method by which states engage in it. While initiation and means of
conflict are not codetermined, they are certainly related phenomenon that requires careful
treatment. In the remaining chapters, I present and implement a research design that
attempts to account for the strategic interaction of initiation and type of conflict, as well
as several other empirical necessities.
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Table 3.1: Summary of Equilibria
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Conditions

Challenger Strategy

Weak Defender Strategy

Strong Defender Strategy

-)
 - ̌&

Economic Sanctions
Sets x  x6

Acquiesce

Acquiesce

-)
  ̌&

Economic Sanctions
Sets   &

Acquiesce

Resist
(Sanctions Imposed)

)
 - ̌*

Military Force
Sets   *

Acquiesce

Acquiesce

)
  ̌*

Military Force
Sets   *

Acquiesce

Resist
(Military Force Employed)

Note: p is the Challenger’s belief the Defender is weak, ξ is the threshold value of p above which the Challenger uses military
force, and p̂e and p̂m are threshold values above which the Defender prefers to resist the actions of the Challenger. The
Defender’s strategies are determined by its type and are presented in this table for reference.
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Figure 3.1: An Illustration of Trade Diversion
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Figure 3.4: Implications of Parameters on Coercion
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Figure 3.5: Interdependence and Coercive Instruments
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CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH DESIGN: MODELING THE INFLUENCE OF
AGREEMENTS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICT
My argument as outlined in the previous chapter requires a modeling strategy that
addresses not only the onset of conflict, but also the type of strategy used by states in
conflict. Furthermore, my formal model makes explicit the strategic interplay between
the onset and strategies used in conflict. Hence, my empirical strategy involves a series
of large-N statistical tests of all non-directed dyad-years from 1970 to 2001 evaluating
the relationship between economic agreements and both the onset and strategies of
conflict in a multifaceted approach. In particular, I propose to evaluate my hypotheses
using military force and economic sanctions as primary dependent variables. To be sure,
other types of conflict are possible between states – e.g., diplomatic disputes, economic
inducements, and covert actions. The prevalence and assumed substitutability of military
force and sanctions, however, make them ideal candidates for a first-cut study.
In this chapter I first outline the dependent variables I use in my analysis.
Following this, I describe in detail my primary explanatory variables, including economic
agreements, measures of trade (inter)dependence, and trade diversion. I then briefly
discuss additional control variables necessary for sound statistical analysis. After
discussing the variables, I outline my estimation strategies and consider how they capture
the concept of foreign policy substitutability. In the final section I consider factors that
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may potentially confound my empirical analysis, including missing data and spatial
dependence, and how I address these issues.

4.1

Dependent Variables: Military Force and Economic Sanctions
In the most general sense, my analysis is concerned with the initiation and method

of resolving conflicts between states. While numerous strategies are possible between
states, it is often posited that economic sanctions may be substituted from military force
as a means of coercing states (Hufbauer 1998; Schott 1998; Schwebach 2000; Garzke, Li
and Boemer 2001). Consequently, I focus my empirical analysis on these two concepts
as the primary mechanisms of interstate conflict. I hope to address additional forms of
conflict and coercion in future work.
There are two key variables necessary for my analysis. First, I am generally
concerned with both the occurrence of conflict and the strategies use by states when it
does take place. As such, I consider a broad conception of military force that include
threats as well as the use of force. It is common practice in conflict literature to limit the
operationalization of military force to incidents where fatalities occur, as participants in
many low-level disputes never intend their escalation to actual violence. My analysis is
as much concerned with the choice of coercive instrument as the use of said instrument,
however. While states may never intend for disputes to escalate beyond the threat of
military force stage, I contend that a choice is implicit in the threat of using military force
instead of economic sanctions. Alternatively stated, restricting my dependent variable to
disputes where force is used eliminates useful information about the decision-making
process that led to the threat of military instead of economic force. Consequently, I
operationalize military force using participation in a militarized interstate dispute (MID)
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within the dyad to include the threat, display, or use of force. I code this variable 1 if
dispute occurs between states in the dyad year and 0 otherwise. I obtain data for this
variable from the Maoz dyadic MID dataset (Maoz 2005).
Second, I consider economic sanctions in a similar manner by including both
threats and imposition. My conceptualization of economic sanctions falls in line with
Drezner’s (2003, 643), who defines it as “the threat or act by a sender government or
governments to disrupt economic exchange with the target state, unless the target
acquiesces to an articulated demand.” Because I am interested in the substitutability of
military force and sanctions, I only include politically motivated sanctions in our
analysis. The rational of this decision is simply that economic issues exclusively are
unlikely to escalate to military force. I code a variable 1 if economic sanctions are
threatened or imposed for political reasons in a dyad in a given year and 0 otherwise
using the Threats and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) dataset (spanning from 1970 to
2001) (Morgan, Krustev, and Bapat 2009).
Hypotheses 1 and 2, in particular, cite “conflict” generally without reference to a
particular instrument of coercion. Evaluating these two hypotheses, therefore, requires an
approach to the conflict process general enough to capture incidents beyond militarized
disputes. I conceptualize this broader variable – called “conflict initiation” – as the use of
either sanctions or military force. Consequently, I code conflict initiation 1 if either a
sanction or a MID occurs in a given year and 0 otherwise.

4.2

Explanatory Variables: Agreements, Interdependence, and Diversion
My argument makes reference to many economic interactions between states.

While economic agreements is my primary variable of interest, my theory also considers
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the material relationships between states as an important component of their overall
conflict behavior. Indeed, economic agreements influence these material relationships by
affecting trade and investment decisions between states. As such, I specify a series of
explanatory variables capturing the complex economic relationships between states.
4.2.1

Economic Integration Agreements
The unifying element across all aspects of my analysis is the conceptualization

and operationalization of economic agreements. In general, the concept is broadly
similar to the conventional use of regional trade agreements. The World Trade
Organization defines a regional trade agreement as a territory that maintains separate
tariffs or regulations for a “substantial part of the trade of such territory” (WTO 1994,
Article XXIV). In short, economic integration agreements are formal arrangements
between states designed to lower barriers to trade. In practice, however, the concept is
stretched somewhat by the states that employ such agreements. Furthermore, some
degree of difference often exists between the stated goal of integration that is formally
reported to the WTO and the realized degree of integration experienced by the agreement.
This leads to a number of conceptual difficulties with respect to the level of economic
integration between states. First, I expand the Mansfield and Pevehouse (2000) dataset
by dividing agreements from 1950-2001 into five basic groups according to the specific
policy measures associated with each level based largely on Bela Balassa’s (1962)
taxonomy. Balassa divides agreements into five levels – free trade areas, customs unions,
common markets, economic unions, and total economic integration in order from least to
most integration. In creating my taxonomy, I modify two aspects of this scale. First, I
add a category capturing “partial scope agreements,” which cut trade barriers between
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states but fail to do so on a “substantial part of the trade of such territory.” Second, I
collapse the economic union and total economic integration categories, as it is highly
debatable whether any agreement achieves the highest degree of integration on Balassa’s
scale. The five levels of integration are briefly described below while Table 4.1 provides
a simple graphic illustration of the relationship between the types of agreements:
Partial Scope Agreements (PSA): Marginal reductions in tariffs for certain goods.
Free Trade Area (FTA): Elimination of tariff barriers on a majority of goods.
Customs Union (CU): Elimination of tariffs and adoption of common external tariffs.
Common Markets (CM): A customs union and the free movement of labor and capital.
Economic Unions (EU): A common market and harmonization of domestic policies and
currency.
I also make informed judgments as to the effective level and timing of integration
achieved by agreements vis-à-vis the stated goal of such agreements based on historical
analysis of individual institutions. For example, despite the initial goal creating an
economic union, the Commonwealth of Independent States remains largely a partial
scope agreement (CIS 2013; WTO 2013). Judgments such as this concerning the
effective level and timing of implementation were made following extensive research on
agreements by the author using national, WTO, and scholarly sources.
It is also important to note that my conceptualization and operationalization of
economic agreements does not include the WTO as a valid agreement type. The WTO
requires reciprocity in trade policy for all member states. Economic agreements,
however, are an exception to this rule. Article XXIV of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade permits states to form regional trade agreements (or simply economic
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agreements) provided they do not raise barriers to commerce with non-agreement
members after creation. Consequently, economic agreements more extensively liberalize
trade between members when compared to the WTO. Alternatively a stated, economic
agreement in my analysis refers to arrangements that go beyond the WTO in liberalizing
trade between states.
Hypotheses 1, 3, 4, and 5 evaluate intra-agreement conflict dynamics.
Consequently, I code a series of variables capturing the shared agreement relationship
between states. I specify three separate variables capturing economic agreement status.
The first variable is an ordinal measure of agreements from 0 (no agreement) to 5
(economic union) according to this taxonomy. The next two variables divide agreements
into “shallow” (PSA and FTA) and “deep” (CU, CM, and EU) arrangements.6
Differentiation between shallow and deep is based on the degree of cooperation required.
While trade PSAs and FTAs simply require the elimination of barriers, custom unions
and beyond require states to change trade policy vis-à-vis all states, and hence require
more political capital. Alternatively stated, shallow agreements require the “negative”
cooperation where barriers to commerce are removed. Deep agreements, on the other
hand, require “positive” cooperation where states must create common policies vis-à-vis
third parties. PSAs and FTAs only remove barriers while customs unions and beyond
require coordinated action by definition. Consequently, differentiating shallow and deep
by the agreement level is a useful and appropriate course of action.
Hypotheses 2 and 6 evaluate extra-agreement conflict dynamics between
agreement members and non-members. Consequently, the primary explanatory variable
in these cases is the presence of an economic agreement within the dyad. Because I am
6

I also test my hypotheses using a pure five-tier classification system.
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interested in how economic agreement members relate to non-members, two dyadic
relationships are important. First, only one state in a dyad may be a member of an
agreement – which I will refer to as “one agreement dyads.” Second, both states may be
members of separate economic agreements – which I will call “opposing agreement
dyads.” I code a dichotomous variable for each of these groups separately. In this way,
dyads without agreements serve as a baseline, comparison group.
Two items are important to note in the coding of these variables. First, dyads
where both states are in the same agreement (i.e., the United States and Canada in
NAFTA) are coded 0 for both one agreement and opposing agreement variables.
Consequently, states that share are agreement but also have other agreements they do not
share in common are not considered one or opposing agreement dyads. Second, not all
agreements are threats to every state. An agreement between Paraguay and Uruguay is
more salient to Argentina than Thailand. Consequently, I only consider “economically
relevant” agreements where the non-member is either contiguous to or a top 10 trade
partner of an agreement member.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the two types of dyadic relationships between members and
non-members. Consider first one agreement dyads as depicted in the top half of the
figure. Argentina and Brazil are both members of Mercosur. Peru, however, is not a
member of any economic agreement. In this instance, both the Argentina-Peru and
Brazil-Peru dyads are coded as one agreement dyads, as only one state in each dyad is a
member of any agreement. The bottom half of the figure illustrates opposing agreement
dyads. Here again Argentina and Brazil are members of Mercosur. Peru, however, has
joined the Andean Community with Columbia and several other states. Because they are
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in different, non-overlapping agreements, both the Argentina-Peru and Brazil-Peru dyads
are coded as opposing agreement dyads.
4.2.2

Trade Interdependence and Asymmetry
My theory hinges not only on agreements proper, but also the economic

relationships that exist between states. In other words, economic agreements structure
both the material relationships between members (and non-members) and how they are
viewed by each. Three additional concepts are important in this regard. First, trade
interdependence captures the extent to which states in the dyad interact, which is
important for traditional notions of opportunity cost. Interdependence in terms of
conceptualization is more than simply interactions between two states. It instead implies
a complex association between states where both face “costly effects,” in the words of
Keohane and Nye (1977), and consequences are inherent in their relationship. Key to
understanding the role of economic interdependence in interstate conflict are capturing
these implicit consequences for policymakers and political institutions. The value states
place on economic interactions, however, is unobservable, which in turn leads to a
multitude of possible operationalizations that vary by research design and individual
preference.
Two major approaches exist for measuring interdependence as a concept. The
most popular operationalization in the literature comes from Russett and Oneal (1997;
1999; 2001). The authors consider trade interdependence a function of how important a
bilateral trade link is to the overall economy of the state, given by:
Dependencei =

8*9:;<=>? @AB9:;<=>?
C(D>
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Trade interdependence in this fashion represents the extent to which states in a
dyad rely on each other for overall economic activity. States with higher interdependence
scores obtain higher amounts of goods and services from each other, thereby implying the
trade relationship is more salient. In subsequent empirical analysis, the authors create a
dyadic measure of interdependence by using the “weak-link” assumption, where only the
lowest score for the dyad is utilized. The rationale behind this approach is simply that the
constraining effect of interdependence is a function of the least interdependent partner.
The second major approach is from Barbieri (1995; 1996; 1998). Barbieri differs
from Russett and Oneal by considering trade interdependence a function of how
important a bilateral trade link is to the overall trade portfolio of a state. This
conceptualization is more in line with Hirschman (1981), who considered vulnerability a
function of how reliant a state was on particular external partners for resources.
Barbieri’s measures are further differentiated from Russett and Oneal’s by their dyadic
construction. She creates three measures to capture the economic relationship between
states – salience, symmetry, and interdependence, given as follows:
Trade Sharei =

8*9:;<=>? @AB9:;<=>?
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Salienceij = GH#+I JK#IL M H#+I JK#IN
Symmetryij = 1  |H#+I JK#IL  H#+I JK#IN |
Interdependenceij = H#+I J"IILN M H#+I J$!!I#$LN
In this way, Barbieri’s measures take into account both states’ reliance on their
trade relationship. Salience captures the relative importance of the relationship (using the
geometric mean) in a way that effectively captures opportunity costs. Symmetry
acknowledges the relative gains arguments of realism and subsequent perceptions of
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vulnerability. Finally, her interdependence measure considers both opportunity and
relative costs essential to understanding a complexly interdependent relationship between
states.
Debate in the literature over which measures are appropriate in empirical analyses
is heated and largely unresolved.7 In reality, both approaches have strengths,
weaknesses, and appropriate applications. Two key factors distinguish the measures as
they relate to my analysis. First, the Russett and Oneal measures excel at capturing
sensitivity interdependence, but a more tenuous grasp on vulnerability interdependence
(Mansfield and Pollins 2001). That is, bilateral trade as a share of GDP implies the
connectedness of states’ economies, but says little about the costliness of severing the
link. If the goods exchanged are highly substitutable by other trade partners or domestic
sources, little vulnerability exists. Trade as a share of GDP, therefore, may not
appropriately capture the cost of conflict between states. Second, Russett and Oneal’s
approach utilizes the weak link assumption that the lowest level of interdependence is
sufficient for identifying dyadic costs. This is not a dyadic measure, however, and cannot
speak to the more complex relationship between interdependence and conflict (Barbieri
and Peters 2003). In particular, the weak link assumption prevents insight into the
influence of asymmetry, relative gains, and strategic vulnerabilities.
In my analysis I adopt a hybrid of the Russett and Oneal and Barbieri measures
suited for my particular hypotheses and questions. Generally, I measure trade
relationships using total dyadic, bilateral trade as a share of GDP (titled “trade
dependence” for convenience) in accordance with Russett and Oneal, given by:

7

For a thorough discussion of the debate, see Gartzke and Li 2003a and subsequent replies by Barbieri and
Peters 2003, Oneal 2003, and their rebuttal in Gartzke and Li 2003b.
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Dependencei =
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This approach has the advantage of capturing the sensitivity aspects of
interdependence in a more complete way by considering trade’s impact on state
economies. To capture trade interdependence specifically, I use a dyadic measure in
accordance with Barbieri’s approach achieved by generating geometric means of trade
dependence:
Interdependenceij =
GH#+I PII+IIL M H#+I PII+IIN
This represents interdependence in the dyad by taking into account both states’
opportunity cost of conflict. Higher scores on this variable indicate greater
interdependence. To address asymmetry and relative gains, which I argue increases
conflict between certain states, I include a measure of trade asymmetry that once again
combines the two approaches by using the absolute difference in trade dependence
scores:
Asymmetryij = |H#+I PII+IIL  H#+I PII+IIN |
Higher scores reflect greater asymmetry. Using both the trade interdependence
and trade asymmetry measures allows me to more fully explain the influence of
interdependence on conflict. All trade data comes from the Correlates of War (CoW)
(Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins 2008) and GDP data from the World Bank (2012). I
interact each of these variables with the aforementioned agreement variables to capture
their influence within the context of economic agreements.
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4.2.3

Intra-Agreement Trade
As my operationalization of economic agreements indicates, they are a highly

heterogeneous group of arrangements. While agreements differ in the scope of coverage
and depth of liberalization, they also differ in the extent of membership. That is, some
agreements are only bilateral treaties while others are multilateral arrangements. The
benefit states derive from bilateral agreements is a function of commerce between the
two members and any intangible gains associated with their bilateral relationship (i.e.,
increased investment from non-member parties). Economic relationships and
interdependence between states in a multilateral agreement, however, are more complex.
Members of multilateral economic agreements benefit from reduced barriers with
multiple states. That is, economic agreements are a series of interconnected
relationships. While a member may not trade extensively with one particular partner, it is
still connected through the structure of the agreement.
In turn, the institutional structures of economic agreements may be affected by
conflict. Disputes between two agreement members – even if they do not trade
extensively – may threaten the existence of the entire agreement. The multilateral
Central American Common Market, for example, dissolved because of disputes between
El Salvador and Honduras. Consequently, trade between agreement members is in part
ascribed to the agreement. In other words, an opportunity cost or degree of
interdependence exists between members of an economic agreement attributable to trade
with third-party members of the agreement. To capture this influence, I specify a
variable capturing the total trade a state conducts with all agreement partners less
bilateral trade as a share of GDP, given by:
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Intra-agreement Tradeij =
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Where all k are members of the economic agreement and j is the dyadic partner of i. In
this way the variable captures the influence of trade with other agreement members net of
the dyadic trade influence. To capture the dyadic influence of intra-agreement trade, I
calculate the geometric mean of these scores:
Intra-agreeement Dependenceij =
GW#  X#II!I H#+IL M W#  X#II!I H#+IN
4.2.4

Foreign Direct Investment
Economic agreements are most often associated with reducing trade barriers

between members. Lower barriers to trade, however, has an important impact on
corporate investment strategies as well. Lower barriers in an economic agreement
effectively increases the available market for goods produced in that region. Expanding
markets, in turn, creates opportunities for firms to capitalize on economies-of-scale by
investing in economic agreement areas (Joumotte 2004; Chen 2009). Foreign direct
investment is one alternative business may employ to avoid the de facto discrimination of
a limited economic integration agreement. Hence, states in an economic agreement
might be expected to benefit from increased FDI inflows. It is important to account for
FDI in my analysis as it may provide another benefit to agreement members that
influences conflict behavior.
Capturing this effect is somewhat difficult given the complexity of the concept I
posit. Specifically, I am interested in investment attributable to the lower barriers of the
economic agreement. Of course, this is inherently unobservable and beyond the reach of
available data or reliable approximation techniques. Furthermore, this investment is non-
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directional in that it need not come from another agreement member to influence conflict
behavior. Hence, bilateral flows are inappropriate for my analysis. Given these factors,
the most appropriate conceptualizations and measures of FDI for my analysis is a net FDI
inflow at the country-year level. While not all FDI inflow is attributable to an economic
agreement, it is likely accurate to say all FDI inflows benefit from the agreement.
Consequently, while not all inflows are agreement-driven, they are all agreementbenefiting, meaning they may influence conflict behavior. I operationalize FDI
dependence using total new inflows as a share of GDP, given by:
FDI dependencei =
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As with trade interdependence, I generate dyadic measures using the geometric mean of
FDI dependence given by:
FDI Interdependenceij = GaPW PII+IIL M aPW PII+IIN
Because FDI flows can be negative, I rescale the variable by adding 1 to all observations.
The FDI interdependence variable is also interacted with the agreement variables. I
obtain FDI data from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) (2013).
4.2.5

Trade Diversion
A final primary explanatory variable captures trade diversion. A broad literature

in economics explores the effects of agreements on bilateral trade flows using gravity
models as a base (see Frankel 1997; Glick and Rose 2001; Rose and Wincoop 2001;
Baier and Bergstrand 2007; Carerre 2006 for recent examples). Differences between
gravity model estimates, which provide a theoretical level of trade, and observed trade
flows are attributed to the presence of an economic agreement (and therefore trade
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diversion). I therefore estimated a gravity model of trade that estimates the (logged)
bilateral trade between states in a dyad.8 To account for zero trade flows, I use a
Heckman selection model with the simple presence of trade in a dyad (coded 1 if trade
occurs, 0 otherwise) as the selection criteria (Carerre 2006). Trade diversion due to
economic agreements is calculated as the difference between the natural log of observed
trade and logged predicted values of the gravity model. Higher values therefore indicate
greater levels of trade diversion caused by membership in economic agreements.9
I use three groups of variables to estimate the gravity model. Table 4.2 briefly
outlines each variable and its source. First, I use a traditional set of variables to account
for the economic and geographic relationships of the states. These variables include GDP
(high and low), population (high and low), distance, contiguity, whether the two states
are in the same geographic region (as defined by the World Bank), individual variables
for each state’s region, and whether the two states share a common language. Second, I
expand on the gravity model by including a series of political variables. In this way I
better approximate the influence of economic agreements by accounting for other
potentially confounding influences on trade. These variables include regime type (high
and low), political affinity, alliances, major power status (total number in the dyad), and
WTO membership. Finally, a third set of variables accounts for conflict between states.
Conflict variables include militarized interstate disputes (cumulative total initiated since
1950), fatal militarized disputes (cumulative total initiated since 1950), a spatial lag of

8

I add $100 to all observations of trade to avoid problems with taking the log of zero.
While I am interested in trade diversion, I do not limit this variable to only diversion (positive values in
my variable). In this way, I permit economic agreements to create trade for excluded states. This may
theoretically occur if economic agreements increase demand for materials with the agreement which are
then sourced by neighboring states. Consequently, observed values on this variable run from negative
(trade creation) to positive (trade diversion).

9
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disputes using alliances to connect (detail provided in a later section), a spatial lag of
disputes using contiguity to connect, and years since the last militarized dispute.
Table 4.3 contains the results of the gravity model estimation. Rather than
discuss the results of individual variables, which is not the focus of my analysis, I focus
on the trade amounts predicted by the gravity model and subsequent estimation of trade
diversion. Figure 4.2 compares the gravity model estimations with actual trade values.
Overall, the gravity model tends to predict lower, more uniform trade values than actually
occur. The gravity model also underestimates zero trade values noticeably. Accuracy
with respect to actual trade values is not the goal of the gravity model, however, as the
presence of trade diversion is dependent on the gravity model being unable to explain
100% of trade values.
Turning to the actual measure, the manufactured trade diversion variable is
roughly normally distributed with very long tails. To provide a useful depiction of the
variable, I rescaled the variable to eliminate negative values by adding the lowest
observed value to all observations. This transformation is only to display the variable
and will not be used in subsequent analysis. Figure 4.3 plots the distribution of trade
diversion between the 5th and 95th percentile (to, once again, aid in displaying the variable
by eliminating very long tails). The majority of dyads witness relatively small amounts
of trade diversion given the cluster around the vertical line referencing “zero trade
diversion.” The area to the right of this line indicates dyads for which trade diversion
occurs. The area to the left, in contrast, indicates dyads with trade creation. Overall,

103

approximately 47.8% of dyads experience trade diversion, 41.1% experience trade
creation, and 11.1% experience neither creation nor diversion.10
To more fully capture the impact of trade diversion, I reference with respect to
GDP. The foundation of my trade diversion variable is thus given by,
Trade Diversionj =
(Lc&;=L:Y>?
C(D>
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As with my other economic variables, I generate dyadic measures using the
geometric mean of trade diversion given by:
Dyadic Trade Diversionij =
GTrade DiversionL M Trade DiversionN
My statistical tests and subsequent diagnostic analysis in Chapter 6 revealed a
polynomial relationship between trade diversion and conflict. Consequently, I include a
squared dyadic trade diversion term in Chapter 6 to appropriately evaluate the influence
of this variable.
4.2.6

Control Variables
I also use a number of control variables to account for competing explanations of

conflict between states. Four control variables – congruity, major powers, alliances, and
capabilities – control for realist arguments of conflict. Contiguous states and major
powers are more likely to fight due to greater opportunities for conflict (Most and Starr
1989). Allies, on the other hand, engage in combat less frequently given shared security
goals (Bremer 1992). I code these variables dichotomously if states are contiguous (or

10

Those experiencing neither trade creation nor diversion are dyads that have zero trade in a given year.
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separated by 150 miles of water or less), if either state is a major power, or if allied
respectively. My control for capabilities is a relative measure using composite index of
national capabilities (CINC) scores from the Correlates of War dataset. The measure is
calculated as a (logged) dyadic ratio of the smaller CINC score over the larger. I obtain
data for all three of these measures from the Alliances and Direct Contiguity datasets
housed at the Correlates of War Project (Singer 1972; Gibler 2009; Stinnett et al 2002).
Four additional controls – democracy, GDP, IGOs, and WTO membership–
account for liberal theories of interstate conflict. First, in accordance with the democratic
peace literature, I control for regime type using composite scores from the Polity IV
dataset scaled -10 to 10 from authoritarian to democratic (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr
2007).11 I use the geometric mean of scores in the dyad to measure democracy. Second,
the sizes of states’ economies are likely to influence both the degree to which they are
involved in international affairs and their ability to use certain policy instruments. To
this end, I control for GDP using the aforementioned Gleditsch figures. Because GDP is
highly skewed, it is logged for statistical analysis. Additionally, I use the geometric
mean of scores in the dyad. Third, since many economic integration agreements are also
international organizations proper, it is important to ensure the various integration
variables are not simply reflecting the broader pacifying effect of IGO membership
(Russett and Oneal 2001). I include a variable controlling for joint organization
membership to control for this possibility. Data comes from the International

11

I use the Polity 2 variable from this dataset. The Polity 2 variable differs from the basic Polity variable in
the authors’ dataset by adjusting several problematic variables for using statistical analysis. For example,
the authors code periods of anarchy -77 on the Polity variable. To facilitate time-series analysis, the
authors of the POLITY IV dataset recoded anarchy to a neutral score of 0, which they believe the
appropriate classification for these cases. For more information, see the POLITY IV Project coding manual
(Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2011).
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Governmental Organization dataset housed at the Correlates of War Project (Pevehouse,
Nordstrom, and Warnke 2004). Finally, in a similar way it is important to control for
membership in the WTO as the most all-encompassing economic institution in the world.
I code this variable 1 if both states are members of the WTO and 0 otherwise.
4.2.7

Descriptive Statistics
Tables 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 include descriptive statistics for all the variables used in

my analysis. Recall that my unit of analysis is non-directed country dyad years from
1970 to 2001. In total, approximately 16% of dyads share membership in a shallow or
deep economic agreement. Likewise, 20% of all observations are either one agreement
or opposing agreement dyads. Consider first statistics for my dependent variables, which
I have broken down by economic agreement type. First, note the relative rarity of both
dependent variables. Militarized disputes and economic sanctions generally occur in less
than 1% of dyads. Second, on the whole, military force is more often observed than
economic sanctions. While the relative popularity of economic sanctions is not
necessarily within the scope of this paper, their comparative unpopularity may reflect the
difficulty of using sanctions, the inability of some states to effectively employ them, or
different data collection procedures. Third, note the extreme infrequence of economic
sanctions between shallow and deep agreement members. Indeed, no two states in a deep
economic agreement (customs union, common market, or economic union) have
threatened or imposed sanctions on each other in the temporal scope of my study. I will
return to this point in the next chapter when discussing intra-agreement conflict.
Turning to my primary explanatory variables in Table 4.5, I have once again
broken the variables down by dyadic agreement type. Note first the relationship between
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shallow and deep agreement types in terms of economic relationships. Overall, deep
agreements tend to foster more interdependence, intra-agreement trade, FDI dependence,
and asymmetry between members. Several of these factors might be expected, save for
the asymmetry. This may reflect on forces creating economic agreements as much as the
impact of agreements, however, as strong states may forge agreements to solidify trade
blocs to their advantage.12 The second item of interest in Table 4.5 is the distribution of
the trade diversion variables. Overall, dyads with opposing agreements – i.e., where both
states are in different economic agreements – appear to experience more erratic patterns
of trade diversion given the mean and maximum observed values. For brevity, I omit
discussion of Table 4.6 regarding control variables.

4.3

Estimation Techniques
I specifically argue that the initiation of conflict and the tactics states use are

connected. That is, the use of sanctions and military force are both possible outcomes of
the same decision-making process. Accounting for this may be important to properly
assay the influence of economic agreements on the conflict process broadly. To this end
I employ several estimation strategies to address the connected nature of conflict and the
tactics utilized by states.13 First, I specify two logit models treating sanctions and
military force as separate dependent variables with the same set of explanatory variables.
This approach treats both events as outcomes of independent processes. Second, I
estimate a bivariate probit model that addresses the potential connection between
sanctions and military force as joint outcomes of the same process. Again, because I am
12

I employ several robustness checks accounting for the potentially endogenous nature of economic
agreement creation and interstate conflict. Results are reported in subsequent chapters.
13
I also conducted several robustness checks omitted here for space. These include rare events logit design to account
for dependent variables coded 1 less than 1% of observations, multinomial logit using imputed data, sample sets limited
to politically relevant dyads, and simultaneous equations accounting for endogeneity using a variety of instruments.
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using a derived predictor for trade diversion, I account for uncertainty in these estimates
using Murphy-Topel corrections in my statistical models (Murphy and Topel 1985;
Hardin 2000; Hole 2006).
While the logit and bivariate probit models are reliable and easily interpreted
estimation techniques, they are not well-suited to evaluating the strategic nature of
hypotheses derived from my formal model. It is possible the decision to initiate any form
of conflict – sanction or military force – is related to the effectiveness of using either
coercive instrument, hence my use of a formal bargaining model. In other words, states
are unlikely to initiate conflict if they cannot effectively employ either sanctions or
military force. Likewise, a defending state may be more likely to give in to demands if it
anticipates the use of one or the other. To address this, I specify a strategic probit model
(using STRAT software (Signorino 2001)), that allows the decision to initiate conflict in
part to derive from the expectation of either military force or economic sanctions being
used. The potential outcomes of interest in the strategic model are 1) no conflict
initiation (either a sanction or a MID) 2) the use of economic sanctions and 3) the use of
military force. Exact specifications for the strategic probit models will be provided in
subsequent empirical chapters. Given the challenges in estimating this complex model, I
limit my sample to dyads that are contiguous, major powers, or where at least one state is
a top ten trade partner of the other (and hence highly economically salient) and eliminate
the major powers and WTO membership variables .14
For comparison and simplicity, I subset my analysis on agreement type in all
models. For intra-agreement conflict, I separate shallow and deep agreements into two
separate regressions with “no agreement” dyads serving as the comparison category.
14

Limiting the logit and bivariate probit models to this subset of dyads does not change the results.
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This allows me to evaluate the impact of economic agreements as an institution. For
extra-agreement conflict between members and non-members, I separate the one
agreement and opposing agreement dyads into separate estimations with “no agreement”
dyads again serving as the comparison category. I lag all independent variables one year
to help control for endogeneity and protect the temporal integrity of the analysis. Given
the rarity of conflict and the possibility events are not truly temporally independent, I
include a cubic polynomial variable capturing the number of years between either a
sanction or MID to account for potential temporal dependence (Beck, Katz, and Tucker
1998; Carter and Signiorino 2010).

4.4

Threats to Internal Validity
No statistical analysis is without complications stemming from the structure of

data or other potential problems with causal inference. In my analysis, I am particularly
aware of two potentially confounding factors. First, my dataset contains a relatively large
proportion of missing data on important variables for my analysis. Second, observations
in my dataset may not be temporally or spatially independent, thus potentially biasing my
results. I address these two issues statistically using imputations and temporal/spatial
lags.
4.4.1

Missing Data and Multiple Imputation
The total number of dyad-years in my analysis is 437,250 running from 1970 to

2001. In total, however, approximately 60% of dyad-years are missing values on at least
one independent variable. This reduces the amount of usable observations to 173,618.
While more than enough for conventional statistical analysis, missingness of this
magnitude is a potential problem in my analysis. The most common means of handling
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missing data is simply omitting the observations from statistical analysis. Excluding
observations for which a portion of the relevant data is missing, however, poses several
potential problems. The least obtrusive problem is simply the loss of potentially useful
information. In extreme cases, however, omitting missing data can result in severe
selection bias (King et al 2001). Consequently, missingness is a statistical issue to be
taken seriously in my analysis.
The source of most missing observations in my dataset is trade. Approximately
27% of my observations do not possess valid trade values. Missing trade data is
compounded by the numerous dyadic measures created using observed trade values. In
total, approximately 37% of dyads are missing trade data for at least one state, resulting
in more missing values for my constructed measures of interdependence and asymmetry.
Second to trade in missingness is FDI, for which 34% of observations are missing data.
Two additional variables are particularly noteworthy in his regard. Democracy values are
missing for approximately 23% of data and GDP is missing for 16% of observations.
Of particular concern for my analysis is trade data given its position in my
theoretical argument and the subsequent conceptualization and operationalization of
variables using trade. Furthermore, missingness in trade data is problematic given the
nature of politics in the global economy. The omission of trade data from national
statistics is often not an issue of oversight or resources, but of political conditions and
influence (Barbieri, and Keshk 2009; 2011). In other words, rather than a random
process, trade data is often missing because of political factors included in my statistical
analysis (Barbieri 1995; Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins 2009; Gleditsch 2010). As trade is
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also one of my primary explanatory variables, it is important to address potential bias
stemming from missing data.
Several studies have used multiple imputation to address missing trade data.
First, Gleditsch (2002) creates a trade dataset using a series of procedures, including
using either export or import figures for one country if the other is missing, using a series
of lags or leads to cover gaps in data, some interpolation, and coding observations 0 if
trade between states is unlikely. These methods allow Gleditsch to eliminate missing
values in his dataset. Gelpi and Grieco (2008) use multiple imputation to fill in missing
trade values and evaluate the connection between interdependence and conflict. The
authors use both the Russett and Oneal and Barbieri datasets in their analysis.
Unfortunately, the authors do not offer a systematic evaluation of their dataset in order to
evaluate the potential appropriateness of imputation for trade data. Finally, Boehmer,
Jungblut, and Stoll (2011) evaluate the use of constructed data in the analysis of
interdependence and conflict. The authors replicate Russett and Oneal (2001) using
Gleditsch (2002) and Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins (2009) data by considering first only
observations with actual trade data. They then add in imputed for missing data at 5%
intervals to evaluate the effect on the interdependence-conflict dynamic. Ultimately the
authors find imputed data tends to inflate the effect of trade in conflict models. Again,
the authors do not systematically evaluate the constructed data in reference to observed
data.
While these studies use statistical techniques to fill in missing trade data, Barbieri,
Keshk, and Pollins (2009), identify potential problems in deriving trade data outside of
official government reports. Several assumptions are required to derive data, many of
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which are tenuous or unfounded. Assuming zero trade between states based on various
dyadic characteristics is generally unsound in this era of globalization. Furthermore,
missing data is often missing for political reasons. Data may be misreported to over or
understate trade relationships, for example. Likewise, conflict can impact trade between
states. Given this inherent difficulty in imputing trade data, I first tested the quality of
imputed trade values against available data. A full description of the procedures and
analysis of the results is available in Appendix A. In short, I evaluate the quality of trade
values imputed using the procedure and software (Amelia II) developed by King et al
(2001) by randomly voiding 20% of known, non-missing trade values. I then evaluate
the real versus imputed trade statistics for accuracy and potential problems.
Based on this analysis, two factors are important in the determination of accurate
trade statistics. The first is whether the observation is missing a GDP score for either
state in the dyad. This is relatively innocuous, however, as only 6.1% of dyads are
missing both trade and GDP. Inaccuracy on 6.1% of observations, while certainly not
optimal, is unlikely to drastically harm my analysis. Furthermore, I can perform two
different statistical analyses that include and exclude the imputed values for observations
missing GDP to evaluate the influence of the 6.1%. The second, however, is the imputed
model’s inaccuracy with respect to predicting zero trade relationships. This is slightly
more problematic given approximately 30% of recorded bilateral trade relationships are
zero. Assuming an identical proportion of dyads missing trade data are in fact zero,
approximately 8% of my total dataset will be affected. My strategy here is to perform
two statistical analyses – one excluding observations that are missing trade data and one
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using the imputed trade values. If results differ, I will explore more carefully the imputed
values and their validity in my statistical analysis.
4.4.2

Temporal and Spatial Dependence
My statistical analysis also requires adjustments to account for potential

dependencies in the data. First, given the rarity of conflict and the possibility events are
not truly temporally independent, I include a cubic polynomial variable capturing the
number of years between either a sanction or MID to account for the recurrence of
conflict over time (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998; Carter and Signorino 2010).
Second, the policies and actions of states on the international stage are in part
dependent on the policies and actions of other states with which they share a connection.
As I have noted in a previous chapter, the proliferation of economic agreements is in part
fueled by states observing agreements between third parties and subsequently forming
agreements of their own. Likewise, incidents of conflict may exhibit some degree of
spatial dependence if wars are prone to spilling across borders or drawing in third parties.
I take into account potential spatial dependency between dyads involved in conflict using
two spatial lag variables capturing an aggregated, lagged value of the dependent variable
(Neumayer and Plumper 2010). The first variable is weighted by geographic continuity
under the assumption a state is more likely to experience conflict when a neighbor is
already embroiled in conflict. The second variable is weighted by alliance ties, as a state
may be more likely to act when an ally is experiencing a conflict. I construct spatial lags
for both militarized interstate disputes and sanctions. Summary statistics for these
constructed variables are available in Table 4.6.
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Table 4.1: Levels of Economic Integration

Reduction in Trade Barriers

Elimination of Trade Barriers
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Creation of a Common External
Trade Policy
Free Movement of Labor and
Capital
Coordination of Domestic
Economic Policies

Partial Scope
Agreement
(PSA)

Free Trade
Area
(FTA)

Customs
Union
(CU)

Common
Market
(CM)

Economic
Union
(EU)

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

Table 4.2: Gravity Model Variables
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Variable
Measure
Dependent Variable
Total Bilateral Trade
Imports + exports in a dyad in a given year (logged)
Traditional Gravity Model
GDPHigh
Highest GDP score in the dyad (logged)
GDPLow
Lowest GDP score in the dyad (logged)
PopulationLow
Highest population in the dyad (logged)
PopulationHigh
Lowest population in the dyad (logged)
Distance
Distance between capitals in miles
Contiguity
Coded 1 if states share a border or less than 150 miles of water
Region
Dichotomous, coded 1 if states in a dyad are the same region
Common Language
Dichotomous, coded 1 if states share a common language
Political Variables
DemocracyHigh
Highest POLITY IV score in the dyad (using Polity 2 variable)
DemocracyLow
Lowest POLITY IV score in the dyad (using Polity 2 variable)
Affinity
Reflects similarity in policies according to UN voting behavior
Allies
Dichotomous, coded 1 if states in a dyad are allies
Major PowerSum
Sum of major powers in the dyad (0, 1, or 2 values)
WTO Membership
Dichotomous, coded 1 if states are both members of the WTO
Militarized DisputesSum Sum of all militarized disputes in a dyad from 1950 to 2001
Fatal Militarized
Sum of all fatal militarized disputes in a dyad from 1950 to
DisputesSum
2001
Spatial LagAlliances
Spatial lag for MID initiation using alliances as connector
Spatial LagContiguity
Spatial lag for MID initiation using contiguity as connector
Peace Years
Years since a militarized dispute between states in a dyad

Source
Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins 2008
Penn World Tables 2012
Penn World Tables 2012
Penn World Tables 2012
Penn World Tables 2012
Gleditsch 2012
Small and Singer (1982)
Author
Mayer and Zignago 2011
POLITY IV
POLITY IV
Gartzke 2008
Gibler and Sarkees 2004
Small and Singer 1982
Author
Maoz 2004
Maoz 2004
Author
Author
Author

Table 4.3: Gravity Model Estimates
Extant Trade
Relationship (Selection)
Standard
Coefficient
Error
Traditional Gravity Model
GDPHigh
GDPLow
PopulationHigh
PopulationLow
Distance
Contiguity
Region
Common Language
Political Variables
DemocracyHigh
DemocracyLow
Affinity
Allies
Major PowerSum
WTO Membership
Conflict Variables
Militarized DisputesSum
Fatal Militarized DisputesSum
Spatial LagAlliances
Spatial LagContiguity
Peace Years
Constant
Constant
N
Censored
Uncensored
λ2
Log Pseudolikelihood
ρ

Total Bilateral Trade
(Outcome)
Standard
Coefficient
Error

0.270***
0.261***
-0.029***
-0.057
-0.000***
0.809***
0.283***
0.243***

0.003
0.004
0.006
0.031
0.000
0.028
0.014
0.012

0.735***
0.800***
0.068***
0.099*
-0.001***
1.399***
0.057***
0.548***

0.004
0.004
0.005
0.005
0.000
0.025
0.018
0.016

0.014***
0.005***
-0.065***
0.370***
0.312***
0.296***

0.000
0.000
0.013
0.018
0.023
0.007

0.008***
0.007***
-0.639***
0.553***
0.586***
0.208***

0.001
0.000
0.015
0.020
0.017
0.010

-0.132***
-0.044
-0.910
7.285***
-0.005***

0.009
0.032
0.760
0.712
0.000

-0.143***
0.104
9.369***
14.395***
-0.024***

0.007
0.034
0.848
0.926
0.000

0.113 -20.248***
261,981
71,183
190,798
206,576.89***
-491,020.00
0.073***

0.155

-12.114***

116

Table 4.4: Descriptive Statistics - Dependent Variables
All and No Agreement Dyads

MIDs

Economic Sanctions

Frequency
Percentage

All Dyads
0
1
(None)
(Initiated)
182,126
631
99.65%
0.35%

Frequency
Percentage

All Dyads
0
1
(None)
(Initiated)
182,533
224
99.88%
0.12%

No Agreement
0 (None)
153,382
99.72%

1 (Initiated)
431
0.28%

No Agreement
0 (None)
153,628
99.88%

1 (Initiated)
185
0.12%

Intra-Agreement Conflict

MIDs

Economic Sanctions

Frequency
Percentage

Shallow Agreements
0
1
(None)
(Initiated)
26,112
168
99.36%
0.64%

Frequency
Percentage

Shallow Agreements
0
1
(None)
(Initiated)
26,241
39
99.85%
0.15%

Deep Agreements
0 (None)
2,632
98.80%

1 (Initiated)
32
1.20%

Deep Agreements
0 (None)
2,664
100.00%

1 (Initiated)
0
0.00%

Exra-Agreement Conflict

MIDs

Economic Sanctions

Opposing Agreements

Frequency
Percentage

One Agreement
0
1
(None)
(Initiated)
15,725
143
99.10%
0.90%

Opposing Agreements

Frequency
Percentage

One Agreement
0
1
(None)
(Initiated)
15,807
61
99.62%
0.38%
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0 (None)
20,056
99.04%

0 (None)
20,163
99.57%

1 (Initiated)
194
0.96%

1 (Initiated)
87
0.43%

Table 4.5: Descriptive Statistics - Primary Explanatory Variables
Mean

Std. Dev.

Minimum

Maximum

All Dyads
Asymmetry
Interdependence
FDI Dependence*

0.008
0.002
1.017

0.032
0.006
0.033

0.000
0.000
0.395

0.907
0.197
1.616

No Agreement Dyads
Asymmetry
Interdependence
FDI Dependence*

0.006
0.001
1.017

0.027
0.004
0.033

0.0000
0.0000
0.395

0.907
0.197
1.616

Shallow Agreements
Asymmetry
Interdependence
Intra-Agreement Trade
FDI Dependence*

0.020
0.003
0.007
1.017

0.048
0.008
0.018
0.038

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.414

0.700
0.163
0.363
1.426

Deep Agreements
Asymmetry
Interdependence
Intra-Agreement Trade
FDI Dependence*

0.025
0.014
0.056
1.020

0.047
0.017
0.075
0.032

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.837

0.461
0.112
0.408
1.418

One Agreement Dyads
Asymmetry
Interdependence
Trade DiversionHigh
Trade DiversionLow

0.022
0.004
0.003
-0.016

0.048
0.007
0.023
0.040

0.000
0.000
-0.059
-0.855

0.851
0.151
0.526
0.037

Opposing Agreement Dyads
Asymmetry
Interdependence
Trade DiversionHigh
Trade DiversionLow

0.018
0.003
0.003
-0.012

0.044
0.006
0.016
0.039

0.000
0.000
-0.077
-0.964

0.998
0.171
0.318
0.195

*In order to generate geometric means, I rescaled the FDI dependence variable to eliminate negative
values by adding 1 to all observations.
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Table 4.6: Descriptive Statistics - Control Variables
Mean

Std. Dev.

Minimum

Maximum

-9.654
0
18.453
0
0
0
0
0
0

-0.001
20
29.552
107
0.127
0.091
0.109
0.074
50

Continuous Variables
Capabilities (logged)
Democracy
GDP (logged)
IGO
Spatial MID LagAlliances
Spatial MID LagContiguity
Spatial Sanctions LagAlliances
Spatial Sanctions LagContiguity
Peace Years

-2.022
8.945
23.358
28.735
0.003
0.003
0.001
0.001
24.212

1.503
6.144
1.479
11.254
0.004
0.004
0.003
0.003
12.361

Frequency

Percentage

164,869
17,977
176,281
6,565
165,190
17,656
91,338
91,508

90.17%
9.83%
96.41%
3.59%
90.34%
9.66%
49.95%
50.05%

Dichotomous Variables
Allies
Contiguity
Major Power
WTO Membership
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CHAPTER 5
INTRA-AGREEMENT CONFLICT
In Chapter 3, I argued that economic agreements confer tangible benefits on
member states by increasing commerce and fostering robust trade networks. The benefits
members gain from economic agreement in turn promotes interdependence between
states. Increased exchange between members encourages reliance on intra-agreement ties
for resources and markets. Overall, members of economic agreements are likely more
vulnerable and sensitive to disruptions in trade with other agreements members. Conflict
behavior between members of the same economic agreement should also be affected by
increased commercial exchange and interdependence. First, the opportunity cost of
conflict increases in tandem with economic exchange. Conflict between agreement
members likely sacrifices tariff revenue for governments, increases risk for business, and
jeopardizes profits for externally oriented actors. Consequently, economic agreements
should decrease the likelihood of conflict between member states. Second, the strategies
used by agreement members in disputes should also shift as a result of increased
interdependence. The less economically dependent state in the dyad, given its relatively
more autonomous position, is better poised to use economic sanctions as a tool of
coercion. More dependent states, in contrast, cannot effectively use sanctions, and
thereby are more likely to use military force in disputes.
This chapter tests this argument with non-directed dyads from 1970 to 2001 using
the procedures and data outlined in the previous chapter. In the first section I revisit the
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relationship between economic agreements and sanctions in light of my deductive theory.
In short, and in spite of my theory, economic agreement members appear less likely to
use economic sanctions than those without an agreement. Following this, I statistically
evaluate the influence of economic agreements on militarized interstate disputes (MIDs).
Ultimately I find that agreements can decrease the probability of militarized conflict if
trade relations are asymmetric and intra-agreement trade is high. Shallow agreements,
however, can increase conflict if trade interdependence and FDI dependence are high.
The next section discusses these results and associated implications for my theory. The
fourth section of this chapter presents an alternative statistical test that considers the
potentially endogenous relationship between agreements and conflict. Finally, I provide
a short illustration of my theory and empirical results by analyzing relations between
Uganda and Kenya since achieving independence.

5.1

Revisiting Economic Agreements and Conflict Between Members
One of the key insights from the formal model detailed in Chapter 3 is the

substitution of economic sanctions for military force in conflict scenarios. Given the
setup of my model, sanctions are possible regardless of interdependence and the cost of
conflict. They are particularly likely, however, if the challenger is relatively autonomous
and the defender relatively dependent. Sanctions are less likely if the challenger is
dependent and the defender autonomous. Asymmetric trade relations are therefore the
most likely to result in economic sanctions. Military force is possible in all scenarios, but
more likely in dyads with relatively little interdependence. Highly interdependent dyads
are less likely to use military force against each other.
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The results of my formal model translate to economic agreements in a relatively
straightforward fashion. Given economic agreements tend to generate commercial
exchange between states and serve as commitments to future interaction, interdependence
between members is relatively high. Conflict should be less likely overall, but if it does
occur, different strategies should be discernible according to the relative economic
position of members. Relatively dependent agreement members are predisposed to
military force while relatively autonomous members are prone to using economic
sanctions per the implications of my formal model. Likewise, symmetrical economic
relations are less likely to encourage military force given the interdependence of
members and presumably muted concerns about relative gains.
A preliminary look at the data, however, suggest some interesting patterns
between members of the same economic agreement and the strategies they employ when
engage in disputes. Figure 5.1 displays the frequency with which states employ any
coercive strategy (sanctions or military force), economic sanctions, and military force
distributed by agreement type. Consider first the all dyads sample in the left panel of
Figure 5.1. Looking at coercion, which is the use of either a sanction or a MID,
agreement members appear if anything more likely to coerce other agreement members
than dyads without an economic agreement. Approximately 0.40% of dyad years without
an agreement experienced either a MID or economic sanction between 1970 and 2001.
In contrast, 0.79% of dyads with a shallow agreement and 1.20% of deep agreement
dyads experienced a MID or sanction.
The disparities between dyads with and without an agreement apply to the
strategies used in conflict as well. Dyads without an economic agreement tend to use
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military force 2.3 times the rate of economic sanctions. Approximately 0.28% of no
agreement dyads experienced a MID while 0.12% experienced an economic sanction.
The corresponding rate for shallow agreements, however, is approximately 4.3 MIDs for
every economic sanction. MIDs have occurred in over 0.64% of shallow agreement
dyads while only 0.15% have experienced sanctions. Of the 39 sanctions used by
shallow agreement members, 32 are between partial scope agreement members at the
lowest levels of integration. Hence, military force is more frequently used by economic
agreement members compared to states that do not share membership in the same
agreement. Likewise, while agreement members use sanctions at about the same rate as
those without an agreement (0.15% versus 0.12% respectively), they use military force at
much higher rates (0.64% versus 0.28%).
An analysis of deep economic integration reveals an even more lopsided
comparison. Indeed, between 1970 and 2001 – the time period of the TIES dataset – no
state in a customs union, common market, or economic union have used economic
sanctions against a fellow member. Agreement members, however, are not so
constrained vis-à-vis the use of military force. Indeed, if anything, agreement members
are more likely to use military force against fellow members (0.28% for dyads without
agreements and 1.20% for deep agreements). Consequently, deep agreement members
appear more prone to both the overall use of conflict and military force as a strategy in
conflict.
To be sure, the states most likely to engage in conflict are also the most likely to
engage in cooperation as both require international interests and/or geographic proximity.
I take this into account by comparing coercion again using only politically relevant
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dyads. The right panel of Figure 5.1 shows frequencies for politically relevant dyads
(where one state is a major power or the states are contiguous). First, shallow agreement
members are still more likely to engage in conflict compared to no agreement dyads
(4.18% of dyads and 2.83% of dyads respectively). Second, the ratio of military force to
economic sanctions for shallow agreement members is 11.3 uses of military force for
every sanction. The corresponding rate for no agreement dyads is 2.3. Third, while the
overall incidence of conflict between deep agreement members is more muted in the
politically relevant dyads sample (2.35% of dyads experiencing conflict compared to
2.83% for no agreement dyads), it remains wholly militarized in nature.
This analysis brings evidence to bear on several of my hypotheses. First,
Hypothesis 1 states economic agreements decrease the likelihood of conflict between
member states. This does not appear to be the case given the use of coercion (particularly
military force) between shallow and deep agreement members.15 Moreover, this effect
appears to grow stronger as the level of integration deepens. Consequently, I find
evidence against my first hypothesis. It is not conclusive, however, as it does not identify
the conditions under which militarized conflict occurs. Second, the results are also
suggestive for Hypothesis 5 concerning the symmetry of economic relations and use of
sanctions or militarized force. The relative infrequency with which agreement members
use economic sanctions indicates agreements, if anything, strongly bias members to use
military force. Hence, I find evidence against Hypothesis 5 stating that symmetrically
dependent agreement members are less likely to use military force against other members

15

To evaluate this statement more fully, I conducted tests pooling sanctions and MIDs as the dependent
variable (coded 1 if either a sanction or a MID occurred, 0 otherwise). As might be expected given the
paucity of sanctions, the results are nearly identical to the reported statistical tests using only MIDs. This
suggests economic agreements can either decrease or increase conflict under certain economic conditions.
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as a tool of coercion than asymmetrically dependent members. Despite these findings, it
is still important to evaluate the structure of trade in economic agreement members’
decision to use military force, which is the subject of Hypotheses 3 and 4. Given the
paucity of sanctions episodes between members, however, I restrict my statistical
analysis to evaluating agreement member’s tendencies to use military force.

5.2

Statistical Results
Chapter 4 describes in detail the procedure I use for statistically analyzing intra-

agreement conflict. To briefly recap, however, this section uses data covering the period
1970 to 2001 for all non-directed dyads. My dependent variable is the onset of a
militarized interstate dispute (MID) in a given year. I employ several primary
explanatory variables capturing agreement structures and associated economic
relationships. The two agreement types I model are shallow and deep agreements. The
former comprise partial scope agreements and free trade agreements. The latter include
customs unions, common markets, and economic unions. To fully capture bilateral
economic relationships between states I interact trade interdependence and trade
asymmetry with the agreement variable. I also use national FDI dependence (interacted
with the agreement variable) and intra-agreement trade (the sum of all trade a state
conducts with other agreement members beside their dyadic partner) to capture economic
relationships more fully. I then use logistic regression to analyze both simple and
imputed data.16

16

I also performed several robustness checks of the results presented here. These include rare-events logit
account for the rarity of observed sanctions/MIDs, models with transformations of primary variables,
alternative specifications of the primary variables, models pooling sanctions and MIDs into one dependent
variable, simultaneous equation models accounting for endogeneity, models with only politically relevant
dyads, and the use of only fatal MIDs. The results are identical to those presented here with the exception
of fatal MIDs, which are discussed in the appendix.
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5.2.1

Basic Logit Results
Table 5.1 contains the results of the logit models estimating the influence of

shallow agreements on conflict between member states. Consider first the basic logit
model that only uses observed data (i.e., no imputed values). Overall, the results for the
shallow agreement model suggest a strong role of agreements in militarized disputes
conditioned by the structure of economic relations between member states. The shallow
agreement variable, indicating two states share membership in this type of agreement, is
negative and statistically significant. Two states that share membership in a partial scope
agreement or free trade area are therefore less likely to engage in conflict simply due to
the existence of the institution and not necessarily its economic consequences. The
pacifying influence of the institution itself may reflect intangible benefits accruing to
member states, such as increased international bargaining power in multilateral
negotiations, the value of signaling commitments to economic openness, or even the
anticipation of future economic gains. This finding is in line with my argument that
economic agreement members tend to engage in less conflict than those without joint
economic agreement membership.
Beyond the agreement variable, two key additional terms are also negative and
statistically significant. First, the intra-agreement trade variable is negative and
statistically significant. Consequently, the more states benefit from membership in the
agreement by trading with all agreement partners, the less likely they are to engage in
military disputes. This result is in line with my overall theory arguing that economic
agreements reduce the occurrence of conflict. Second, the interaction between
asymmetry and shallow agreements indicates disparate reliance on bilateral trade tends to
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reduce the occurrence of militarized conflict. Dyads where one state is relatively more
dependent on the other for trade as a share of its overall economy are less likely to
engage in militarized conflict. By implication, more symmetric trade relations between
agreement members are relatively more conflict prone. This is a somewhat puzzling
finding given my theory argues asymmetric trade relations are more likely to result in
militarized disputes. The results of the standalone, non-interacted asymmetry variable –
which is positive and statistically significant – make these results all the more puzzling.
Dyads without an economic agreement and asymmetric trade relations are therefore more
likely to engage in military conflict. Hence, while asymmetry increases conflict between
states without an agreement, it may reduce it once an agreement is introduced. This
brings evidence to bear against Hypothesis 5.
Some aspects of shallow economic agreements also encourage conflict. First, the
interaction between shallow agreements and interdependence is positive and statistically
significant. States sharing joint membership in a shallow economic agreement are more
prone to militarized conflict the more they rely on each other for trade. This is again
somewhat of a puzzling finding given the bulk of literature of interdependence and
conflict. Indeed, it contradicts my theory arguing that interdependence between
agreement members should both decrease the likelihood of overall disputes and shift
strategies away from militarized conflict. It is important to note that the standalone, noninteracted interdependence variable is negative and significant, indicating dyads without
an economic agreement are indeed less likely to engage in militarized conflict as
interdependence increases. Second, the interaction of FDI dependence and shallow
agreements is also positive with confidence bounds independent of zero. Shallow
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economic agreement members who rely on FDI for increasingly large shares of their
economy are more likely to engage in conflict than those with less FDI reliance. Once
again, the non-interacted FDI dependence variable is negative and statistically significant.
In absence of a shallow economic agreement, FDI pacifies state relations. This suggests
some aspect of shallow agreements alters the normal functioning of FDI with respect of
conflict. Both findings suggest certain economic relationships encourage conflict,
thereby highlighting the conditional nature of Hypothesis 1.
Before discussing the imputed logit results, consider the results of the deep
agreement model. Table 5.2 contains the results of the logit models estimating the
influence of deep agreements on conflict between member states. Only two primary
variables achieve statistical significance in the deep agreement model. First, intraagreement trade is negative and statistically significant. As with the shallow agreement
model, a greater proportion of trade occurring with third-party agreement members tends
to pacify bilateral relations. Second, the interaction between asymmetry and deep
agreements is negative and statistically significant. This result for deep agreements is in
line with those for shallow agreements. Consequently, asymmetric trade relations reduce
the probability of conflict between economic agreement members regardless of the depth
or scope of integration. Unlike the shallow agreement model, however, the noninteracted asymmetry variable does not achieve statistical significance in the deep
agreement model.17 The interactions between deep agreements and, individually,
17

To test the baseline impact of interdependence, asymmetry, and FDI without economic agreements, I
specified a model using only dyads that do not share membership in the same economic agreement. The
results indicate that interdependence and FDI dependence reduce conflict between states (i.e., negative and
statistically significant coefficients). Asymmetry increases conflict (a positive and statistically significant
coefficient). This is identical to the results of the shallow agreement model, which in subsequent
discussions I will refer to when making comparisons between dyads with and without joint membership in
an agreement.
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interdependence and FDI dependence do not achieve statistical significance, thereby
suggesting they do not impact militarized conflict in this context.
The remaining variables in the shallow and deep agreement models exhibit
relatively similar patterns. Many variables achieve statistical significance across all
model specifications. The two variables capturing opportunities for conflict – contiguity
and major power status – are positive and significant across all models (basic and
imputed logit, shallow and deep agreements). Two states sharing a border or with at least
one major power are more likely to engage in militarized disputes. This is likely due to
the increased opportunities for conflict presented to neighbors and highly involved major
powers. Likewise, power parity appears to increase the probability of conflict between
states given the positive and significant capabilities variable. The intuition behind this
finding is straightforward. States only engage in militarized conflict if there is a
possibility of prevailing, which in turn is given by relatively similar capabilities.
Larger economies, indicated by the GDP variable, are also more likely to engage
in conflict, once again owing to the opportunity large states have to project military
power. Interestingly, the more IGOs states share membership in, the more likely they are
to engage in conflict. This may suggest the propensity for IGOs to raise issues of
disagreement between member states or highlight differences in policy. In line with the
robust literature on the democratic peace, democratic states are less likely to experience
conflict. Finally, the spatial lag variable for contiguity is positive and significant across
all models. States with conflicts on their borders are therefore more likely to be
embroiled in conflicts as well. Of the remaining three variables, only alliances achieve
statistical significance in any of the models. Allies are more likely to engage in
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militarized conflict, but only in the basic logit models without imputed data. Neither
joint WTO membership nor the spatial lag based on alliances achieves statistical
significance in any of the models.
5.2.2

Imputed Data Statistical Results and Discussion
The results of the logit model using imputed data, contained in the right two

columns of Table 5.1 and Table 5.2, present less clear results concerning economic
agreements and conflict. Of my primary explanatory variables in the shallow agreement
model, only the interaction between shallow agreements and asymmetry achieves
statistical significance. It enters into the equation negatively, suggesting once again that
asymmetric trade relations reduce conflict while symmetric relations are more conflict
prone. In the deep agreement model, only intra-agreement trade is statistically
significant. It is also negative such that higher degrees of trade with third-party
agreement members reduce dyadic conflict. The remaining variables in both models fail
to achieve statistical significance.
Differences in the basic and imputed logit specifications warrant here a more
detailed discussion. Overall, the basic and imputed logit models differ in statistical
significance on a number of my key explanatory variables. All of my primary
explanatory variables achieve statistical significance in the basic logit shallow agreement
model. While the corresponding variables for the imputed logit model are of similar
signage, only one achieves statistical significance. In the deep agreements model, two
primary explanatory variables are statistically significant in the basic logit compared to
one in the imputed logit. Perhaps more disconcertingly, however, is that none of the
economic variables – interdependence, asymmetry, or FDI dependence – achieve
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statistical significance in either model. Indeed, the economic variables do not gain
statistical significance in tests where agreements and all interaction variables are
removed. Economic relations, therefore, have little to do with conflict according to my
imputed dataset.
There are several possible explanations for these findings. First, and perhaps
most basically, is that economic relations do not truly have an effect on interstate conflict.
In other words, the imputed data may be the more accurate reflection of reality. While
this may be the case, several other studies using imputed data find economic relations do
indeed influence conflict (Gelpi and Grieco 2008; Boehmer, Jungblut, and Stoll 2011).
My analysis incorporates more economic variables than previous studies, but that does
not explain a prior the lack of statistical significance on all variables. Second, the sheer
amount of missingness in my dataset – most of which is a consequence of the economic
variables mentioned – may complicate statistical analysis. Using imputed data allows me
to increase the number of observations by 90% from approximately 183,000 to 347,000.
This amount of constructed data may unduly bias against finding results on my primary
explanatory variables. Indeed, Boehmer, Jungblut, and Stoll (2011) use Monte Carlo
simulations to find that statistical analysis of trade data is meaningfully impacted as the
proportion of missing data increases. Given the nearly 1:1 ratio of observed to missing
data, it is not unreasonable to think my results biased by the scale of missingness.
Third, to return to a point Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins (2009) have made, missing
data is often missing for political reasons. Periods of conflict or tense relations may
result in missing trade data, for example. Certain types of states are also less likely to
supply trade statistics. Boehmer, Jungblut, and Stoll (2011) find that states with missing
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trade data are less democratic, less developed, and materially weaker than those that
supply statistics. I replicated and expanded their analysis with my dataset to analyze
missing data, as well. In addition to the aforementioned factors, geographic distance,
lack of participation in international organizations, and conflicts in neighboring countries
also increase missingness of both trade and FDI data. While I have taken care to model
these factors into generating my imputed data, the results may still be inaccurate. In
particular, as Appendix A illustrates, the imputation model does poorly at predicting zero
trade values. Several of the factors predicting missingness also predict zero trade flows,
including distance, power disparities, and conflicts in neighboring countries. It is
reasonable to believe inaccuracies in the imputed trade data stems from the tendency of
statistical models (and researchers) to specify trade values where none may exist. Hence,
the nature of missingness in trade data may stymie my efforts to develop accurately
imputed data.
As for its overall impact on my analysis, the results of the imputed logit model are
to be taken seriously. I am less confident in them, however, the validity and usefulness
of imputed trade data based on the factors I mention in this section. I believe it important
to report this alternative finding, however, in the interest of those who may look upon the
basic logic results skeptically because of missing data. I believe it also important to
provide more rather than less analysis in the case that my suspicious of imputed trade
data are warranted. Consequently, my empirical analyses in Chapters 5 and 6 will favor
the basic over the imputed logit for purposes of interpretation and discussion.
Furthermore, this can be observed as the more conservative route from the perspective of
the literature and policy. I doubt many scholars will dismiss the findings of the trade and
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conflict literature based on the imputed dataset I propose. Likewise, the riskier route for
policymakers is to dismiss the impact of trade on conflict given I find it can both assuage
and exacerbate tensions. Consequently, I believe the results of the basic logit model are
worth reporting and interpreting.
5.2.3

Substantive Interpretation
Before discussing the theoretical implications of my results, it is important to

consider the substantive impact of my variables of interest. First, recall the shallow
agreement variable is negative and statistically significant. Given this is a simple
dichotomous variable, I estimate the change in the predicted probability of a MID by
shifting the shallow agreement variable from 0 to 1 while holding all other variables at
their mean or modal values using Clarify (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003). The
baseline probability of a MID given all variables are held at their mean or modal values is
0.071%. Two states sharing membership in a shallow economic agreement have a MID
probability of 0.064% for a total decrease of 8.88%. By way of comparison, this is
roughly equivalent to an increase of two units on the dyadic democracy score generated
using Polity IV. Forming a shallow economic agreement therefore results in a small, but
noteworthy, decline in the probability of militarized conflict.
I use a series of graphs to interpret my remaining primary explanatory variables.
Figure 5.2 plots the out-of-sample predicted probabilities for the primary explanatory
variables in the shallow agreements model. All probabilities were calculated by
manipulating the variable of interest while holding all other variables at their mean or
modal values. The solid line indicates probabilities for shallow agreements while the
dashed line plots dyads without any agreement for comparison. The band and spike plots
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around the lines are the 95% confidence intervals for shallow and no agreement dyads
respectively. Finally, note also the different scaling between the top and bottom two
quadrants. This is done for convenience of presentation given the disparities in predicted
probabilities and directionality of the variables.
The two top plots of Figure 5.2 are for trade asymmetry and intra-agreement
trade, both of which reduce the probability of militarized conflict. The baseline
probability of a MID is approximately 0.07% for sates in a shallow agreement. As one
shallow agreement member in the dyad develops a more dependent economic
relationship, meaning it relies on its dyadic partner for a relatively larger portion of trade
and economic activity, the probability of a MID decreases. At relatively asymmetry
levels approaching 8% of GDP, the probability of a MID is only approximately 0.03%.
This contrasts with dyads that do not share membership in an agreement. The probability
of a MID increases from approximately 0.06% to 0.09% as asymmetry rises from 0% to
8% of GDP. It is also important to note that a clear distinction between shallow and no
agreement dyads cannot be made until approximately 6% of GDP, where the two
confidence intervals diverge. This is a relatively high threshold with values that only
approximately 25% of politically relevant dyads reach. Consequently, the majority of
shallow agreement dyads exhibit similar behavior to no agreement dyads vis-à-vis trade
asymmetry. Intra-agreement trade exhibits a similar pattern. As the states in the dyad
rely more on other agreement partners for trade, and therefore experience relatively
higher costs of conflict, the probability of conflict declines from 0.07% when no thirdparty trade occurs (as with bilateral trade agreements) to 0.01% if the geometric mean of
intra-agreement trade approaches 20%.
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The bottom two panels of Figure 5.2 plot FDI dependence and interdependence,
both of which increase the probability of militarized conflict between shallow agreement
members. In absence of a shallow agreement, FDI dependence reduces the probability of
a MID between states from approximately 0.07% to 0.02% at geometric mean values of
10%. In contrast, shallow agreement members actually experience an increase in conflict
due to FDI dependence. This probability increases to approximately 0.2% at 10% FDP
dependence. Note two additional points concerning the comparison of shallow and no
agreement dyads. First, if FDI dependence is negative, indicating a net outflow of
capital, the probability of a MID is lower for shallow agreement members compared to
no agreement dyads. Second, the confidence intervals for shallow and no agreement
dyads again diverge at approximately 5% of GDP. Consequently, if FDI dependence is
between approximately 0% and 5%, its effect for shallow and no agreement members is
almost indistinguishable. FDI dependence greater than 5%, however, results in a higher
probability of MID initiation for shallow agreement dyads than no agreement dyads.
Overall, approximately 10% of shallow agreement dyads experience FDI dependence
above this threshold.
Trade interdependence, show in the bottom right plot of Figure 5.2, also increases
the probability of conflict. As shallow agreement members rely more on each other for
trade, the probability of experiencing a MID increases from 0.07% with 0% trade to
approximately 0.15% probability at geometric mean values of 4%. Dyads without an
agreement, in contrast, experience less conflict as trade interdependence increases.
Furthermore, the confidence intervals between shallow and no agreement dyads begin to
diverge around approximately 2%, after which the effect of shallow agreements is
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statistically discernible from states without an agreement. Again, approximately 10% of
shallow agreement members breech this threshold.
Turning to the deep agreement model, consider first what might be considered a
typical case. When holding all variables constant at mean or modal values, dyads without
an agreement have a 0.064% chance of a MID. Keep all variables again at mean or
modal values, but shifting the deep agreement variable from 0 to 1, the probability of a
MID decreases approximately 70% to 0.019%. Given what might be considered the most
typical case, consequently, deep agreements reduce conflict. Figure 5.3 plots predicted
probabilities to evaluate the influence of specific variables. Both trade asymmetry and
intra-agreement trade reduce conflict between deep agreement members. First, as trade
asymmetry increases, the probability of a MID decreases from approximately 0.06% to
0.01% if asymmetry reaches a geometric mean of 4% in the dyad. Unlike asymmetry’s
effect in shallow agreements, however, deep agreement members are more sensitive to
asymmetry. Confidence intervals for deep and no agreement dyads diverge at
approximately 1.2%, a value over 50% of deep agreement dyads achieve. Consequently,
asymmetry tends to pacify the majority of deep agreement members. The effect of intraagreement trade is more muted for deep agreement members. While the effect is
statistically significant, it is relatively mild. MID probability decreases from 0.03% to
approximately 0.01% at geometric mean values of 20%, values approximately 22% of
deep agreement members achieve.

5.3

Discussion of Statistical Results
The results of my statistical analysis provide mixed evidence for my hypotheses

concerning intra-agreement conflict. Hypothesis 1 states that economic agreements
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decrease the likelihood of conflict between member states. The cross-tabulations
presented at the outset of this chapter indicate economic agreements may actually be
more conflict prone than dyads without agreements. However, statistical analysis
indicates that economic agreements can reduce conflict under certain circumstances. In
particular, dyads with asymmetric trade relations and high levels of trade with third-party
agreement members experience less overall conflict.18 This holds true for both shallow
and deep agreements. High levels of dyadic trade interdependence and FDI dependence,
however, tend to exacerbate conflict between members of shallow agreements. Overall,
holding all other variables constant, shallow agreement members are 8.8% less likely to
experience a MID while deep agreement members are 70% less likely. If mean and
modal values are taken to be the typical case, it appears economic agreements on the
whole reduce conflict, providing partial support for hypothesis 1.
The remaining hypotheses are generally not supported, however. Hypothesis 3
states that less economically dependent agreement members are more likely to use
economic sanctions against other members as a tool of coercion. Given the extreme
infrequency with which economic agreement members use sanctions, however, no
support is available for this hypothesis. Hypothesis 4 states that more economically
dependent agreement members are more likely to use military force against other
members as a tool of coercion. It is difficult to evaluate this hypothesis without sanctions
as a reference. However, asymmetry appears to actually reduce the likelihood of MID
initiation according to my statistical models. No support therefore exists for this
hypothesis. Likewise, Hypothesis 5, which states that symmetrically dependent
18

Recall footnote 1, which outlines my tests pooling sanctions and MIDs as the dependent variable (coded
1 if either a sanction or a MID occurred, 0 otherwise), the results of which were identical to those reported
in the MIDs table.
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agreement members are less likely to use military force against other members as a tool
of coercion than asymmetrically dependent members, is unsubstantiated by the results of
my tests.
These results raise several questions and puzzles in light of my theory. Perhaps
the most pressing of which is that some of the implications from my formal model
suggest economic agreement members are the most likely to utilize economic sanctions
as an alternative strategy to military force. Agreements tend to foster interdependence
between members by increasing trade, investment, and intangible benefits. Furthermore,
they possess ready-made institutional mechanisms that allow for the coordinated
economic action sanctions require (Martin 1992). However, the findings in this chapter
indicate that economic agreement members are actually much less likely to use sanctions.
One possibility is that the institutional structure of economic agreements may prevent or
severely restrict the use of economic sanctions. First, the legal framework of agreements
may prohibit their use. If economic sanctions are indeed foreign policy “on the cheap,”
we might expect agreements that do indeed restrict the use of sanctions to all but
eliminate them as a low-cost, low-risk coercive strategy. Only serious disputes that
warrant militarization are therefore observed as conflicts at the international level.
Second, a state that uses an economic sanction against another member may face
a coordinated response from other states in the agreement. In other words, agreements
may practice “collective economic security” by responding to sanctioning states with
coordinated, “overwhelming” economic force. Hence, sanctions are unlikely to succeed
on their own. Military force, however, may actually work by raising the stakes of
conflict and demonstrating more clearly the resolve of aggrieved parties. Finally, as
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Bearce and Bearce and Omori (2005) argue, economic agreements may provide conflict
resolution forums that obviate the need for any type of coercion. Regular meetings of
leaders within the framework of economic agreements, for example, provide an
opportunity to resolve issues before coercion is needed. Again, the only disputes that
therefore reach the coercion stage are those worthy of being militarized.
Third, economic sanctions may not be substitutes for military force. This is not to
say sanctions can never be, or never are, used to the same ends as military force. What it
suggests instead is that the range of issues for which both economic sanctions and
military force can be useful may be limited. Sanctions may be employed for one set of
issues while military force is reserved for more serious disagreements. Economic
agreements may obviate the need for sanctions to address this set of issues due to conflict
resolution mechanisms. Likewise, sanctions and military force may not be substitutes for
all states equally. Weak or isolated economies, for example, may not be able to use
sanctions and instead use military force as a first-best strategy. Economic agreement
members, in turn, may not possess the characteristics that allow for the use of sanctions.
Alternatively, sanctions and military force may be used concurrently such that they are
compliments rather than substitutes. Sanctions would not necessarily be observed in such
cases, as they are often coupled with military force when uses as a coercive policy.
A second major puzzle raised by my results is the conflict inducing tendencies of
trade interdependence and FDI interdependence between members of shallow economic
agreements. This finding goes against many arguments in the broader liberal peace, but
can possibly be explained by several forces. Economic agreements may highlight the
policy differences or security issues between member states, thereby increasing the
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likelihood of conflict. Integration may increase economic tensions between member
states by bringing business into direct competition for markets and resources (Viner
1950). Intense competition between members agreement members, which might be
expected when the share of trade between states is relatively high, may encourage states
to view economic linkages in terms of relative gains and losses. Even complementary
trade can promote this view if states are concerned about their terms-of-trade or
overreliance on partners for certain resources. Commercial and political competitions are
often linked insomuch as wealth is a means to power and vice versa (Viner 1948;
Hirschman 1980; Gilpin 1987). Concerns about the equitable distribution of gains and its
impact on power relations, therefore, can arise if commercial competition is sufficiently
intense. The codified nature of agreements compounds this problem by institutionalizing
trade relationships and competition through formal structures. Furthermore, foreign
direct investment may flow from outside the agreement to particular agreement members
and not others, thereby advantaging one state over others. FDI disparities may once
again encourage relative gains concerns insomuch as investment increases the industrial
and latent military capacity of the receiving state. The substantive results of FDI
dependence displayed in Figure 5.2 lend credence to this argument. Shallow economic
agreements tend to encourage conflict when FDI dependence is relatively high, which
presumably is when competition for investment is also relatively high. Hence, economic
agreements may increase competition over finite resources and expose the vulnerabilities
of both states and firms.
Indeed, while economic agreements can embolden internationally invested
constituencies, it can also foster reactionary elements opposed to openness (Panagariya
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and Findlay 1994; Krugman 1999, 384-385; Schiff and Winters 2003, 72). While this is
unlikely to actively foster conflict, it may be enough to enable it by short-circuiting the
pacifying influence of domestic constituencies. In other words, if conflict is possible
between two agreement members, a business elite losing to foreign competition may not
be as vocal in stopping the conflict. As an example, Honduran workers witnessing
inflows of Salvadorians and the corresponding increase in job competition resulting from
the Central American Common Market triggered protests and sporadic violence in the
state (Cable 1969). This likely contributed to the 1969 Football War between the two
agreement members. Economic agreements further exacerbate or solidify tensions by
imposing some degree of binding structure on commercial relations through a codified
structure (Whalley 1996; Schiff and Winters 1998). Consequently, rather than fostering
interdependence, shallow economic agreements may simply highlight dependence and
strategic vulnerability between agreement members.
A third puzzle is the influence of trade asymmetry on conflict. I argue that
asymmetry is likely to increase militarized conflict while symmetry reduces it. My
statistical results indicate the opposite, however, for both shallow and deep agreements.
One possible explanation is that trade asymmetry is also indicative of general power
asymmetries. In particular, both power and trade asymmetries likely exist between
economically large and small states. The more dependent state in the power/trade
asymmetry may be unable to either use or resist threats. Consequently, it complies with
demands before coercion is used. Only issues on which both states are greatly resolved
reach the coercion stage. Lending credence to this argument is that some agreements
tend to reflect asymmetrical relationships between states. For example, the African,
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Caribbean, Pacific – European Community agreement (APC-EC) signed in 1963 and
expanded in 1975 provides seventy-nine developing states with market access to
European Community states for certain goods. The United States and Australia hold
similar agreements within their respective spheres of influence (Whalley 1996). Deep
agreements may also foster asymmetry, as they might be attempts by economically
dominant states to solidify or entrench privileged economic access to smaller markets.
Asymmetry may therefore foster capitulation by the dependent state rather than resistance
and coercion.
One particularly interesting finding in my analysis is the role of intra-agreement
trade on conflict. The pacifying influence of intra-agreement trade suggests an
interesting causal process at work. In particular, Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig (2008)
argue the influence of dyadic and systemic trade relations work in opposite directions.
Robust bilateral trade relations tend to reduce conflict between any given two states.
Greater multilateral openness, however, tends to reduce the cost of conflict in ways that
may actually promote (or at least fail to restrict) militarized conflict. Relations between
economic agreement members, which might be considered regionally focused, are
situated between dyadic and systemic dynamics. Opportunity costs of conflict should be
lower between agreement members in the logic of Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig (2008),
thereby leading to an increase in the probability of conflict if anything. Finding that intraagreement trade actually reduces conflict suggests an important role for the structure and
pseudo-formality of agreements in restraining conflict. That is, the codified framework
of trade relations established by economic agreements and the inherent excludability of
benefits in the advent of conflict may in fact increase opportunity costs in ways that
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reduce conflict. Multilateral openness, in other words, may reduce conflict if
appropriately structured and defined.

5.4

An Alternative Statistical Consideration
The results presented in previous sections suggest economic agreements do

indeed have an influence on interstate conflict, even if it only offers qualified support for
my hypotheses. It is important to consider more carefully, however, the complex
relationship between economic agreements and interstate conflict. In particular, it can be
argued that an endogenous relationship exists between agreements and conflict. On one
hand, states that share relatively robust economic ties may be less likely to engage in
conflict given the opportunity cost associated with fighting. By the same token, however,
states with a propensity for conflict are unlikely to form relatively complex cooperative
arrangements as economic agreements.
Accounting for this endogenous relationship is somewhat difficult given the
number of key factors inherent in economic integration. It is possible, however, to
incorporate the formation of an economic agreement into the analysis of conflict
initiation using a Heckman selection model. Specifying membership in either a shallow
or a deep agreement as the selection criteria, with initiation of a MID as the outcome
variable, allows me to account for states’ selection into cooperative agreements when
analyzing conflict. In other words, this specification can aid in controlling for the
proclivity of states to only enter into agreements with states they view as peaceful. One
drawback of this approach is that selecting on agreement membership precludes inference
into how agreement specifically influences conflict. However, I can still identify how my
primary economic variables (asymmetry, interdependence, FDI dependence, and intra-
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agreement trade) influence conflict between agreement members, as the outcome
equation is limited to a sample of only shallow or deep agreement members per the
selection criteria.
In specifying the selection equation of this alternative statistical approach, I use
membership in a shallow or deep economic agreement separately as the selection criteria.
To predict membership in an economic agreement, I use many of the variables used in the
prediction of MIDs. Specifically, interdependence, asymmetry, FDI dependence,
alliances, contiguity, democracy, GDP, major power status, peace years and WTO
membership are all included in both the selection and outcome equations.19 The
Heckman model depends in large part on the availability of exclusion criteria in the
selection equation. Consequently, I include inter-capital distance, whether states share a
common language, the geometric mean of logged population, political affinity based on
UN vote similarity (Gartzke 2008), and the cumulative total of dyadic MIDs since 1950
in the selection equation only. Finally, to the outcome equation, I add capabilities, IGO
membership, and spatial lag variables as with my basic logit specifications.
Table 5.3 contains the results of the Heckman selection model. The top half of
the table displays the estimates for militarized interstate disputes as the outcome variable
divided by shallow (left columns) and deep (right columns) agreements. Because the
selection criterion is membership in either agreement, the outcome equation contains only
dyads in either a shallow or deep agreement. In other words, the coefficient estimates
reflect the variable’s impact on states sharing membership in that particular agreement.
Consider first the shallow agreement results. As with the basic logit model, asymmetry

19

Contiguity and major power status are excluded from the deep agreement model outcome equation, as
the combination with the selection equation perfectly predicts peace.
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and intra-agreement trade reduce the likelihood of conflict between states sharing
membership in a shallow economic agreement. FDI dependence, in turn, increases the
probability of conflict. One change from the basic logit is that interdependence is
statistically insignificant in the Heckman specification. The results of the deep
agreement model are also remarkably similar to the basic logit specification. Both trade
asymmetry and intra-agreement trade tend to reduce the occurrence of MIDs between
deep agreement members. Overall, therefore, the Heckman and basic logit specifications
are nearly identical for my primary explanatory variables in both the shallow and deep
agreement models.
While it is not the primary reason for estimating the Heckman model, some
insights can be gleaned from the selection equation as well. Several variables increase
the probability of forming either a shallow or deep economic agreement. Dyads with a
major power are more likely to form either agreement. This is presumably due to the far
reaching economic interests of major powers. Allies, WTO members, and states with
high affinity are more likely to form either agreement, which is most likely a reflection of
common political or security goals. Two gravity model variables – distance and common
language – influence both agreement types, albeit in different ways. Not surprisingly,
distance reduces the likelihood of forming agreements while sharing a common language
increases it. Both are likely consequences of the opportunities for cooperation.
The remaining variables are less clear-cut with respect to agreement formation.
Contiguity, for example, positively influences deep agreements but negatively influences
shallow ones. This may indicate geographically proximate states are more likely to form
deep instead of shallow agreements, thereby suggesting a substitution mechanism.
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Likewise, large economies tend to form deep agreements over shallow ones given the
positive and significant sign on the former and negative on the latter. The opposite effect
is witnessed for population, where more populous states tend to form shallow instead of
deep agreements. High degrees of trade interdependence tend to result in deep instead of
shallow agreements in contrast. This suggests states with robust trade tend to form either
deep agreements or no agreements. Intuitively, this might make sense, as shallow
agreements may be a tool to jumpstart rather than lock-in trade. Trade asymmetry and
FDI dependence reduce the probability of forming deep agreements but have no affect on
shallow ones. Likewise, democracies are more likely to form deep agreements. Finally,
the sum of dyadic MIDs does not influence agreement formation.
Overall, the results of Heckman selection models largely support the previously
discussed logit models. While this does not completely rule out the potential for
endogeneity, it does help guard against it by accounting for selection into agreements as
part of the conflict dynamic.20 It also strengthens previous results by demonstrating the
economic variables influence agreement member conflict behavior even when the sample
is limited to only agreement members.

5.5

Uganda-Kenya, an Illustration of Economic Agreements and Conflict
The results of my statistical analysis provide some support for my argument that

economic agreements reduce conflict but little support that they encourage the use of
sanctions. Some of the more interesting findings to emerge from my analysis, however,
concern the role of particular economic forces in the conflict process. In particular, both
FDI and interdependence are found to increase conflict between shallow agreement
20

I also specified a series of granger causality tests with various lag structures. All tests indicated both
shallow and deep agreement granger cause MIDs.
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members while failing to restrain conflict in deep agreements. To help make sense of
these findings, I offer a brief example illustrating the potential conflict inducing
tendencies of trade interdependence and FDI dependence between agreement members.
In this section, I consider the case of Uganda and Kenya since independence. Uganda’s
relationship with Kenya in context of several commercial agreements and more than three
decades of competition illustrates how economic integration can fall prey to security
dynamics. Economic circumstances helped condition tensions between the two which, in
turn, influenced conflict behavior in four general periods. In total, Uganda initiated four
militarized disputes in 1973, 1976, 1987, and 1989, the latter two of which were fatal.
All four disputes occurred during periods of integration, while periods without economic
agreements did not witness conflict initiation.
My intention in this section is not necessarily to offer a detailed, systematic case
study analysis of my theory. I am instead interested in leveraging the advantages of
qualitative research in identifying and fleshing-out causal processes as a complement to
my statistical analysis (Brady, Collier, and Seawright 2004). Indeed, given the somewhat
counterintuitive findings in my statistical models, this example can serve as both an
illustration of how causal mechanisms work and a “sanity check” of sort ensuring the
processes my models suggest are actually plausible (Granato and Scioli 2004; Bennett
and Elman 2006; 2007). In addition, given my theory and portions of results specifically
reference non-events (i.e., the absence of conflict), this qualitative assessment can help
highlight some the causal processes quantitative techniques may not capture (Maoz
2002).
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Consequently, in this section, I use process tracing techniques to help illuminate
the underlying mechanisms of conflict and subsequent “story” inherent in the quantitative
models. This approach has particular advantages. By connecting pieces of the policy
process across time, process tracing can more easily identify the reasons for outcomes
and non-outcomes critical to my theory (Tarrow 2004, 173-174). Furthermore, by
inherently analyzing a broad temporal domain, process tracing is possible and effective in
analyzing a single dyadic interaction. In turn, I select the Uganda-Kenya case primarily
because it exhibits extensive variation in both the dependent and independent variables of
military force and economic agreements respectively. Given my approach and intentions,
I believe this illustration a useful component of my analysis and subsequent theoretical
implications.
5.4.1

Rivalry Development and the East African Community (1967-1977)
Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania operated semi-autonomously while under British

Colonial rule and achieved independence as separate states in the 1960s. Strong, wellgrounded economic and institutional ties, including a customs union, developed during
the colonial era that carried over after interdependence. The region’s first attempt at
economic integration as independent states was the East African Community (EAC),
initially called the East African Common Services Organization (EACSO), and lasted
from 1961 to 1977. The EAC sought deeper integration than achieved under colonialism
by way of a common market that achieved the relatively free movement of labor and
capital (Gladden 1963). In addition, it created a robust administrative network to manage
common assets and economic coordination between the states. The heads of government
for each state shared membership in the East African Central Assembly, which served as
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the highest authority in the organization. Shared services included transportation
(notably rail and air), communication, and income taxation (Gladden 1963). Common
assets accounted for 21,000 jobs and 8% of the region’s GDP (Nye 1963).
Simultaneous with early economic integration was the development of security
concerns between Uganda and Kenya. First, tensions developed as Ugandan leadership
turned increasingly nationalist and radical after independence. Growth in the military’s
influence under Milton Obote and his decision to restrict, then ban, Kenyan workers from
Uganda peaked concern in the mid-1960s (Mutibwa 1992, 67). Second, ideological
differences emerged as Kenya developed a relatively open capitalist system while
Uganda tended towards more socialist policies. Finally, instability in Uganda allowed for
the continuation of security concerns through subsequent decades. Radicalization of
Ugandan policy notably heightened after Idi Amin gained power in the 1970s. Strategic
rivalry persisted in the 1980s due in large part to instability in Uganda fueling suspicion
of Kenyan influence in the region and numerous incidences of conflict (Byrnes 1990).
In addition to political issues, economic integration contributed to deteriorating
relations between Uganda and Kenya under the EAC. Although significant cooperation
was achieved, Kenya accrued disproportionate gains due in part to the agreement. Kenya
possessed the majority of manufacturing capacity in the region. The agreed upon
common external tariffs, erected to spur industrial development region-wide, primarily
benefited Kenyan firms (Nye 1963; Stock 2004, 445). One way in which this advantage
manifested was intense commercial competition. Figure 5.4 sketches the economic
relationship between Uganda and Kenya from 1970 to 2000. The top panel plots trade
dependence (bilateral trade as a share of GDP) while the bottom plots FDI dependence
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(total inward FDI). Bilateral trade over time constitutes a significant portion of the
economies of both states. Furthermore, the relationship is relatively symmetric for most
of the time period, save for a period between 1978 and 1984 which I will discuss. Kenya
also attracted the majority of foreign investment in the region due to both its more
developed industry and port access (Nye 1963; Stock 2004). Until the 1990s, Uganda
oscillated between years of very modest inflows and occasional outflows in absolute
terms and relative to GDP. Kenya, on the other hand, maintained robust capital inflows,
particularly compared to Uganda. Perhaps most importantly, however, is that Uganda
and Tanzania perceived their economic relationship with Kenya as highly competitive
and zero-sum. Beliefs that Kenya’s success came at the cost of Uganda and Tanzania
were the norm in both states (Fellows 1966). One Tanzanian official stated “we do not
appreciate our people being exploited for the benefit of industries in Kenya” (Quoted in
Nye 1963, 486).
At several points in time the Uganda-Kenya rivalry erupted into bouts of deadly
militarized conflict, all initiated by Uganda, stemming in part from tenuous economic
relations.21 Outbreaks of violence during the 1970s were aided by perceptions of
economic dependency and the proliferation of contentious issues. Leading to the first set
of conflicts in the 1970s, it is clear that Uganda was simultaneous concerned with their
economic position vis-à-vis Kenya and constrained by membership in the EAC. Uganda
embarked on a series of self-sufficiency programs in the late 1960s designed to wean the
economy of Kenya dependence. On January 27, 1967, The New York Times documented
extensive Ugandan policy changes promoting foreign investment, diversifying exports,

21

Between 1970 and 2004, Kenya initiated three militarized conflicts against Uganda (1975, 1995, and
1997). None of the conflicts initiated by Kenya resulted in fatalities.
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and stemming the tide of imports without upsetting the tenets of the EAC. Membership
in the EAC, however, prevented the government from raising tariff barriers to address
strategic concerns. Uganda’s trade balance with Kenya deteriorated further during the
1970s as Amin’s policies wreaked havoc on industry (Kasozi 1994). Tensions further
escalated in 1972-1973 when Amin vetoed a 1972 financing bill for EAC common
services, effectively putting them on life-support and challenging legitimacy of EAC
administrative bodies (Mohr 1972). The following year, Uganda again challenged
several common services, including the common tax regime and the harbor commission
and the EAC (Shilling 2005, 378).
Relations reached a low in 1973 partially as a result of economic tensions
between the two states. Despite efforts at self-sufficiency, Ugandan competition with
Kenya businesses increased. The deterioration of Ugandan industry both opened the door
to Kenyan exports and afforded them additional leverage in service negotiations
(Jorgensen 1981, 297-298). Imports from Kenya increased 8% and 49% in 1972 and
1973 respectively while exports to Kenya decreased 10% and 38%. Kenya was also able
to negotiate advantageous terms for the transport of goods as a result of Ugandan
economic weakness (Kasozi 1994, 120). Then, as noted in the New York Times of
February 4, 1973, Kenya suspended shipments of dairy products to Uganda in retaliation
for the latter party’s refusal to make payments on previous Kenyan exports. Uganda, in
turn, accused Kenya of exploiting common institutions – notably railroads and harbors –
for their own gain (Shilling 2005, 378). Uganda’s vulnerability combined with longstanding security concerns and fears that Kenya sought to destabilize Uganda to further
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increase tension. Ultimately, in context these issues, Uganda threatened Kenya with
military force as relations reached new lows.
Relations continued to deteriorate under Amin leading to military action and the
dissolution of the EAC. Although Uganda’s trade dependency on Kenya lessened in
1975, it grew again in 1976 as imports surged to record highs. Disagreements continued
over the distribution of commonly administered assets in the organization. During this
period, Uganda refused to remit payments to Kenya for the administration of the common
railway and airline and once again accused Kenya of abusing the EAC (Hughes 1977;
Shilling 2005). Under the strain of the economic situation, Amin laid claim to portions of
Kenya and hinted at claiming it by force in February of 1976 (Hughes 1977; Lewis
1976). The Kenyan government responded with a series of administrative measures that
included demanding cash payments for the transit of all Uganda goods and a fuel
embargo (Darnton 1976). Uganda retaliated by cutting electricity supplies to Kenya
affecting between 10% and 25% of the population (Hughes 1977; Kasozi 1994, 38).
Uganda ultimately launched a series of cross-border raids into Kenyan territory both in
retaliation and as a signal to domestic constituencies of the threat Kenyan posed (Kasozi
1994, 38-39; US State Department 1976). The EAC effectively ceased functioning in
1977 as a result of the economic and political turmoil (Hughes 1977; Stock 2004).
5.4.2

Ugandan Instability and Interregnum in Integration (1978-1982)
The interregnum between the dissolution of the EAC and establishment of the

Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa in 1982 did not witness
militarized conflict between Kenya and Uganda. This period of relative calm in the
rivalry is likely attributable to several factors. First, Tanzania surpassed Kenya as
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Uganda’s primary security concern in the late 1970s as the two states waged war. An
unintended consequence of the conflict was a lull in Uganda’s otherwise tense
relationship with Kenya. Second, the removal of Amin from power in 1979 ushered in a
period of instability as government forces battled the National Resistance Movement
(NRM) for power from 1981 until the latter party prevailed in 1985 (Byrnes 1990).
Domestic security concerns preoccupied the interest of Ugandan government during this
period.
Two economic factors likely played into the lull in relations as well. First, the
dissolution of the EAC removed some contentious issues from the table, including
charges that Kenya manipulated institutions for its own benefit. Second, the Ugandan
economy essentially collapsed from years of mismanagement and political instability
(Kasozi 1994). As a consequence, the nature of the Uganda-Kenya trade tie changed as
well. Ugandan trade dependence on Kenya spiked sharply during this period. This
effectively created an asymmetric relationship where Uganda clearly dependent more on
Kenya than Kenya on Uganda. In the first three years after the collapse of the EAC
(1978 – 1980), exports to Kenya, overwhelmingly comprised of coffee, tea, and tobacco,
experienced a surge to an average of $3.6 million from a low of $1.0 million in 1977
(Morrissey and Rudaheranwa 1998). Likewise, economic reform in Uganda, part of
which included commitments to a new economic agreement, revived imports that
particularly benefited Kenyan comparative advantages in manufactured goods and
transportation (Musila 2004).
5.4.3

Renewed Tensions and the New Wave of Integration (1983-1989)
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Economic cooperation revived six years after the collapse of the EAC in form of
the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA-ESA). Created in
1982, the agreement brought Uganda, Kenya, and over a dozen other African states
together in a loose-fitting trade agreement. Despite its modest goals of reducing, not
eliminating, trade barriers, the agreement created a relatively elaborate administrative
structure. Shared institutions created by the agreement include a payments clearing
house (1984), a development bank (1985), an association of commercial banks (1987),
and provisions for meetings of political elites (Asante 1997, 51-55). In 1994, the PTAESA was recast as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) in
accordance with goals of deeper integration.
Disparate patterns of trade emerge in the new organization as Uganda and Kenya
relied on intra-agreement trade to differing degrees. Figure 5.5 plots the total intraagreement trade (i.e., total trade with other agreement members) for the two states. Not
surprisingly given its advantageous economic and geographic position, Kenya relied on
economic agreements much more heavily than Uganda for trade and economic activity.
During the period of the PTA-ESA, Kenya averaged 3.11% of its GDP in trade with other
agreement members compared to 0.27% for Uganda. Intra-agreement trade, therefore,
appear to be a much stronger force in Kenya than Uganda.
Conflict between Uganda and Kenya flared again in the late-1980s in part from
economic tensions. Particularly important during this period were concerns about
relative gains and the influence of domestic constituencies. Although the PTA-ESA
involved more players and called for less integration than the EAC, Kenya clearly
emerged as one of the central states in the agreement (Asante 1997, 49). Distribution of
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gains from the preferential trade area arose once again as an important issue between
Uganda and Kenya and one of the defining elements of agreement (Asante 1997, 71;
Rule 1984). Uganda responded with attempts to develop alternative trading partners,
including deals with Libya exchanging goods for oil, but remained highly competitive
with Kenya for the majority of trade goods (Harden 1987b).
Tensions boiled over in 1987 sparked in part by conflict over coffee transport. In
the 1980s, coffee was the largest foreign exchange earner for Uganda and comprised the
majority of its exports (Buckoke 1988; Morrissey and Rudaheranwa 1998). Shipments of
coffee, furthermore, flowed almost exclusively through the port of Mombasa in Kenya.
Consequently, it was both of supreme strategic importance for Uganda and vulnerable to
disruptions. The strategic importance of coffee also afforded those connected with the
industry strong influence in the Ugandan government (Forrest 1988, 426). In 1987, the
key entity responsible for purchasing wholesale coffee in Uganda, he Coffee Marketing
Board (CMB), encouraged the government to reconsider current shipping arrangements.
The CMB and government agreed, first, that transit by road to Mombasa was costlier than
rail and, second, diverting some cargo to Dar el Salaam in Tanzania might defray costs
(Byrnes 1990; Kasozi 1994). Uganda thus moved away from road transport through
Kenya for coffee shipments by imposing duties of Kenya trucks (Buckoke 1988).
Uganda’s move clearly countered Kenyan interests. Trucking lobbies in Kenya,
being well connected with the government, lobbied for retaliation over the lost business
(Buckoke 1988; Kasozi 1994). In an effort to coerce Uganda into using road transport,
the government severed communication lines, halted all shipments out of Uganda, and
cut fuel supplies (Harden 1987b; Kasozi 1994). Uganda, once again suspended power
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supplies to Kenya (Buckoke 1988). Broader security issues enveloped the trade issue
with both states accusing the other of attempting to destabilize the government and
harboring rebel groups (Harden 1987a). With little ability to coerce the stronger Kenya
economically, Uganda resorted to militarized conflict. Initially, troops harassed Kenyan
truck drivers which resulted in at least eight killings on Ugandan soil (Harden 1987b).
Uganda troops then launched raids into Kenya for three days in December, 1987,
resulting in numerous fatalities, as both states prepared for war (Harden 1987a; Rule
1987). The states reached a tenuous agreement in general favor of Uganda just short of
war that allowed Uganda to ship coffee via rail to Mombasa (Byrnes 1990; Kasozi 1994).
Despite the agreement, acrimonious relations between the rivals continued through 1989
as economic and security issues clashed repeatedly. Sporadic fighting occurred that year
on the border in response to a Ugandan attack on Kenyan fishing vessels in Lake Victoria
and harassment of Ugandan vehicles shipping goods through Kenya (Byrnes 1990;
Kasozi 1994).
5.4.4

Easing Tensions and Economic Convergence (1990-1997)
Relations improved notably during the 1990s leading to the effective end of

heightened tensions. Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania also agreed to pursue deeper
economic integration and revitalized the East African Community in 1994. Several
factors led to this turn of events. First, despite Ugandan attempts to the contrary, its
dependence on Kenya grew in the 1990s. Indeed, trade asymmetry between Uganda and
Kenya averaged 2.3% in the decade of the 1990s. This is more than double any other
period save for the early 1980s. In other words, Uganda grew increasingly dependent
Kenya without the corresponding dependence of the latter. Second, relative levels of FDI
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shifted from Kenyan to Ugandan favor. FDI inflows into Uganda and Kenya totaled
$720 million and $210 million respectively during the 1990s, a mirror image of the
previous two decades. More important than absolute flows of FDI, however, is the nature
of FDI composition shifted. Uganda shifted strategies away from attempts to lure exportoriented manufacturing and instead courted manufactures for the local market, export
agriculture, and food processing (UIA 2013; Riddervold 2011). Kenyan FDI was
comprised of export-oriented manufactures (such as textiles and apparel), services (call
centers), and tourism (MIGA 2007). Hence, FDI competition diminished during this
period despite increases in total inward FDI. Indeed, FDI flows may have increased
precisely because competition gave way to Uganda seeking comparative advantages.
Finally, acutely aware of the possibility of economic domination and vulnerability, the
revitalized East African Community treaty stresses the equitable distribution of gains as
one of the core objectives and principles of the community. Per the new treaty, articles
6e, 6f, and 7f clearly state the objective of the EAC as the “equitable distribution of
benefits” and “co-operation for mutual benefit.”
5.4.5

Summary of Trends in the Uganda-Kenya Relationship
Uganda and Kenya have experienced a tumultuous relationship since achieving

independence in the 1960s. Some of these tensions are the result of economic relations
between the two. By way of summary, consider the influence of economic factors on
conflict between the two states. First, as Figure 5.4 aptly displays, periods of conflict
where associated with relatively symmetric trade relationships and high degrees of
competition between the two. The average asymmetry score for the year prior to and
including MIDs between Uganda and Kenya is 0.94%. Periods of asymmetry, however,
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are associated with the absence of conflict. Indeed, the average asymmetry score
excluding years prior to and including MIDs is 2.44%. Consequently, it is during periods
when trade dependence is relatively high and asymmetry relatively low that conflict
manifested. It is difficult to pinpoint situations where Uganda or Kenya altered their
behavior because of asymmetry or symmetry specifically. To be sure, however, Uganda
viewed integration with Kenya as a zero- or even negative-sum game (Hazlewood 1985,
184). Statements by Ugandan leaders highlighted through this illustration suggest they
were more concerned with their absolute dependence (a factor captured by my trade
interdependence variable) than their relative dependence (a factor captured by the
asymmetry variable) on Kenya. The distinction is subtle but important. Uganda leaders
were concerned about their vulnerabilities more than the possibility Kenya was
mobilizing gains from trade into military advantages. Furthermore, domestic
constituencies with seemingly complementary aims – notably coffee in Uganda and
trucking in Kenya – aided in the securitization of economic issues and enabled violent
responses during the 1980s. This suggests dependence and not asymmetry drove
Ugandan aggression.
Second, FDI dependence appears to be an important component of conflict
between Uganda and Kenya. Kenya attracted the majority of high-quality FDI for the
first three decades after interdependence. This statistic belies the fact that Uganda
actively and aggressively courted manufacturing and export-oriented FDI after
independence as a means to counter Kenyan advantages in the EAC. Consequently,
competition between the two for investment was relatively intensive if lopsided. Only
when Uganda shifted strategies to attract industries for which it possessed comparative
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advantages did tensions ease. FDI was also a factor for Ugandans in what they perceived
as a dependent economic relationship. FDI into Kenyan was indicative of their
manufacturing and services prowess. In other words, FDI into Kenya in no small part
generated exports to Uganda, thereby perpetuating the dependent relationship.
Third, intra-agreement trade may also have played a role in the conflict dynamic
of Uganda and Kenya. Overall, as Figure 5.5 indicates, Kenya relied to a much greater
extent on the economic agreement for trade than did Uganda. To the extent intraagreement trade constrains state behavior, as my statistical models indicate, Kenya is the
party more likely to be influenced. It is therefore interesting to note that Uganda initiated
nearly all conflicts between the two states. This is of course correlation and not
causation, and it is difficult to point to instances of non-action with attribution to
particular factors, but it is suggestive of underlying economic and political processes.
Finally, this illustration provides some insight into the comparative use of
economic and military coercion. It is debatable whether the economic measures
employed by either Kenya or Uganda in disputes – such as cutting power or stopping
payments – truly meet the definition of “economic sanctions.” After all, it is not clear
what either party intended to achieve in terms of policy outcomes. Indeed, several of the
measures appear purely commercial in scope. However, both states’ attempts at using
economic tools failed to prevent escalating the conflict. The ineffectiveness of economic
tools in some ways forced Uganda to escalate conflicts to violence or the threat thereof to
achieve palatable outcomes. While this does not provide satisfactory evidence
concerning the avoidance of sanctions by agreement members, it is suggestive of broader
processes at work that might provide avenues for future study.
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Overall, this example is presented not necessarily as evidence supporting my
statistical results so much as an illustration for the plausibility of several interesting
findings in my analysis. It is difficult to believe, on the surface, that FDI and trade flows
may exacerbate conflict given the bulk of literature finding the just the opposite. What I
hope this case has demonstrated is simply the possibility that economic relationships can
both pacify and enflame tensions between states, particularly those sharing membership
in economic agreements.
5.5

Conclusion: Economic Agreements and Interstate Conflict
My theoretical argument in Chapter 3 draws hypotheses concerning the influence

of economic agreements on intra-agreement conflict. The first, reproduced below,
addresses broad conflict dynamics between states that share membership in an economic
agreement:
H1: Economic agreements decrease the likelihood of conflict between member
states.
I evaluate this hypothesis using a large-N statistical analysis of dyad years from
1970 to 2001. Ultimately, I find conditional support for this hypothesis. Shallow and
deep economic agreements tend to reduce conflict – overall and particularly militarized –
between states with asymmetric trade relations and high shares of trade with third-party
agreement members. In contrast, relatively interdependent and FDI dependent dyads
tend to experience more conflict, but only if they share membership in a shallow
economic agreement. These results are seemingly counterintuitive given the broader
literature on interdependence and conflict. To illustrate the plausibility of FDI and
interdependence leading to conflict, however, I provide an example using relations
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between Uganda and Kenya. The illustration shows that the economic relations I model
did indeed influence conflict behavior in this particular case. While this example may
fall short of a systematic case study, it does demonstrate the plausibility of my findings.
The remaining three hypotheses that are the topic of this chapter concern the
substitution of economic sanctions for military force:
H3: Less economically dependent agreement members are more likely to use
economic sanctions against other members as a tool of coercion.
H4: More economically dependent agreement members are more likely to use
military force against other members as a tool of coercion.
H5: Symmetrically dependent agreement members are less likely to use military
force against other members as a tool of coercion than asymmetrically dependent
members.
Ultimately I find little to no support for these hypotheses. I first analyzed the
frequency with which shallow and deep agreement members use both economic sanctions
and military force. Shallow agreement members use sanctions are much lower raters than
no agreement dyads. Furthermore, an economic sanction has yet to occur between two
states in a deep economic agreement. Consequently, substitution does not appear to be
taking place between agreement members. Likewise, symmetrical relationships between
agreement members appear to be the most prone to militarized conflict. These findings
may be a consequence of the structure of economic agreements, power asymmetries, or
alternative conflict resolution mechanisms. Additional theoretical and empirical work is
needed to fully understand these findings.
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Table 5.1: Shallow Agreements and Intra-Agreement Conflict
Basic Logit

Imputed Logit

Shallow Agreements

Shallow Agreement
Shallow*Asymmetry
Shallow *Interdependence
Shallow *FDI
Intra-Agreement Trade
Asymmetry
Interdependence
FDI
Alliance
Contiguity
Capabilities
Democracy
GDP
IGOs
Major Power
WTO
Spatial Lag (Alliances)
Spatial Lag (Contiguity)
Constant
N
λ2
Pseudo-R2
Log Pseudolikelihood

Standard
Coefficient
Error
-14.935***
2.710
-13.14***
3.359
25.676*
10.194
14.902***
2.667
-8.842***
1.882
2.627**
0.986
-17.307**
6.251
-5.126***
0.921
0.243*
0.115
3.111***
0.130
0.125***
0.038
-0.053***
0.010
0.183***
0.040
0.018***
0.005
1.366***
0.156
-0.126
0.109
-9.41
15.676
34.655***
8.185
-3.715***
1.132
182,708
3,811.54***
0.3457
-2752.54

Standard
Coefficient
Error
-2.450
2.142
-9.599***
2.966
4.936
9.356
2.734
2.096
-2.190
1.963
2.466
1.315
-7.997
8.174
0.135
0.513
0.193
0.107
3.018***
0.109
0.205***
0.029
-0.076***
0.008
0.280***
0.035
0.013**
0.004
1.276**
0.123
0.164
0.099
7.107
5.416
20.719***
6.342
-11.001***
0.977
347,734
-------------------------------------

The dependent variable is the initiation of a Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID). Shallow agreements
include Partial scope agreements (PSAs) and free trade areas (FTAs) Temporal control variables (peace
years3) omitted for space. *p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
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Table 5.2: Deep Agreements and Intra-Agreement Conflict
Basic Logit

Imputed Logit

Standard
Coefficient
Error
-3.827
3.870
-56.429**
21.632
6.802
16.515
4.020
3.783
-4.384*
2.061
1.494
1.368
-17.557**
6.187
0.208
2.626
0.249*
0.115
3.121***
0.130
0.126***
0.038
-0.052***
0.010
0.175***
0.042
0.019***
0.005
1.329***
0.159
-0.117
0.109
-9.773
15.727
35.200***
8.036
-8.934***
2.739
182,708
3,884.23***
0.342
-2768.06

Standard
Coefficient
Error
0.640
2.874
-13.309
14.792
-22.455
19.271
0.270
2.820
-12.211***
5.038
2.642
1.401
-9.345
8.972
0.169
0.522
0.166
0.131
3.042***
0.122
0.206***
0.032
-0.072***
0.009
0.306***
0.038
0.014**
0.005
1.152***
0.134
0.141
0.113
7.924
5.450
23.121***
6.530
-11.712***
1.065
332,376
-------------------------------------

Deep Agreements

Agreement
Agreement*Asymmetry
Agreement*Interdependence
Agreement*FDI
Intra-Agreement Trade
Asymmetry
Interdependence
FDI
Alliance
Contiguity
Capabilities
Democracy
GDP
IGOs
Major Power
WTO
Spatial Lag (Alliances)
Spatial Lag (Contiguity)
Constant
N
λ2

Pseudo-R2
Log Pseudolikelihood

The dependent variable is the initiation of a Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID). Deep agreements
include customs unions (CUs), common markets (CMs), and economic unions (EUs). Temporal control
variables (peace years3) omitted for space. *p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
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Table 5.3: Selection Model Results of Intra-Agreement Conflict
Shallow Agreements

Deep Agreements

Militarized Interstate Disputes
Coefficient
Intra-Agreement Trade
-2.126*
Asymmetry
-4.019**
Interdependence
6.908
FDI
3.144***
Alliance
0.013
Contiguity
1.010***
Capabilities
-0.046
Democracy
-0.002
GDP
0.029
IGOs
0.002
Major Power
0.363*
WTO
-0.209*
Spatial Lag (Alliances)
-12.205
Spatial Lag (Contiguity)
13.438*
Constant
-5.210***
Formation of an Economic Agreement

Asymmetry
Interdependence
FDI
Affinity
Alliance
Contiguity
Democracy
Distance
GDP
Language
Major Power
Population
Total Dyadic MIDs
WTO
Constant

Coefficient
-0.011
-2.340**
-0.064
0.346***
0.407***
-0.333***
0.001
-0.001***
-0.014*
0.302***
0.122***
0.091***
-0.004
0.342***
-1.877***
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Standard
Error
Coefficient
0.892
-4.851*
1.546 -27.293**
4.270
10.651
0.955
-0.913
0.121
-0.444*
0.173
---0.042
0.249
0.008
0.043*
0.035
-0.031
0.005
-0.005
0.188
---0.093
-0.506*
17.802
-5.769
6.980
7.991
1.407
2.964

Standard
Error
2.270
10.661
9.269
2.317
0.212
---0.158
0.021
0.073
0.010
---0.240
17.912
22.866
2.719

Standard
Error
Coefficient
0.181
-0.735**
0.911
3.652***
0.158
-0.930*
0.027
0.840***
0.015
0.562***
0.024
0.325***
0.001
0.016***
0.000 -0.001***
0.006
0.040***
0.015
0.143***
0.026
0.970***
0.007 -0.388***
0.005
0.017
0.012
1.163***
0.217
2.152***

Standard
Error
0.251
0.786
0.401
0.073
0.025
0.041
0.002
0.000
0.010
0.027
0.048
0.016
0.009
0.040
0.491

Table 5.3: Continued
N
Censored
Uncensored
λ2
Log-Pseudolikelihood
ρ

196,017
182,782
13,235
266.56***
-30986.2
-0.350

197,424
194,991
2,433
193.28***
-6646.41
-0.542**

The dependent variable is Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) initiation. The selection criterion is
joint membership in either a shallow or deep economic agreement. *p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
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CHAPTER 6
EXTRA-AGREEMENT CONFLICT
The previous chapter evaluates the influence of economic agreements on conflict
when two states share membership in the same agreement. In this chapter, I consider the
influence of agreements on member state relations with the external world. Economic
agreements do not exist in a vacuum. Rather, they can affect trade relationships between
members and non-members of agreements as profoundly as intra-agreement, member-tomember relationships. First, lowering trade barriers may reduce the salience of a member
state’s trade ties with the external world by simply increasing overall trade between
agreement members. By relying more heavily on other agreement partners for markets
and resources, agreement members are less connected to states outside the agreement.
Second, economic agreements may actually generate trade diversion, a process where
increased intra-agreement trade comes at the expense of trade with the external world.
This not only reduces the members’ salience of external trade ties, but also can generate
relative gains for members and losses for non-members.
The overall impact of these forces on conflict, I argue, is to increase tensions and
encourage disputes. Reducing the salience of trade ties lowers the cost of conflict
between members and non-members of agreements. The process of trade diversion,
furthermore, encourages states to view trade relations in terms of relative gains and
losses. As diversion represents a direct relative gain to members and loss to nonmembers, it likely increases perceptions of dependence and strategic vulnerability.
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Consequently, Hypothesis 2 holds that economic agreements increase conflict between
members and non-members of agreements. In addition to the overall use of conflict, I
also argue the dynamics of agreements encourage a shift in coercive strategies away from
economic to military measures. Reduced interdependence renders sanctions less
effective between members and non-members of agreements, thereby discouraging their
use as tools to resolve disputes. Given this, Hypothesis 6 states that economic
agreements increase the likelihood of militarized conflict between members and nonmembers.
This chapter thus builds on my previous empirical tests using non-directed dyads
from 1970 to 2001 with the procedures and data outlined in the previous chapter. Section
1 of this chapter presents the results of my logit, bivariate probit, and imputed logit
models and substantive interpretations. Following this, in the second section, I outline
and conduct a statistical test using a strategic probit estimation that more directly tests my
formal model. Ultimately, the results of these statistical tests suggest dyads where two
states are in different economic agreements (opposing agreement dyads) are more
sensitive to economic conditions than dyads without any agreements. In particular,
extreme values of trade diversion and trade creation tend to reduce conflict. Dyads that
have a relatively neutral impact with respect to diversion, however, appear the most
conflict prone with respect to military force. The final section of this chapter discusses
the results with respect to the theory I develop in Chapter 3.

6.1

Statistical Results
Recall that Chapter 4 describes in detail the procedure I use for statistically

analyzing conflict between members and non-members of agreements. To briefly recap,

175

however, this section uses data covering the period 1970 to 2001 for all non-directed
dyads. My dependent variables are the onset of a militarized interstate dispute (MID) or
threat or imposition of an economic sanction in a given year. I employ several primary
explanatory variables capturing agreement structures and associated economic
relationships. The two agreement types I model are one agreement dyads, where only
one state in the dyad is a member of an agreement, and opposing agreement dyads, where
both states in the dyad are in different economic agreements. Dyads without any
economic agreements serve as a baseline for comparison. States that share membership
in an economic agreement are excluded from this analysis.
I also use a series of economic variables to more fully capture commercial
relationships between members and non-members. In addition to trade interdependence
and trade asymmetry variables, which were utilized in the previous chapter, I add a
measure of trade diversion. To calculate trade diversion, I specified a gravity model of
trade to estimate a baseline value of trade between states. Trade diversion due to
economic agreements is calculated as the difference between the predicted values of the
gravity model and observed trade such that higher values indicate trade diversion. All
economic variables are interacted with the aforementioned one agreement and opposing
agreement variables. I use several different statistical tests to evaluate my hypothesis,
including basic logit (with Murphy-Topel corrections to account for uncertainty in the
trade diversion estimates), imputed logit, and bivariate probit.22

22

I also performed several robustness checks of the results presented here. These include rare-events logit
accounting for the rarity of observed sanctions/MIDs, models with transformations of primary variables,
alternative specifications of the primary variables, simultaneous equation models accounting for
endogeneity, models with only politically relevant dyads, heckman selection models to account for
selection into different economic agreements, and the use of only fatal MIDs. The results are very similar
to those presented here with the exception of fatal MIDs, which are discussed in the appendix.
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6.1.1

Statistical Results – Basic Logit and Bivariate Probit
Table 6.1 contains the results of the logit models estimating the influence of one

agreement dyads on MID initiation between member and non-members. In this section, I
focus my attention to the results of the basic logit and bivariate probit models. I will
return to the imputed logit results, appropriateness of the bivariate probit, and a
comparison of the three models in the next section. In Table 6.1, note first that the results
of the basic logit and bivariate probit are nearly identical in sign and significance.
Overall, the results indicate the presence of only one economic agreement in a dyad has
little influence on the initiation of a MID. None of the terms interacting one agreement
dyads with various economic variables achieve statistical significance at conventional
levels. In contrast, the standalone, non-interacted interdependence variable is negative
and statistically significant, indicating that dyads without any economic agreements
experience less militarized conflict as trade between them increases. Hence, while dyads
with one agreement may not increase conflict between members and non-members, they
do appear to arrest the pacifying influence of interdependence on militarized conflict.
The results of the trade diversion variables indicate a polynomial relationship in dyads
without an economic agreement. As trade diversion increases, the likelihood of MID
initiation also increases. At some point, however, the influence of trade diversion
reverses and decreases the likelihood of MID initiation. The least conflict prone dyads
with respect to diversion, consequently, experience either high trade creation or high
trade diversion. Again, the lack of significance in the interacted variables indicates one
agreement dyads short-circuit the influence of trade diversion.
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Table 6.2 estimates the influence of one agreement dyads on economic sanctions.
Again note the basic logit and bivariate probit models, with the exception of
interdependence, are generally similar in sign and significance. Unlike the MIDs model,
however, one agreement dyads appear to influence the threat or imposition of economic
sanctions. First, the agreement variable, which captures dyads where only one state is in
an agreement, is negative and statistically significant. The fact that only one state is in a
dyad reduces the likelihood of an economic sanction occurring, suggesting intangible
aspects of this institutional arrangement influence sanctions behavior. Of my primary
explanatory variables, the only interaction terms to achieve statistical significance in both
models are the trade diversion variables. The simple trade diversion variable is positive
while the polynomial term is negative, again indicating a curvilinear relationship. The
one agreement dyads least likely to experience sanctions, therefore, are again at high
levels of trade creation or high levels of trade diversion. It is important to note the
interaction between one agreement dyads and interdependence is positive and significant
in the bivariate probit model. Dyads with one agreement are more likely to experience an
economic sanction as interdependence between states increases.
Of the non-interacted economic variables, only asymmetry is statistically
significant. Furthermore, it is positive, indicating dyads without an economic agreement
are more likely to experience an economic sanction. Economic agreements do therefore
appear to be influencing economic sanctions. On one hand, it is only when one state is in
an agreement does trade diversion affect economic sanctions. On the other, one
agreement dyads disrupt the influence of trade asymmetry. Hence, one agreement dyads
appear to influence interstate conflict by interrupting some pacifying mechanisms with
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respect to MID initiation and directly impacting the use of economic sanctions. The
combined results of the MIDs and sanctions models suggest some limited support for
Hypothesis 6, as dyads with one agreement are neutral on the former and may decrease
the use of the latter.
Turning to opposing agreement dyads, where both states in the dyad are in
different economic agreements, Table 6.3 includes the results of MID initiation. The
results of the basic logit and bivariate probit models, with the expectation of the
interaction between opposing agreements and interdependence, are very similar. First,
the opposing agreement variable which indicates simply that both states are in different
agreements is negative and significant. With all other factors held constant, opposing
agreement dyads are less likely to engage in militarized conflict. Second, the trade
diversion variables achieve statistical significance. As with prior models, the simple
trade diversion variable is positive while the polynomial term is negative, again
indicating a curvilinear relationship. The opposing agreement dyads least likely to
experience MIDs, therefore, are again at high levels of trade creation or high levels of
trade diversion. Finally, the interaction between opposing agreements and
interdependence is negative and significant, indicating opposing agreement dyads
experience fewer MIDs as trade interdependence increases.
The results of the non-interacted economic variables provide some interesting
insight into the dynamics of economic agreements as well. Unlike the one agreement
model, where the interacted and non-interacted variables differed in significance, the
non-interacted interdependence and trade diversion variables are of similar sign and
significance as their interactions with opposing agreements. The non-interacted
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interdependence variable is negative and significant such that dyads without an
agreement experience less conflict as trade interdependence grows. Trade diversion is
positive and significant on the simple variable and negative and significant on the
polynomial term. Hence, while one agreement dyads appear to arrest the influence of
economic factors between states, opposing agreement dyads appear to heighten the
influence of these variables with respect to MID initiation.
Consider finally Table 6.4 showing the influence of opposing agreements on
economic sanctions. Here again the results of the basic logit and bivariate probit models
are nearly identical. Interestingly, none of my primary explanatory variables achieve
statistical significance. Indeed, the only economic variable that influences economic
sanctions in the opposing agreement model is the standalone asymmetry variable. The
likelihood of experiencing an economic sanction increases in tandem with trade
asymmetry. Consequently, while asymmetry increases the use of sanctions in dyads
without an agreement, no such influence takes place in opposing agreement dyads. These
results provide some limited support for Hypothesis 6, given opposing agreements have a
neutral effect on sanctions and may increase MID initation.
Before turning to an evaluation of the logit, bivariate probit, and imputed models,
consider the control variables across the logit and bivariate probit specifications. Overall,
there is general agreement between the four models estimating MID initiation.
Contiguity and major power status, which capture opportunities for conflict, are positive
and significant all models (basic and imputed logit, one and opposing agreements). This
is unsurprising given the immediate and far-reaching political interests of contiguous
states and major powers respectively. Power parity also appears to increase the
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probability of conflict, as only states with valid opportunities to prevail in conflict are
likely to risk it. GDP and IGO membership are also positive and significant such that
militarized conflict increases when these variables also increase. GDP is relatively
intuitive, as larger economies are likely better able to project power. IGO membership is
somewhat of a puzzle, however. One possibility is that IGOs may simply create or
highlight issues over which states have disagreement. As might be expected,
democracies are less likely to engage in militarized conflict given the negative and
significant coefficient. The spatial lag using contiguity as a connector is positive and
significant in all but the opposing agreement basic logit model. The plurality of evidence
therefore indicates that conflicts are prone to spilling over. Finally, allies may be more
likely to engage in militarized conflict, but only according to the basic logit models.
WTO membership and the spatial lag with alliances fail to achieve statistical
significance.
With respect to economic sanctions, general agreement is once again observed,
albeit with less consistency. Four variables consistently and positively predict the
occurrence of economic sanctions – GDP, major power status, WTO membership, and
the spatial lag of sanctions based on contiguity. The first two variables, GDP and major
powers, again make intuitive sense. Large economies and major powers have both the
opportunity and ability to use economic sanctions as tools of coercive policy. That is,
they can both afford the cost of sanctions and can reasonably disrupt others’ trade when
employed. WTO members are more likely to sanction each other, which is somewhat
interesting. The institutional structure of the WTO, it might be argued, discourages the
use of economic instruments for political aims. It may also, however, provide a ready-
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made sanction by simply suspending preferential trade status conferred by the WTO. The
spatial lag of sanctions is positive and significant, indicating that states are more likely to
experience sanctions if they are geographically close to other sanctions.
The remaining variables are less consistent in the sanctions models. First, IGO
membership is negative and significant in all but the opposing agreement basic logit
model. Combined with the positive coefficients in the MIDs model, this suggests states
sharing more memberships in IGOs substitute military force for economic sanctions.
This is somewhat puzzling given the literature on organizations. One possible
explanation is the IGOs carried in the IGO variable are more security focused, while my
agreement variables have siphoned off the influence of economic organizations. The
effect of organizations on sanctions might therefore wash out. Allies are more likely to
use sanctions, but only in the one agreement model. In contrast, democracies are less
likely to use sanctions, but only in the opposing agreement model. The stakes of disputes
for allies, even low-level ones that advantage sanctions, might be high enough such that
low-level conflicts are more likely. Democracies, on the other hand, may be less likely to
use sanctions for normative or institutional reasons akin to the democratic peace.
6.1.2

Imputed Data, Statistical Results, and Model Evaluation
In the previous chapter I noted differences between logit estimations using

observed and imputed data with respect to intra-agreement conflict. The results of this
chapter dealing with extra-agreement conflict exhibit a similar outcome. The results of
the logit model using imputed data, contained in the right two columns of Tables 6.1
through 6.4, in many ways conflict with the basic logit and bivariate probit models. In
total across all models (one/opposing agreements, MIDs/sanctions), there are 36 primary
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variables of interest, defined as the agreement variable, its interaction terms, and noninteracted economic variables. The basic and imputed logit disagree in significance for
18 (50%) of these variables. More disconcertingly, perhaps, is that the basic and imputed
logit also disagree on the sign of 19 (53%) of those variables. For comparison, there are
a total of 40 control variable coefficients. The basic and imputed logit disagree in
significance for only 10 (25%) of these coefficients, however. There are only 7 (18%)
disagreements in terms of sign for the control variables. Consequently, the majority of
variation in coefficients between the imputed and observed data is the result of economic
variables.
As with the intra-agreement trade model, differences are to be taken seriously
between the observed and imputed data. It is interesting that the imputed data reports
generally similar results for all but the economic variables. This may reflect two general
possibilities. First, imputed data is a more accurate reflection of actual trade patterns than
only observed data. If this is indeed the case, the degree of difference between my basic
and imputed logit models suggests missingness drastically biases results when trade
and/or FDI measures are included in international relations analyses. Second, my
imputed data is highly inaccurate due to my estimation procedures or inherent difficulties
in estimating trade/FDI data.
The previous chapter discusses in some detail potential pitfalls with my imputed
data. To those comments, all of which apply to the results here, I might add a few points.
First, the analysis in this chapter may be more sensitive to imputed data given my use of
the trade diversion variables. Trade diversion is effectively a constructed measure using
gravity model estimates of trade. Imputed trade values are effectively constructed
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measures using an expanded gravity model. When creating the imputed dataset for
statistical analysis, I reconstructed the trade diversion variable using a gravity model
estimate of imputed trade scores. Hence, I constructed a measure of trade diversion
based on a constructed measure of trade.23 The inherent uncertainty in imputation
estimates combined with the uncertainty of trade diversion may seriously bias this
measure and subsequent data. Consequently, my analysis of extra-agreement conflict
may be more prone to errors in imputed data than the intra-agreement conflict models.
In considering the overall impact of imputed data in this chapter, the differences
in results are again to be taken seriously. My skeptical view of imputed trade data
nurtured in the previous chapter again applies here. I still believe it important to provide
more rather than less analysis in the case that my suspicious of imputed trade data are
warranted. Consequently, my empirical analyses will favor the basic over the imputed
logit for purposes of interpretation and discussion.
Beyond the differences in analysis using observed and imputed data, the results of
the basic logit and bivariate probit are very similar. It is worth noting the ρ statistic for
the bivariate probit models is statistically significant. This indicates that residuals from
the economic sanctions and military force models are correlated. That is, economic
sanctions and military force are affected by the same factors and in some fashion jointly
determined. In practical terms, however, the results for my primary variables of interest
are similar enough to suggest the simpler logit specification is preferable.
6.1.3

Substantive Interpretations

23

I also created a dataset that excluded trade diversion when creating an imputed dataset. The results were
identical to those reported here. Also, excluding trade diversion from the logit estimates using imputed
data does not change the results.

184

The substantive impact of economic agreements on conflict between members
and non-members is based on the basic logit results in Tables 6.1 through 6.4. In a basic
sense, the one and opposing agreement results are mirror images, as one agreement dyads
tend to influence economic sanctions while opposing agreements impact MID initiation.
Consider first the impact of one agreement dyads on economic sanctions. Given this is a
dichotomous variable, I estimate the change in the predicted probability of a sanction by
shifting the one agreement variable from 0 to 1 while holding all other variables at their
mean or modal values. The baseline probability of a sanction is 0.013% for dyads
without an economic agreement. For dyads with only one agreement and holding all
other variables at their mean and modal value, the probability of a sanction decreases a
modest 8% to a total probability of 0.012%. For comparison, this is equivalent to
increasing the number of shared IGO with which states share membership by 3 from
approximately 29 to 32 in total.
Figure 6.1 plots the predicted probabilities of an economic sanction based on the
trade diversion variable, as it is the only statistically significant primary explanatory
variable in my one agreement models. These out-of-sample probabilities were calculated
by manipulating the variable of interest while holding all other variables at their mean or
modal values. The solid line indicates probabilities for one agreement dyads while the
dashed line plots dyads without any agreements for comparison. The band and spike
plots around the lines are the 95% confidence intervals for one and no agreement dyads
respectively.
When considering Figure 6.1, note first the curvilinear relationship between trade
diversion and the probability of sanctions. The probability of a one agreement dyad
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experiencing sanctions increases as the variable moves from trade creation (values less
than 1) to approximately neutral values indicating neither creation nor diversion. Once
trade diversion occurs, however, the probability of sanctions decreases, although remains
higher than most trade creation values for the relevant range of observed diversion scores.
Consequently, as the economic agreement in the dyad moves from promoting trade
between members and non-members to actually diverting (or siphoning) it away from
non-members, the probability of sanctions grows. Interestingly, however, once the trade
diversion begins in earnest, the probability of sanctions declines. Equally as important,
however, the one agreement is only truly independent of the no agreement curve between
diversion values of approximately 0.975 and 1.25. Consequently, it is only in this range
that the effect of economic agreements is statistically discernible. This range contains the
peak of the diversion curve, however, indicating that one agreement dyads do appear to
encourage the use of economic sanctions compared to no agreement dyads.
Moving to the substantive results of the opposing agreement model, consider first
the influence of the institutions themselves. The baseline probability of a MID occurring
between two states without an economic agreement is 0.068%. When each state forms an
economic agreement independent of the other, holding all other variables constant, the
probability decreases 56.1% to 0.043% total. This decrease, however, belies the true
influence of opposing economic agreements. Specifically, states in different economic
agreements exhibit different economic patterns than those without agreements. To gain a
more accurate picture, instead of keeping the economic variables at their global means, I
adjusted them to the average for opposing agreement dyads. That is, I set the means of
interdependence, asymmetry, and trade diversion equal to the average for two states in
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different economic agreements. In this way we can more accurately judge the most
typically observed case of a no agreement dyad and opposing agreement dyad. In this
case the probability of a MID between two states without an agreement is again 0.043%,
but the corresponding probability for opposing agreement dyads is 0.067%, or an
increase of 54.7%. The typical opposing agreement member is thus actually more likely
to experience a MID than no agreement members, providing conditional support for
Hypotheses 2 and 6.
Figure 6.2 plots the influence of trade diversion and interdependence on MID
initiation between opposing agreement members. First, concerning trade diversion in the
left panel, note a curvilinear relationship that is similar to the one agreement sanctions
model. As trade creation declines, the probability of a MID increases to approximately
0.1% at the inflection point of 0.975. After this, the probably of a MID decreases to
almost 0 at very high levels of trade diversion. Interestingly, the only portion of the
opposing agreement curve that achieves statistical independence from the no agreement
curve exists between approximately 0.975 and 1.01. Hence it is mild values of trade
creation that tends to spur conflict between members and non-members of opposing
agreements. This is somewhat counterintuitive given my argument about diversion and
relative gains. I return to this point in the discussion section.
The right panel of Figure 6.2 shows predicted probabilities assessing the influence
of trade interdependence on MID initiation. Overall, most of the interdependence range
is statistically indistinguishable between the opposing and no agreement dyads. Near the
intercept at 0, however, interdependence between states with opposing agreements is
distinct. Small increases near zero, consequently, decrease the probability of two states

187

in different agreements engaging in militarized conflict. While trade interdependence
does reduce conflict between states, increasing trade beyond a relatively low threshold
garners opposing agreement members an almost identical result as no agreement
members.

6.2

Strategic Probit Estimation and Interpretation
As I discuss in Chapter 4 outlining my research design, logit and bivariate probit

models may not be optimal in evaluating the strategic nature of hypotheses derived from
my formal model. My use of the formal model specifically stems from my argument that
initiating a dispute – be it sanction or military force – is related to the effectiveness of
using either coercive instrument. To capture the strategic elements of my formal model, I
specify a strategic probit model (using STRAT software (Signorino 2001)), that allows
the decision to initiate conflict in part to derive from the expectation of either military
force or economic sanctions being used.
Before detailing my specification of the strategic probit, an important clarification
is necessary. My formal model places agency on the Challenger to choose the instrument
and potential escalation of conflict. The Defender in the model does not “choose” to
acquiesce or resist, as this decision is given by its type (strong versus weak). In other
words, the Defender does not possess agency and the observation of conflict is an
inherent assumption of my formal model. I am limited in testing my formal model,
however, by the availability software and programs to estimate complex strategic
interactions. Specifically, the most appropriate empirical setup for my formal model is a
two-stage game testing the decision to issue a weak or bold demand and choice of
sanctions or military force as stages respectively. Unfortunately, the two-step game setup
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in STRAT requires placing agency on the Defender in the first stage as a built-in
requirement of the software. This setup is akin to giving the Defender the choice to
acquiesce or resist the Challenger’s demands. In the strictest sense this is inaccurate, as
the Defender does not possess agency. However, it can also be viewed as an observable
implication of the Challenger’s decision to issue weak or bold demands. Resistance will
only be observable if the bold demand is issued. Consequently, sanctions or military
force (i.e., resistance) will only be viewed if the Challenger chooses the bold demand.
Again, while not strictly correct, this approach is defensible on these grounds.
Furthermore, as my regressors are dyadic in nature, the values of variables are identical
for Defender and Challenger. If an alternative setup were available, the estimation
procedure is unlikely to change as a result.
Strategic probit estimation, due to the relatively heavy computational burden,
requires a more parsimonious and careful specification. Recall the potential outcomes of
interest; 1) no conflict initiation (either a sanction or a MID) 2) threat or use of economic
sanctions 3) the threat or use of military force. With this in mind, Figure 6.3 depicts the
relevant portion of the game tree presented in Chapter 3 with associated regressors. Note
that it begins with the Defender resisting or acquiescing to the Challenger’s demand,
which as noted is an implication of the weak or bold demand, as this is the first earnest
and empirically observable decision in the game. The immediately observable outcome
of this first-stage decision is no conflict initiation. To model this effect, I place the
following regressors capturing whether the dispute ends without conflict or escalates to
the use of a coercive strategy: One agreement and opposing agreement dyads (in separate
models), asymmetry, interdependence, trade diversion, trade diversion2, contiguity,
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capabilities ratio, democracy, and interactions between the agreement variable and
asymmetry/interdependence/trade diversion/trade diversion2. Hence, in comparison to
the logit and bivariate probit models, I exclude alliances, GDP, IGOs, major powers,
WTO membership, spatial lags, and temporal controls.24
The next decision point is the Challenger’s choice between economic sanctions
and military force. The decision as I have modeled it requires input from the Challenger
exclusively. Consequently, I only place a constant term on the sanctions outcome for the
Defender. For the Challenger, however, I take into account predictors of both sanctions
and military force, or perhaps more importantly, differences in utility functions between
them. To be sure, the majority of variables in my research design and subsequent results
from the logit/bivariate probit estimations suggest a stronger influence on military force
than economic sanctions. I do, however, place the democracy regressor on the
Challenger’s utility for economic sanctions. The logic underlying this decision is that,
given the structure of the game, the choice at this node is between military force and
sanctions. Democracies are less likely to use military force against each other, but do not
appear as inhibited with economic sanctions. Consequently, regime type is likely as
much or more associated with sanctions than military force in this setup.
To round out the strategic probit model, I place the following regressors on the
war or military force outcome in Figure 6.3: One agreement and opposing agreement
dyads (in separate models), asymmetry, interdependence, trade diversion, contiguity,
24

I conducted several tests using multiple combinations of variables used in the basic logit and bivariate
probit estimations. In addition, I placed the regressors on several different decision points as robustness
checks. Overall, the results of alternative specifications are very close to those presented here. Two
caveats are important to mention, however. First, some variables when included (notably the spatial lags)
prevented the model from converging, thereby forcing their exclusion in the interest of obtaining actual
results. Second, adding additional variables to the relatively parsimonious model presented here reduced
the stability of results. While statistical significance did not change with the inclusion of most additional
controls, the coefficient estimates and subsequent predicted probabilities exhibited erratic behavior.
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capabilities ratio, democracy, and interactions between agreement variables and
asymmetry/interdependence/trade diversion. Note that the polynomial trade diversion
term is eliminated in the Challenger’s utility structure, as my analysis indicates a
curvilinear relationship is only present in conflict initiation and not the selection of
sanctions or military force. Also, to reiterate a portion of the research design from
Chapter 4, I limit my sample to politically relevant dyads where states are contiguous or
contain at least one major power. This is necessary for computational efficiency and to
achieve stable convergence of the strategic probit model.
6.2.1

Strategic Probit Results
The results of the strategic probit model are contained in Table 6.5. Consider first

the top portion of the table that models if the Defender resists or acquiesces to the
Challenger’s demands. In effect this models the initiation of conflict (defined as use of
either a sanction or a MID). STRAT requires this variable be coded 1 if no conflict
initiation takes place and 0 if either a sanction or MID occurs. Consequently, positive
and coefficients indicate a reduced likelihood of conflict initiation. Negative coefficients
indicate a greater probability of conflict initiation. Looking at the one agreement model,
only the interaction between one agreement dyads and asymmetry achieves statistical
significance. Furthermore, it is positive, indicating dyads with one economic agreement
experience less overall conflict as trade relations become more asymmetric.
Interestingly, the non-interacted interdependence term is positive and significant such
that dyads without an agreement experience less conflict as trade interdependence
increases. By implication, dyads with one agreement do not share the pacifying influence
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of asymmetry. Dyads with one agreement, however, do not generally appear more
conflict prone given the strategic probit estimates, lending evidence against Hypothesis 2.
In the opposing agreements model, however, several key variables achieve
statistical significance. The agreement variable is positive, suggesting dyads where both
states are in different agreements are overall less likely to have disputes. This is
mitigated, however, by the influence of trade asymmetry. The negative and significant
coefficient on the interaction term indicates dyads with separate economic agreements are
more likely to experience conflict as trade relations become more asymmetric. The noninteracted asymmetry term is also negative and significance, signifying that dyads
without agreements also experience less conflict with trade asymmetry. The effect of
opposing agreements, therefore, is to heighten the effect of asymmetry. The trade
diversion variables are both significant, but the differing signs suggest a curvilinear
relationship with conflict. Specifically, the negative simple term and positive polynomial
term indicate the opposing agreement dyads least likely to experience conflict are those
with extremes of trade creation and diversion. The standalone trade diversion terms show
identical sign and significance, once again suggesting opposing agreements heighten the
influence of these variables. Finally, while the interaction between opposing agreements
and interdependence does not achieve statistical significance, the non-interacted term
does. This suggests opposing agreements short-circuit the pacifying influence of
interdependence. Overall, the results of this model suggest opposing agreement dyads
can encourage conflict in certain circumstances.
Consider now the bottom half of Table 6.5 showing the results of Challenger’s
choice between economic sanctions and military force. For my primary explanatory
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variables, positive coefficients indicate a tendency for military force while negative
indicates increased likelihood of economic sanctions. In the one agreement model, only
the interaction between agreements and asymmetry achieves statistical significance.
Hence, dyads with one agreement are more likely to use military force instead of
economic sanctions as trade asymmetry increases. The remaining economic variables,
interacted and otherwise, fail to achieve statistical significance. Overall, members and
non-members of one agreement dyads appear more likely to use military force if trade
asymmetry grows, lending support to Hypothesis 6.
The opposing agreements model presents some interesting results. First, the
agreement variable itself is positive and significant. Dyads in opposing agreements are
therefore more likely to use military force (and less likely to use economic sanctions) by
simply being in different agreements. This effect is reduced by the effects of asymmetry
and trade diversion, however. Both interaction terms are negative and significant such
that opposing agreement dyads with high levels of asymmetry and/or trade diversion
prefer economic sanctions to military force. Consequently, the results of the agreement
variable and interaction terms present conflicting evidence with respect to Hypothesis 6.
Looking briefly at the three control variables, the one and opposing agreement
models disagree slightly.25 Geographic contiguity paradoxically decreases the likelihood
of conflict, but only the one agreement model. Both indicate contiguity advantages the
use of military force over economic sanctions, however. Power parity as measured by
capabilities ratio is more important in the initiation of conflict given the negative and
significant coefficients in the Defender’s utility structure. According to the opposing

25

I also tested a separate analysis that used only control variables. The results of this model, while not
reported, are more in line with the opposing agreement model.
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agreement model, furthermore, power parity encourages military force and discourages
economic sanctions. Finally, more democratic dyads are paradoxically more likely to
engage in conflict according to the one agreement model. When in conflict, however,
they prefer economic sanctions to military force per the opposing agreement model.
6.2.2

Interpretation
The computational limitation of the strategic probit model renders interpretation

somewhat more difficult than with basic logits. This is particularly true given the number
and nature of interaction terms in my model. The most useful means of interpretation is
calculating the change in predicted probabilities by shifting the variable of interest from
minimum to mean values (holding all others constant). While this is suboptimal given
my interaction and polynomial terms, it is still useful and suggestive of how impactful
economic relationships are between economic agreement members. Hence, Table 6.6
contains predicted probabilities based on the strategic probit model.
In the one agreement model, only the interaction between one agreements and
asymmetry achieves statistical significance. Overall, the baseline probability of a conflict
in this model is 5.27%. As asymmetry moves from its minimum to mean value, however,
this probability decreases 20.4% to a 4.2% probability of conflict. Preferences regarding
the strategies used in disputes also shifts with asymmetry between states in one
agreement dyads. The probability of observing a MID increases 40.3% while the
probability of a sanction decreases 21.4%. This suggests a substitution effect is in place
for one agreement dyads between military force and economic sanctions given certain
levels of asymmetry.
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The opposing agreements model presents some interesting results. First, when
compared to no agreement dyads, dyads with two states in different agreements are 99%
less likely to experience any type of conflict. Certain economic relationships between
opposing agreement members, however, limit this pacifying effect. Asymmetry in
opposing agreement dyads, for example, increases the probability of conflict 13% as it
moves from minimum to mean values. Likewise, trade diversion increases the likelihood
of conflict by 137.5%. Hence, as trade creation (negative values of the trade diversion
variable) diminishes and approaches trade diversion (positive values on the variable),
conflict becomes more probable. At a point, however, trade diversion reduces conflict,
specifically by 99% as the polynomial term shifts from minimum to mean values. While
the available interpretation techniques limit my ability to pinpoint the inflection point of
trade diversion, these results indicate once again that the most peaceful opposing
agreement dyads have high levels of trade creation or trade diversion. Overall, the results
of the opposing agreement model suggest that two states in different economic
agreements that also do not interact economically have almost no chance of a conflict.
As asymmetric trade and certain diversion patterns occur, however, conflict becomes
more probable.
The tradeoff between economic sanctions and military force is evident in the
predicted probabilities of the opposing agreement model. First, while simply having two
states in different agreements reduces conflict, it drastically changes preferences for
coercive strategy. Specifically, when compared to no agreement dyads, opposing
agreement dyads are over 613% more likely to use military force and 48.9% less likely to
use economic sanctions. This is reduced, however, by asymmetry and diversion.
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Moving from the minimum to mean of asymmetry in opposing agreement dyads reduces
the use of military force by 15% and increases the use of sanctions by a modest 9.8%.
Likewise, moving from the minimum of trade diversion (which is effectively high levels
of trade creation) to the mean (effectively neither creation nor diversion) decrease
military force by 57.6% and increases sanctions by 80.6%. A substitution affect appears
to be in place with respect to opposing agreements in light of these results. The exact
nature of the substitution, however, is ambiguous. By themselves, opposing agreement
dyads are more likely to use military force than economic sanctions. Once trade
asymmetry and diversion develop, though, this preference wanes such that economic
sanctions become proportionally more likely.

6.3

Discussion of Results
The combined results of the logit and strategic probit estimations provide mixed

and at times confusing results for my broader theory on extra-agreement conflict. First,
there is qualified support for the argument that members and non-members of agreements
are more likely to engage in conflict based on the results of the strategic probit model.
The strategic probit shows that dyads with one agreement are more likely to engage in
conflict (initiation of either a MID or sanction), but only insomuch as trade asymmetry
manifests in the dyad. Likewise, the model indicates that dyads with opposing
agreements are more likely to experience conflict if asymmetry manifests and trade
diversion is at moderate levels. It is also worth noting that while trade interdependence
reduces conflict in dyads without an agreement, no such influence takes place between
members and non-members of agreements given the lack of statistical significance on the
interaction term with agreement structure. Consequently, it does appear that conflict is
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more likely between members and non-members of agreements provided certain
economic conditions are met. This provides qualified support for Hypothesis 2.
Second, qualified and limited support is also found for the argument that the
preferred strategy in disputes between members and non-members is military force. The
logit specification indicates that states with membership in different economic
agreements are more likely to experience a MID at relatively modest levels of trade
creation. This is mitigated, however, to the extent trade interdependence is high. Given
the characteristics of the typical opposing agreement, however, MIDs are generally more
likely when compared to no agreement dyads. The picture is muddied somewhat by the
results of the strategic probit. These results show opposing agreement dyads are
generally more likely to experience militarized disputes, but trade diversion and
interdependence discourage militarization in favor of economic responses.
As for one agreement dyads, the results of the logit and strategic probit provide
somewhat contradictory results. Dyads with only one state in an agreement are neither
more nor less likely to experience MID according to the logit results. Indeed, if anything,
they are more apt to use economic sanctions provided trade diversion is modest. The
strategic probit, however, indicates one agreement dyads substitute militarized for
economic coercion as asymmetry between the states increases. I believe the more
accurate assessment of conflict dynamics is given by the strategic probit, as it more
directly models the connection between conflict initiation and strategies. Consequently, I
find limited support for Hypothesis 6.
The combined results and less than overwhelming support for my argument raise
a number of issues to address. First, the strategic probit and logit models provide slightly
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different perspectives on the conflict process. Overall, opposing agreement dyads
influence militarized conflict, but not economic sanctions, according to the logit
specification. The strategic probit suggests opposing agreements affect conflict initiation
and both coercive strategies. As for one agreement dyads, the logit points to little
influence on militarized conflict and negative influences on sanctions. The strategic
probit shows one agreement dyads are less likely to engage in conflict and have
discernible influences on sanctions and military force. Differences between the two
models are not necessarily inconsistent, as the two methods model the conflict process
differently. My use of logit and bivariate probit to test the use of military force and
economic sanctions essentially permits the two instruments to be compliments. That is,
rather than substitutes, the basic logit models permit both economic sanctions and
military force to be used more or less frequently. This is possibly the case given the
inability of the logits to rule out either coercive instrument in favor of the other. Hence,
the logits model a decision-making process that permits complementary process in
coercive strategies.
Strategic probits, in contrast, model more closely a substitution effect by pitting
sanctions against military force directly. The two-stage approach allows the
sanctions/military force decision to follow the initiation of conflict broadly. In other
words, the decision-making process modeled by the strategic probit captures an either-or,
true substitution effect. It is as if decision-makers first decide to initiate conflict and
subsequently determine, given the decision to initiate, the means by which they will
coerce. The validity of the strategic choice model appears to hinge on the
appropriateness of modeling the conflict process as a two-stage, conflict-then-coercive-
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tactic game. Such an assumption may impose too strict logic on the conflict process,
however, leading to the different results. What is likely more valid is that economic
sanctions and military force are both complements and substitutes in different
circumstances and times. The assumption of complements or substitution is a critical in
my model, and will be addressed in future research.
Second, while some evidence suggests conflict may increase between members
and non-members of agreements, several of my causal mechanisms fail to perform as
expected. In particular, I anticipate trade diversion, which I argue is a more or less direct
assessment of relative gains and losses, to increase both overall and militarized conflict.
My results indicate that if diversion has any relationships with conflict, it is to encourage
it with states experiencing the least amount of diversion or even trade creation. The
economic agreement dyads most prone to conflict are those that may actually slightly
benefit from the creation of economic agreements of which they are not a part. In other
words, mild gains experienced from neighbors in trade agreements may encourage
conflict.
This puzzling finding can possibly be explained by a number of factors. Dyads
where high levels of trade creation occur may not engage in conflict, particularly
militarized, because it risks the substantial gains they receive from the agreement. For
example, it is possible that that Russia benefits from the European Union without being a
member. They likely benefit from unified supranational trade laws that replaced myriad
national systems, eased transportation regulations, and possibly efficiency gains from
exporting to a proportionally larger trade area. Likewise, the EU might benefit from the
Commonwealth of Independent States in a similar manner. To the extent militarized
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conflict introduces uncertainty or otherwise disrupts trade, the gains from these
agreements may be lost. Consequently, it makes intuitive sense that trade creation
reduces interstate conflict between members and non-members.
The connection between high levels of trade diversion and a reduced likelihood of
conflict is more complicated and tenuous, however. One possibility is simply that should
enough relative gains accrue to a state in the dyad, as would be the case with high degrees
of diversion, the balance of power may shift such that the state experiencing relative
losses acquiesces to demands without militarized coercion. Insomuch as the gains from
trade can be translated into coercive economic or military power (Baldwin 1985;
Hirschman 1981; McKeown 1984; Root 1984; Gowa and Mansfield 1993), states that
substantially benefit from their discriminatory membership in an economic agreement
possess distinct advantages. While I argue that such strategic imbalances result in
conflict, they may also simply result in such imbalances that conflict is not a viable
strategy for the weaker state. This explanation is particularly valid for one agreement
dyads where one state clearly gains and the other clearly loses. It might also explain the
curvilinear relationship between diversion and sanctions between states in one agreement
dyads. As for opposing agreement with states in different economic agreements, while
the previous argument might still hold, losses from trade diversion are theoretically
replace by trade in each states’ respective agreement. Conflict may simply decline here
because the states drift away economically. That is, with less commerce taking place,
there are fewer issues about which to fight. The issues that do require coercion are of
sufficiently low salience given the marginalized economic relationship to warrant lowlevel coercive responses. This might explain the simultaneous findings of the logit and
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strategic probit model, where the formal indicates reduce likelihood of MIDs with
diversion and the latter a higher likelihood of sanctions.
A second possible explanation extends one made in the previous chapter. States
with relatively mild levels of trade creation may be the most competitive commercial
relationships. This is particularly true to states that form different economic agreements.
One of the primary reasons states form economic agreements is the desire to lock-in
access to markets and resources (Whalley 1996). Insofar as agreements harm the profits
of non-member exporters, additional agreement formation is spurred by excluded states
that desire corresponding preferential access with other states (Baldwin 1993). The end
result can be competing trade blocs and high degrees of inter-regional competition.
Rather than cordoning off exclusive economic zones, however, the agreements may
provide certain exporters with sanctuary profits collected from the trade bloc. Possessing
a relatively safe home market might permit these exporters to more aggressively pursue
business overseas. Intense competition with other trade bloc exporters may result. The
American car manufacturing industry, for example, likely gains sanctuary profits from
NAFTA given their comparative advantage in North America. This in turn permits them
to compete fiercely with Japanese and European manufacturers and vice versa. In these
cases, we might expect mild levels of trade creation given efficiency gains from
agreements and the promotion of intra-industry trade between blocs. Competition as
reflected by trade creation may spur concerns about relative gains and losses if resources
and markets are threatened. These forces may translate to conflict if strategic
vulnerabilities are fostered.
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Alternatively, the most convincing explanation may be that dyads with mild levels
of trade creation are simply the dyads with the least realized or potential economic
interdependence. States with high levels of trade creation or diversion are first and
foremost states geography, nature, and basic political systems suggest should be highly
interdependent. States with trade creation may fight less due to the gains from trade.
High diversion dyads, however, have distanced themselves economically. The potential
for commerce and interdependence, however, might discourage conflict if businesses
believe relations will thaw. Likewise, trade diversion may simply reflect high degrees of
unrecorded or illicit trade. That is, while the gravity model predicts relatively little
commerce between states in the dyad, trade actually occurs outside official channels or
through third-party states. Illicit trade, in turn, may discourage conflict in the traditional
opportunity cost and lobbying mechanisms discussed in Chapter 3. States with mild
levels of either creation or diversion are, first, dyads for which my expanded gravity
model predicts trade well. They may also be states that we might expect will trade
relatively little given geography, political systems, and natural endowments of resources.
Economic agreements for either state, consequently, might spur some trade simply by
increasing overall economic activity and openness. Alternatively, low levels of trade
creation between unlikely trade partners might simply be measurement error by my
gravity model. Either way, if mild trade creation reflects economic odd couples with
little interdependence, my formal models predicts a higher likelihood of militarized
conflict.
One final explanation of my trade diversion finding is measurement error. The
gravity model I specify, while carefully constructed, is a blunt instrument given the
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nuances of international trade. Myriad factors influence trade flows, including several
that are likely unobservable. My estimates may be off as a result. Furthermore, I have
attributed all trade creation/diversion between agreement members and non-members to
the agreement, which may not be accurate. Measurement error in this capacity is
particularly problematic if it is non-random. For example, if I estimate high trade
diversion for dyads with certain characteristics (e.g., allies or autocracies, for example),
the relationship between diversion and conflict will likely be biased. From my analysis
and diagnostics presented in Chapter 4, my gravity model poorly predicts zero-trade
flows. This might overstate diversion, and to the extent dyads with zero-trade flows
share common characteristics, bias my analysis. Unfortunately, I have incorporated
many of the factors predicting non-zero trade flows in my gravity model, suggesting
unobservable factors may be driving zero-trade estimates.
Third, the differences between one and opposing agreements on conflict is
interesting. My argument about marginalized trade ties and relative gains concerns
between members and non-members intuitively suggests one agreement dyads are more
conflict prone. While opposing agreement members derive benefits from their
corresponding trade blocs, the excluded state in the one agreement model is isolated
without an agreement. Yet it appears opposing agreements are more conflict prone, and
particularly so with militarized force. This may reflect the aforementioned heightened
competition between opposing agreement members. In contrast, it may also be that
opposing agreement members drift away economically such that interdependence is
particularly low. Conflict and militarization might be more common as a result. One
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agreement dyads, in contrast, may still possess economic relationships risked by conflict.
Relative gains concerns may be muted or overcome by potential gains as a result.
Fourth, according to the strategic probit models, certain economic relationships
make economic sanctions more likely for opposing agreement members. This is in direct
contrast to my theory of substitution. This may reflect a few processes at work. Reduced
interdependence may lower the cost of sanctions such that they are more frequently
employed in low-level conflicts. The low cost of sanctions between members and nonmembers may increase the range of political issues decision-makers deem worthy of
coercive action. Alternatively stated, policy makers may be more willing to use sanctions
to coerce – materially or symbolically – given it is unlikely to hurt the sender.
Alternatively, in a similar vein, sanctions and military for may not be substitutable
policies. Sanctions may be employed for one set of issues while military force is
reserved for more serious disagreements. This harkens back to the need for more work
on the assumption of substitutability regarding sanctions and military force.
Fifth, my analysis indicates some important caveats for the broader liberal peace.
In particular, the structure of trade relationships – and not simply the amount of trade –
appears to influence conflict behavior. Overall, economic agreements do appear to
influence interstate conflict. Furthermore, trade diversion (and to some extent trade
asymmetry) stemming from membership in economic agreements influences conflict
between members and non-members according to my analysis. In turn, interdependence
in the traditional sense is limited in its ability to constrain states from conflict when
economic agreements are introduced per most of my models. That is not to say, of
course, that interdependence is not relevant to conflict between members and non-
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members. Rather, interdependence is only one aspect of economic relationships that
influence conflict behavior. In other words, it is not sufficient to only identify the extent
of commercial exchange between states to accurately understand their propensity to
coerce. It is important also to understand how states value their commercial relationship
and in what context it exists.

6.4

Conclusion: Economic Agreements and External Conflict
My theoretical argument in Chapter 3 draws hypotheses concerning the influence

of economic agreements on extra-agreement conflict. The first, reproduced below,
addresses broad conflict dynamics between members and non-members of an economic
agreement:
H2: Economic agreements increase the likelihood of conflict between members
and non-members of the agreement.
I evaluate this hypothesis using a large-N statistical analysis of dyad years from
1970 to 2001 using basic logit and strategic probit models. Ultimately, I find conditional
support for this hypothesis. Certain economic conditions spur conflict between members
and non-members of agreements. Dyads with one agreement are more likely to
experience conflict if trade asymmetry is present (per the strategic probit). Likewise,
dyads with opposing agreements are more likely to experience conflict if asymmetry
manifests and trade diversion is at moderate levels. Consequently, it does appear that
conflict is more likely between members and non-members provided certain economic
conditions exist.
The second hypothesis in this chapter addresses the substitution of economic
sanctions for military force:
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H6: Economic agreements increase the likelihood of militarized conflict between
members and non-members.
Again, qualified and limited support is found for this argument.

While opposing

agreement members are overall more likely to use MIDs per the logit and strategic probit
models, it is only at modest levels of trade diversion. Furthermore, trade asymmetry may
favor sanctions over military force per the strategic probit model. Dyads with only one
state in an agreement are neither more nor less likely to experience MID according to the
logit results and are slightly more likely to use economic sanctions provided trade
diversion is modest. The strategic probit models indicate a direct substitution effect,
however, as trade asymmetry increases. Hence, some preliminary support is found for
this hypothesis. The validity of these results, however, is contingent on the
appropriateness of modeling the conflict process as a two-stage, substitution between
sanctions and military force. More work is required to fully understand this dynamic.
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Table 6.1: One Agreement Dyads and Extra-Agreement Conflict, Militarized Interstate Disputes
Basic Logit

Bivariate Probit

Imputed Logit

Militarized Interstate Disputes
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Agreement
Agreement*Asymmetry
Agreement*Interdependence
Agreement*Diversion
Agreement*Diversion2
Asymmetry
Interdependence
Trade Diversion
Trade Diversion2
Alliance
Contiguity
Capabilities
Democracy
GDP
IGOs
Major Power
WTO
Spatial Lag (Alliances)
Spatial Lag (Contiguity)
Constant

Coefficient
8.970
-4.905
6.919
-5.410
-3.309
3.071
-23.625***
33.992**
-20.014**
0.363**
3.252***
0.163***
-0.041***
0.216***
0.015**
1.326***
0.055
-0.369
27.788**
-23.859***

Standard
Error
17.486
4.265
13.608
36.990
20.132
1.965
6.694
14.094
7.449
0.138
0.158
0.043
0.010
0.044
0.005
0.175
0.125
9.892
9.610
6.867

Coefficient
-0.137
-0.319
6.538
1.214
-1.066
1.040
-12.638***
9.837*
-6.603**
0.102
1.408***
0.063***
-0.018***
0.112***
0.010***
0.482***
-0.056
3.245
14.163***
-8.417***

Standard
Error
8.123
1.646
5.387
16.721
8.750
0.800
2.731
4.533
2.426
0.053
0.053
0.017
0.004
0.017
0.002
0.067
0.047
3.531
3.154
2.243

Coefficient
-11.026
10.315***
-3.410
8.069
3.175
-5.651*
-13.872*
-1.353
-6.239
0.277*
3.344***
0.254***
-0.059***
0.320***
0.007
0.989***
0.505***
10.245*
24.165***
-4.516

Standard
Error
6.697
3.221
16.970
15.109
9.515
2.437
5.533
10.856
7.954
0.123
0.129
0.034
0.009
0.035
0.005
0.156
0.112
5.173
6.197
4.229

Table 6.1: Continued
N
λ2
Pseudo-R2
Log-Pseudolikelihood
ρ

191,887
3,225.82***
0.3535
-2,273.15
-------------

191,887
2,876.57***
-------------3,183.382
0.460***

368,562
-------------------------------------------------

The dependent variables are Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs). The "agreement" variable indicates dyads where only one state is in an
economic agreement. Temporal control variables (peace years3) omitted for space Model statistics for bivariate probit repeated on Table 6.2, as
they are produced by the same regression and divided only for viewing convenience.. *p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
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Table 6.2: One Agreement Dyads and Extra-Agreement Conflict, Economic Sanctions
Basic Logit

Bivariate Probit

Imputed Logit

Economic Sanctions
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Agreement
Agreement*Asymmetry
Agreement*Interdependence
Agreement*Diversion
Agreement*Diversion2
Asymmetry
Interdependence
Trade Diversion
Trade Diversion2
Alliance
Contiguity
Capabilities
Democracy
GDP
IGOs
Major Power
WTO
Spatial Lag (Alliances)
Spatial Lag (Contiguity)
Constant

Coefficient
Standard Error
-258.470*
121.717
-0.226
5.008
23.150
18.328
521.820*
245.567
-263.403***
124.126
4.714***
1.602
-14.401
10.271
28.078
33.113
-15.442
18.047
0.605*
0.284
0.359
0.491
-0.096
0.078
-0.020
0.017
0.921***
0.112
-0.030**
0.010
1.392***
0.325
0.630**
0.226
6.296
11.705
32.237*
15.813
-41.308**
15.096

Coefficient
-97.596*
-0.679
14.730*
196.357*
-98.785*
1.869**
-3.650
26.106
-13.921
0.274**
0.112
-0.032
-0.005
0.292***
-0.011***
0.432***
0.238***
0.499
12.841**
-22.156**

Standard Error
46.901
1.906
6.564
93.743
46.918
0.647
3.720
18.028
9.523
0.098
0.163
0.025
0.005
0.037
0.003
0.099
0.072
4.384
4.693
8.520

Coefficient
36.186
11.884*
-2.951
-114.302
78.625
-7.292
-14.250
130.140
-85.712
0.393
1.130***
0.013
-0.011
0.883***
-0.016
1.221***
0.938***
-5.490
38.103***
-72.682

Standard Error
54.609
5.874
18.926
124.399
70.555
5.798
12.739
121.199
69.085
0.233
0.353
0.053
0.016
0.099
0.009
0.334
0.220
13.403
10.288
52.949

Table 6.2: Continued
N
λ2
Pseudo-R2
Log Pseudolikelihood
ρ

191,887
824.55***
0.223
-928.327
-------------

191,887
2,876.57***
-------------3,183.382
0.460***

385,729
-------------------------------------------------

The dependent variable is the threat or imposition of an economic sanction. The "agreement" variable indicates dyads where only one state is in an
economic agreement. Temporal control variables (peace years3) omitted for space Model statistics for bivariate probit repeated on Table 6.1, as they are
produced by the same regression and divided only for viewing convenience.. *p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
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Table 6.3: Opposing Agreement Dyads and Extra-Agreement Conflict, Militarized Interstate Disputes
Basic Logit

Bivariate Probit

Imputed Logit

Militarized Interstate Disputes
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Agreement
Agreement*Asymmetry
Agreement*Interdependence
Agreement* Diversion
Agreement* Diversion2
Asymmetry
Interdependence
Trade Diversion
Trade Diversion2
Alliance
Contiguity
Capabilities
Democracy
GDP
IGOs
Major Power
WTO
Spatial Lag (Alliances)
Spatial Lag (Contiguity)
Constant

Coefficient
-517.941**
1.266
-38.919*
1064.753**
-546.033**
2.905
-27.923***
37.738*
-22.755*
0.396**
3.221***
0.242***
-0.056***
0.261***
0.017**
1.860***
0.047
-6.480
18.163
-25.775***

Standard
Error
180.875
4.889
18.300
363.892
183.186
2.122
7.021
16.997
8.922
0.127
0.146
0.049
0.010
0.043
0.005
0.165
0.122
11.985
10.246
8.311

Coefficient
-188.135***
0.809
-13.722
386.185***
-197.771***
0.673
-12.647***
9.546*
-6.668**
0.085
1.409***
0.063***
-0.024***
0.119***
0.011***
0.613***
-0.090
-1.643
13.001***
-8.187***

Standard
Error
57.221
2.023
7.457
114.681
57.530
0.836
2.755
4.899
2.584
0.051
0.052
0.019
0.004
0.017
0.002
0.062
0.047
4.904
3.534
2.450

Coefficient
-5.684
5.495
3.132
3.436
2.705
-8.068**
-15.640**
-6.099
-5.104
0.090
3.354***
0.261***
-0.067***
0.252***
0.019***
1.727***
0.138
9.071
20.524***
0.570

Standard Error
7.138
3.326
11.659
15.740
9.872
2.641
5.880
10.092
7.733
0.112
0.114
0.034
0.008
0.035
0.005
0.142
0.104
7.162
6.485
4.031

Table 6.3: Continued
N
λ2
Pseudo-R2
Log Pseudolikelihood

194,857
3,282.32***
0.364
-2,396.75

194,857
3,021.92***
------------0.554***

360,783
-------------------------------------

The dependent variable is the initiation of a Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs). The "agreement" variable indicates dyads where both states are in
different economic agreements. Temporal control variables (peace years3) omitted for space Model statistics for bivariate probit repeated on Table 6.4, as
they are produced by the same regression and divided only for viewing convenience.. *p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
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Table 6.4: Opposing Agreement Dyads and Extra-Agreement Conflict, Economic Sanctions
Basic Logit

Bivariate Probit

Imputed Logit

Economic Sanctions
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Agreement
Agreement*Asymmetry
Agreement*Interdependence
Agreement* Diversion
Agreement* Diversion2
Asymmetry
Interdependence
Trade Diversion
Trade Diversion2
Alliance
Contiguity
Capabilities
Democracy
GDP
IGOs
Major Power
WTO
Spatial Lag (Alliances)
Spatial Lag (Contiguity)
Constant

Coefficient
-10.490
3.007
-35.301
8.615
2.319
6.040***
-11.503
32.479
-17.126
0.113
0.082
-0.058
-0.045**
0.778***
-0.016
1.733***
0.488*
5.338
56.817***
-40.741**

Standard Error
22.255
2.563
28.876
46.663
24.716
1.527
9.947
33.545
18.419
0.291
0.537
0.062
0.015
0.098
0.009
0.282
0.198
12.007
8.051
15.146

Coefficient
-2.657
1.974
-11.161
-1.009
3.813
2.388***
-3.070
29.058
-15.195
0.076
0.002
-0.022
-0.013**
0.254***
-0.006*
0.511***
0.216***
1.156
20.347***
-22.949**

Standard Error
11.664
1.196
10.428
23.804
12.248
0.663
3.743
18.433
9.731
0.104
0.168
0.021
0.005
0.035
0.003
0.089
0.064
4.557
3.170
8.730

Coefficient
13.832
10.836
-15.937
-67.447
54.214
-5.148
-9.369
136.317
-86.838
-0.313
0.849*
0.085
-0.055***
0.758***
-0.003
1.834***
0.365
-4.829
45.042***
-74.404

Standard Error
59.699
5.974
30.450
133.032
74.096
5.787
11.806
120.354
68.167
0.254
0.364
0.052
0.013
0.086
0.009
0.284
0.177
12.373
7.179
52.707

Chapter 6.4: Continued
N
Chi2
Pseudo-R2
Log Pseudolikelihood
Rho

194,857
864.08***
0.244
-1,028.976
-------------

194,857
3,021.92***
-------------3,396.443
0.554***

377,459
-------------------------------------------------

The dependent variable is the threat or imposition of an economic sanction. The "agreement" variable indicates dyads where both states are in different
economic agreements. Temporal control variables (peace years3) omitted for space Model statistics for bivariate probit repeated on Table 6.3, as they are
produced by the same regression and divided only for viewing convenience.. *p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
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Table 6.5: Strategic Probit Estimation of Extra-Agreement Conflict
One Agreement
Opposing Agreements
Defending State (Initiation of Either a Sanction or a MID)
Standard
Standard
Coefficient
Error
Coefficient
Error
Agreement
0.334
5.369
52.916**
20.03
Agreement*Asymmetry
12.470***
3.579
-6.234***
1.709
Agreement*Interdependence
-16.576
10.29
-1.724
9.194
Agreement*Trade Diversion
-2.150
10.45
-97.23*
39.07
2
Agreement*Trade Diversion
1.375
5.906
44.195*
19.14
Asymmetry
-1.619
1.337
-2.086**
0.725
Interdependence
9.736*
4.727
10.412***
3.15
Trade Diversion
0.492
1.254
-2.072**
0.708
Trade Diversion2
-0.842
2.316
4.130***
0.735
Contiguity
2.452*
1.132
0.005
0.121
Capabilities
-0.092*
0.042
-0.079**
0.028
Democracy
-0.016*
0.007
0.001
0.006
Challenging State (Choice of Sanction or MID)

Agreement
Agreement*Asymmetry
Agreement*Interdependence
Agreement*Trade Diversion
Asymmetry
Interdependence
Trade Diversion
Contiguity
Capabilities
Democracy
Constants
βC Economic Sanctions
N
Mean Log-likelihood

Coefficient
-3.623
10.110*
6.167
3.260
1.346
-7.262
0.452
2.868***
0.083
0.017

Standard
Error
4.505
4.012
10.63
4.406
1.050
5.313
0.260
0.287
0.046
0.010

-5.952**
18,589
-0.123

2.322

Coefficient
33.199***
-17.446**
15.102
-32.633***
0.956
-9.262
1.425***
3.062***
0.243**
0.065***
-0.947**
17,188
-0.142

Standard
Error
9.158
6.070
42.25
9.039
3.362
11.56
0.340
0.359
0.078
0.018
0.323

The potential outcomes in the strategic probit are 1) no conflict initiation 2) threat or use of economic
sanctions 3) threat or use of military force. Estimates produced using STRAT software. The
"agreement" variable indicates dyads with either one state possessing membership in an economic
agreement (left columns) or where both states are members of different agreements (right two columns).
*p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
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Table 6.6: Predicted Probabilities for Strategic Probit Estimation
One Agreement

Opposing Agreement

% Change in Probability
Conflict
Initiation
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Agreement
Agreement*Asymmetry
Agreement*Interdependence
Agreement*Trade Diversion
Agreement*Trade Diversion2
Asymmetry
Interdependence
Trade Diversion
Trade Diversion2
Contiguity
Capabilities
Democracy
Baseline Probability

----20.4%
-------------10.2%
-------99.0%
189.6%
28.5%
5.27%

Economic
Sanctions

Military
Force

----21.4%
----------------------1,260.0%
------1.36%

---40.3%
---------------------3,800.0%
------3.90%

Conflict
Initiation

-99.0%
13.3%
---137.5%
-99.0%
14.9%
-12.2%
-95.0%
142.9%
---164.8%
---3.23%

Economic
Sanctions

-48.9%
9.8%
---80.6%
----------9.5%
----89.0%
-11.8%
55.8%
0.67%

Military
Force

613.3%
-15.0%
----57.6%
---------172.3%
---232.5%
456.5%
-37.9%
2.56%

Changes in the probability of conflict are calculated by shifting the value of the variable from minimum to mean value (or 0 to 1 for
dichotomous variables) while holding all others at their mean value. The "agreement" variable indicates dyads with either one state
possessing membership in an economic agreement (left columns) or where both states are members of different agreements (right columns).
*p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001

0.08%
0.06%
0.04%
0.02%
0

Probability of MID Initiation
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Figure 6.3: Strategic Probit Regressors

CHAPTER 7
CONCLUDING REMARKS ON ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS,
INTERSTATE CONFLICT, AND POLICY SUBSTITUTABILITY
At the outset of this project, I asked whether formal economic integration
agreements influence interstate conflict. I addressed this question by developing a
deductive theory that builds on assumptions and findings in the extant trade and conflict
literature. My theory and formal model indicated economic agreements should impact
conflict relations between states in several ways. Members of the same economic
agreement should engage in less overall conflict as interdependence and linkages
increase. Furthermore, my argument predicted asymmetric trade relations between
agreement members leads to the use of military force by the dependent state and
sanctions by the autonomous state. Because economic agreements do not exist in a
vacuum, I also derived predictions about conflict relations between members and nonmembers of agreements. Specifically, members and non-members are more likely to
engage in conflict given reduced interdependence. They also likely prefer militarized
force as a strategy in disputes due to the same factor.
The subsequent research design and statistical results in Chapters 4, 5, and 6
evaluate these arguments. For some of my hypotheses, the statistical analyses reveal
conditional support and/or partial confirmation. For others, general patterns in the data
suggested strong evidence against my hypotheses, extant scholarship, and possibly
conventional wisdom. Each of these findings is interesting in their own right, but the
220

combination of results and bearing on my overall project is the focus of my concluding
remarks. Overall, the results of my analysis raise interesting puzzles and avenues of
future inquiry that are worthy of additional scholarly attention.
To conclude, I first summarize my findings in terms of their overall consistency
with my general argument on economic agreements and interstate conflict. Then I build
off of this summary and consider what we can draw from my analysis and findings. In
other words, what have we learned from the previous six chapters? The third section of
this chapter draws implications for policymakers from my argument and findings.
Finally, I address the puzzles raised by my analysis and potential avenues of future
inquiry for scholarly work. That is, I ask – where do we go from here?

7.1

Summary of Findings, or What Have I Done?
When considering the results of Chapters 5 and 6, the most notable outcome is the

highly conditional nature of the influence economic agreements have on interstate
conflict. Agreements do not necessarily have direct and clear positive or negative
influences on conflict initiation. Rather, the economic relationships contain within and
fostered by the agreements appear to be the mechanisms through which conflict is
affected. Table 7.1 is an attempt to help organize the myriad relationships contained in
my empirical analysis. Economic agreement status is shown on the left with the variables
that increase (+) or decrease (-) the probability of conflict, sanctions, and military force in
turn. Also shown are regressions for which none of my primary explanatory variables
achieved statistical significance (⃝).
Surveying the results of the intra-agreement conflict chapter in the top half of the
table reveals several interesting patterns. First, membership in an economic agreement,
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particularly a deep one, is practically sufficient for the suppression of economic sanctions
between states. Indeed, no two members of a customs union, common market, or
economic union have experienced an economic sanction, suggesting deep economic
integration is indeed sufficient for the non-use of sanctions. This likely reflects aspects
of the institutional structure of agreements, such as codified rules or formalized
relationships, which prevent or dissuade sanctioning. Second, asymmetry and intraagreement trade appear to have strong and robust pacifying influences on conflict and
militarized force between members of all agreement types. Hence, some aspects of
agreements can indeed reduce the occurrence of conflict. Third, however, trade
interdependence and FDI dependence may actually encourage militarized conflict
between members of low-level trade agreements. This is an interesting finding that
contradicts the current literature on commerce and conflict. It also highlights the
conditional nature of economic relations and conflict. Some commercial linkages may
induce peace while others may fan the flames of conflict.
The bottom half of Table 7.1 shows the results for extra-agreement conflict
between members of agreements and non-members. In contrast to the intra-agreement
model, conflict between members and non-members is noteworthy for differences
between agreement types and economic relationships. First, distinct differences exist
between the basic logit and strategic probit results. On one hand, this stands in stark
contrast to the results of the intra-agreement analysis, where little strategic interaction
appeared to be taking place with respect to policy substitution. Some economic
relationships, such as asymmetric trade, appear to encourage economic agreement
members to consider their opponent and potential consequences when acting. On the
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other hand, the validity of the strategic probit rests on the assumption that a two-stage
game is taking place where a state decides to coerce then determines the instrument to
employ. Confidence in my results depends on the accuracy of this assumption.
Second, noteworthy differences exist between one and opposing agreement
models. According to the basic logit, the two arrangements are mirror images. Having a
dyad with one state in an agreement can affect sanctions, but not military force. Having
two states in different agreements affects military force, but not economic sanctions. The
strategic probit specification also shows key differences. Asymmetric trade relations
reduce overall conflict, reduce sanctions, and increase MIDs in one agreement dyads.
For opposing agreements, however, asymmetry increases overall conflict, increases
sanctions, and reduces MIDs. Differences of this nature suggest different processes are at
work in one agreement and opposing agreement dyads. It may be that asymmetry in the
context of one agreement dyads results in militarized disputes because the state without
an agreement is isolated economically and possesses fewer coercive alternatives.
Members have an established and robust trade network while non-members are
marginalized by the growing economic distance. Neither state is truly interdependent,
thereby increasing the occurrence and severity of conflict. Opposing agreements are less
sensitive to asymmetry, however, because both states possess their own trade networks.
Vulnerabilities may be less acute as a result, thereby warranting lower-level coercive
action through sanctions.
Third, the relationship between trade diversion and conflict is non-linear and nonintuitive. I argued in Chapter 3 that trade diversion represented relative gains for
members and losses for non-members of agreements given the former simply shifts the
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source of import/export while the latter experiences less overall trade. Relative
gains/losses from trade are further posited to exacerbate conflict between states. My
results do not lend credence to this argument, however. If anything, high levels of trade
diversion may actually reduce conflict. The most conflict prone states are those with
neutral levels of diversion or even mild trade creation. I touched on this point in Chapter
6, and will return to it in a more detailed discussion below.
Table 7.2 summarizes the findings in context of my six hypotheses. Consider
each one in turn. H1 argues that economic agreements reduce conflict between agreement
members. I find conditional support for this argument, as asymmetry and intraagreement trade reduce conflict (particularly MIDs) for both shallow and deep agreement
members. H2 states that conflict should be more likely between members and nonmembers of agreements. I again find conditional support. Per the strategic probit results,
asymmetry and mild trade creation increases conflict for opposing agreement dyads.
This result does not hold for dyads with one agreement, however. H3 holds that less
dependent agreement members are more likely to use economic sanctions than military
force as a strategy in conflict. I do not find support for this argument, as states in the
same economic agreement use sanctions with much less frequency than states without an
agreement. H4 builds on H3 by arguing that more dependent agreement members use
military force instead of economic sanctions. Again, no support is found for this
argument. Asymmetry actually decreases MID initiation for members of both shallow
and deep agreements. By extension, H5 that argues symmetric trade relations reduce the
occurrence of military force receives no support. Symmetry actually promotes military
force between agreement members, it seems. Finally, H6 argues that members and non-
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members of agreements are more likely to use military force in disputes. I find
conditional support for this hypothesis. Per the strategic probit results, asymmetry
increases the use of MIDs in dyads with one agreement. Institutional structures increase
the use of MIDs in opposing agreement dyads.

7.2

Piecing Together the Implications, or What Have We Learned?
Beyond the statistical results and their bearing on my hypotheses, it is important

to consider the overall implications of my analysis for both scholars and policy makers.
Several of my findings contradict portions of the literature on commerce and conflict. I
offer a preliminary discussion and possible answers to several of these puzzles in this
section. First, I consider in general the impact of agreements on conflict between
members. I then discuss the unintended consequences of economic agreements as they
relate to the broader context in which they are formed. Third, I revisit the substitutability
of sanctions and military force along with a discussion of strategic behavior by states
regarding coercive instruments. Finally, it is necessary to revisit the relationship between
commerce and conflict in light of my results.
7.2.1

Summing Economic Agreements and Conflict
Perhaps the most basic point gleaned from my analysis of intra-agreement conflict

is that economic agreements can indeed influence the conflict behavior of states. The
structure of some trade relationships will encourage peace while others promote conflict.
Specifically, trade symmetry, trade interdependence, and FDI dependence between some
agreement members promotes conflict while asymmetry and intra-agreement trade
encourage peace. Likewise, in the most basic sense, my analysis of extra-agreement
conflict shows that economic agreements can influence conflict between members and
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non-members. Relying on the strategic probit results, it appears that trade asymmetry
discourages conflict (particularly militarized conflict) in dyads with only one agreement.
In contrast, asymmetry and mild values of trade creation encourage conflict between
states in different economic agreements. This is tempered by the institutional influence
of opposing agreements and extreme values of trade creation and diversion, which
decrease conflict. The strategies used in conflict also shift between opposing agreement
members, as asymmetry and diversion promote sanctions while institutional structures
encourage military force. Economic relationships thus appear to be contextual
phenomenon which states interpret with some degree of latitude.
They key point, however, is that economic agreements appear to be moderating
the influence of these factors. In other words, economic agreements do not simply
accelerate the mechanisms by which commerce operations in international relations.
Instead, they materially change the way in which states view and act on these
relationships. On one hand, asymmetry tends to increase militarized conflict between
states that do not share membership in an agreement. When two states form an
agreement, however, asymmetry tends to pacify relations. On the other hand, trade
interdependence and FDI dependence reduce militarized conflict in states without
economic agreements. It is only through the influence of formal economic agreements
that these factors result in disputes. This suggests agreements are the key factor in
attenuating the influence of certain economic variables. It follows logically that certain
structures of economic agreements, the relationships they foster, or characteristics of the
states that form them alter the lens through which states view economic relationships.
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Several possibilities exist for explaining the particular influence of economic
agreements. As I argue in Chapter 3, economic agreements draw states into coordinated
economic management and are difficult to shed as a result. Agreements also impose
certain structures on economic relations between members that may institutionalize
commercial relationships and give them a sense of relative permanence. Such factors
may alter the way states view certain relations. With respect to asymmetry, for example,
the institutionalized nature of agreements may bind highly dependent states to particular
agreement members. Militarized conflict may be less likely, despite the vulnerability of
the more dependent state, because the cost of conflict is simply too high. In other words,
more dependent states may capitulate to stronger states instead of risking exclusion from
the agreement by fighting. Symmetrically dependent states, on the other hand, are better
poised to withstand the cost of conflict given their proportional reliance on each other.
Alternatively, economic agreements may highlight the policy differences or
security issues between member states, thereby increasing the likelihood of conflict.
Integration may increase economic competition between member states by bringing
business into direct competition for markets and resources. High degrees of trade
interdependence between states may therefore be indicative of competition instead of
cooperation. Furthermore, foreign direct investment may flow from outside the
agreement to particular agreement members and not others, thereby advantaging one state
over others. Instead of developing internationally invested constituencies, economic
agreements may encourage reactionary elements opposed to cooperation with other
agreement partners. While this may not create conflict, it can neutralize the pacifying
influence of domestic business constituencies on interstate conflict. Hence, while
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vulnerabilities to states may have existed before integration, economic agreements may
exacerbate or solidify them by imposing binding structure on commercial relations.
Likewise, the institutional structure of economic agreements may prevent or
severely restrict the use of economic sanctions. On one hand, the legal framework of
agreements may prohibit their use. That said, military conflict seems a more costly
policy despite the “illegal”
nature of sanctions. On the other, a state that uses an economic sanction against another
member may face a coordinated response from other states in the agreement. In other
words, agreements may practice “collective economic security” by responding to
sanctioning states with coordinated, “overwhelming” economic force. Hence, sanctions
are unlikely to succeed on their own. Military force, however, may actually work by
raising the stakes of conflict and demonstrating more clearly the resolve of aggrieved
parties.
Exclusion from economic agreements also appears to affect the influence of
economic relationships on conflict. In particular, agreements also appear to structure the
way members and non-members view their trading relationship. States may value trade
differently depending on the context within which it exists. Again, interdependence in
dyads with one agreement or opposing agreements does not appear to discourage conflict
as reliably as it does between states without an agreement. My theory predicts as much
by arguing that the salience of trade ties between members and non-members decreases
when economic agreements are formed. Even though trade may exist, the pacifying
influences are muted as members rely more on other members and less on the outside
world for resources and markets. The more states look to agreement members for future
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commercial relations, the less important non-members become. Once states form
economic agreements that exclude others, in other words, the pacifying benefit of
interdependence is sacrificed. Other commercial relationships may in turn become more
important. Competition between members and non-members, which may manifest in
trade symmetry or mild trade creation, can increase in importance and influence on
conflict.
7.2.2

The Unintended Consequences of Economic Agreements
My results also highlight the unintended consequences of formal economic

integration. Agreements are generally created to draw member states closer together
economically. What is not readily apparent, however, is how such arrangements may
alter commercial relationships with the external world. The existence and operation of
finite international institutions influence relations with states excluded from membership
precisely because they are excluded from membership. Hence, not all trade openness can
be expected to purchase a state security. Indeed, those states that seek economic
integration as part of a security plan aimed at excluded states may exacerbate conflict
under certain economic conditions. States that seek intra-agreement security through
economic agreements risk worsening tensions with those outside the agreement.
Likewise, economic agreements created to exclude a particular adversary or rival may
backfire, as agreements can exacerbate tensions between members and non-members.
Creating agreements may also have unintended consequences for conflict between
agreement members. In particular, one of the more puzzling findings in my analysis is
conflict-inducing tendencies of FDI dependence for shallow agreement members. The
current scholarship on FDI and conflict indicates that inward FDI tends to reduce conflict
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between states by providing information about capabilities, increasing opportunity costs,
or providing alternative means of acquiring resources (Brooks 1999; Souva 2002; Souva
and Prins 2006; Bussmann 2010; Lee and Mitchell 2012). Indeed, my analysis shows
that two states without an economic agreement do experience less MIDs. When two
states form a shallow agreement, however, FDI dependence actually increases the
probability of conflict. This suggests the conditionality of FDI’s influence on conflict. I
offer potential explanations for this result in Chapter 5 and augment them with a case
study of the East African Community. To summarize, however, the conflict inducing
tendencies of FDI for shallow agreement members may reflect competition between
businesses (and states) for resources. I return to this point in section 7.2.4 with a more
thorough discussion of the liberal peace in light of my analysis.
7.2.3

The Puzzle of Economic Sanctions and Military Force
Overall, I find little evidence that states substitute economic sanctions for military

force. One of the theorized mechanisms through which the liberal peace works is the use
of sanctions to send costly signals in disputes, thereby obviating the need for war
(Morgan and Schwebach 1997; Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 2001; Drezner 2003; Verdier
2004; Lektzian and Sprecher 2007). By severing beneficial trade linkages, states are able
to demonstrate their resolve and willingness to fight. It logically follows that the
effectiveness of economic sanctions is a function of the interdependence between
disputants (Allen 2008; Jing, Kaempfer & Lowenberg 2003). Economic agreement
members, intuitively, are strong candidates to use economic sanctions given their explicit
attempts at fostering interdependence and institutional ties. In turn, states that form
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separate economic agreements excluding other trade partners appear less likely to use
sanctions given reductions in interdependence.
My research indicates the opposite, however. Economic agreement members are
in many ways the least likely group to use economic sanctions in disputes. Likewise,
certain commercial relationships between members and non-members actually encourage
the use of economic sanctions. Hence, the most likely group per my theory does not use
sanctions while the least likely group does. In each empirical chapter I offered potential
explanations for these results. By way of wrapping up this discussion, I draw together
these two puzzling findings and offer general explanations about the process of sanctions.
One possible explanation of the sanctions results is that certain threshold effects
are at play. Economic sanctions may be used for particularly low-level conflicts while
military force is reserved for more serious disputes. Issues of relatively minor
importance to states or in their early stages of development may warrant economic
sanctions as a resolution attempt. Once the salience of a particular issue rises high
enough, states might abandon sanctions in favor of more forceful policies that involve
militarization. In this way, economic sanctions may not actually substitute for military
force, but simply expand the range of issues over which states are willing to use coercive
mechanisms. Sanctions and military force may be complementary policies in states’
foreign policy tool kit.
Economic agreements may alter the cost-benefit calculus of these decisions
depending on how they impact interdependence. Between agreement members, for
example, the cost of sanctions may be relatively high given increases in trade between
members and investment into the region. Fewer issues therefore warrant the cost of
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economic sanctions between these highly interdependent states. Issues of mild
importance are thus tolerated or resolved through diplomatic or less coercive tactics. In
contrast, reduced interdependence between members and non-members may lower the
cost of sanctions such that they are more frequently employed in low-level conflicts. The
low cost of sanctions between members and non-members may increase the range of
political issues decision-makers deem worthy of coercive action. To the extent trade
blocs increase competition between members and non-members, sanctions may actually
make a great deal of sense. Drezner (1999) models the effects of conflict expectations on
economic statecraft. He finds that as concerns over relative gains and reputation
increase, a state’s decision to utilize sanctions increases as well. Alternatively stated,
policy makers may be more willing to use sanctions to coerce – materially or
symbolically – given it is unlikely to hurt the sender. There still exists, however, a range
of issues over which even interdependent states are willing to risk lost trade and
investment. Indeed, economic agreements may increase these issues due to commercial
competition between states. For these issues, sanctions are inappropriate, as they might
signal something less than total commitment (Fearon 1997; Hufbauer 1998).
Consequently, the rate with which agreement members use military force against both
other members and non-members can remain unchanged while sanctions become
unnecessarily costly compared to other options.
This raises an additional point about the substitutability of coercive policies. I
have modeled two alternative coercive policies in this study. The reality, however, is that
coercion is a continuum on which many strategies exist. For example, diplomatic actions
can serve as coercive tactics (e.g., boycotting the Olympics or withdrawing diplomats).
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Alternatively, positive inducements like foreign aid or technical assistance can be used to
“coerce” states into adopting more favorable policies. Economic agreements may indeed
results in the substitution of coercive policies, just not economic sanctions as a preferred
substitute. My analysis does not capture these potential substitutions given its focus on
the more popular and costly coercive activities of sanctions and military force. While
exploring these options is beyond the scope of this particular study, it might provide
fruitful avenues of future research into substitutability.
Another possible explanation for my puzzling sanctions results concerns my
modeling of the decision-making process. My theory and formal model sketch a twostage approach where the sanctions/military force decision follows conflict initiation. In
this way, decision-makers first decide to initiate conflict and subsequently determine the
means by which they will coerce. Economic sanctions and military force are therefore
outcomes of the same decision-making foreign policy process. This logit may be too
rigid, however, as sanctions and military force may be compliments rather than
substitutes. Likewise, sanctions may be viable for one set of issues and military force
another. Modeling the two policies as potential outcomes of the same process in such
cases would be comparing apples and oranges. The assumption of complements or
substitution is a critical in both my research and policy generally, and deserves future
attention.
In light of this, the strategic model and argument I develop may be inappropriate
for analyzing the use of economic sanctions. It certainly appears that economic
agreement members are not acting strategically when engaging in disputes with other
members given the near absence of economic sanctions. This is somewhat puzzling
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given extant research. Tsebelis finds that strategies of target and sender depend on the
payoff of the opponent rather than their own payoff in the case of sanctions. This
suggests that leaders in the sending state are interested in punishing the target even at
their own cost, which would seem to make sanctions more likely between agreement
members given interdependence implies high costs. Likewise, Eaton and Engers (1992)
find that sanctions and threats are more likely to be successful when expectation of future
interaction exists, as we might expect between economic agreement members. The
abstention from economic coercion by agreement members, in spite of the seemingly
strong incentives, casts doubt on the use of strategy in using economic sanctions. It may
be instead that states are primarily concerned about their own payoffs and costs when
selecting coercive strategies. Hence, sanctions may be expressions of disapproval or
attempts at punishment for the transgressions of other states instead of active compellent
measures (Nossal 1998). Alternatively, they may serve a deterrent function meant to
demonstrate the potential cost of objectionable policies rather than actually change the
target state’s policies (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot 2007). These factors might lend
credence to the notion that sanctions and military force are more often compliments than
substitutes.
In a similar vein, it may be entirely inappropriate to model economic sanctions as
an outcome of a primarily foreign policy focused process. In addition to my assumption
that sanctions and military force are outcomes of the same process, I assumed more
fundamentally that sanctions are used exclusively (or at least primarily) to achieve
foreign policy goals. It may be the case, however, that the use of sanctions reflects a
domestically oriented policy process. Sanctions may demonstrate strong leadership or

234

sympathy to domestic constituencies by governments in order to gain political support
(Drury 1998; Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1992; Mundo 1999; Whang 2011). Likewise,
Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1988; 2003) and Eaton and Engers (1992) argue that
sanctions may be more expressive than instrumental, whereby the goal of the sender is
not necessarily to coerce the target state, rather to satisfy domestic audiences. This
argument parallels the arguments made by Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007) with
respect to foreign aid. Leaders care first and foremost about maintaining political power.
Consequently, foreign aid is doled out by leaders with large winning coalitions to extract
policy concessions from other states, not necessarily to achieve foreign policy goals.
Sanctions, in turn, can be used to extract concessions for domestic political gains instead
of security concerns. Consequently, the sanction process may not be so much
strategically as domestically focused, an effect outside the scope of my model and study.
7.2.4

Puzzles in the Liberal Peace
My results also have interesting implications for the liberal peace. In some ways

my theory and analysis pertaining to extra-agreement conflict supports the important
pacifying forces behind arguments of interdependence and conflict. Exclusion from
economic agreements, I argue, reduces the salience of trade ties. Consequently,
integration severs the mechanisms by which the liberal peace operates between members
and non-members. The core of liberalism is intact and possibly augmented by my
analysis. What I do, however, is refine the conditions under which economic liberalism
may succeed in preventing conflict between states. Economic integration may create
security externalities for states if they significantly reduce the importance of external ties
or allow security concerns to develop.

235

Likewise, my finding that intra-agreement trade reduces conflict may strengthen
and expand some aspects of the liberal peace. Intra-agreement trade, as I have modeled it
in this study, is all trade a state conducts with agreement members less bilateral trade
with the specific dyadic partner. So in the case of NAFTA, the influence of intraagreement trade between the United States’ and Mexico is the geometric mean of USCanada and Mexico-Canada trade. In this way the measure captures purely third-party
influence. This suggests actors outside the immediate dyad in question can constrain
conflict behavior between a particular pair of states. This suggests a somewhat unique
causal process at work that goes beyond simple dyad relations and considers the broader
effect of trade networks. The codified framework of trade relations established by
economic agreements and the inherent excludability of benefits in the advent of conflict
may in fact increase opportunity costs in ways that reduce conflict. Such findings lend
themselves well, in theory, to a network analysis study that more formally models
multilateral trade ties. While beyond the scope of this study, network analysis may prove
a useful tool in exploring the affects of trade agreements on conflict in the future.
Yet my analysis raises several puzzles inherent in the liberal peace. First and
foremost is the finding that foreign direct investment actually increases militarized
conflict between members of shallow economic agreements. This challenges a
burgeoning literature and requires more careful theory and testing of investment
dynamics. Just as important, however, are my findings that the structure of trade
relationships matter for conflict in certain situations. Indeed, this may be the most
poignant criticism of the liberal peace in my analysis. While traditional liberal arguments
hold that states value absolute gains in trade, and therefore are loath to sacrifice them
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through conflict, I show that the structure of trade relations, specifically symmetry,
matters in the decisions of states. Likewise, in the classic sense of the liberal argument,
the diversion of trade due to economic agreements should not meaningfully influence
state behavior. States instead tend to focus on extant trade and the benefits that accrue
from it. The fact that trade diversion influences conflict behavior in any way suggests
states do indeed care about the structure and context of trade. Consequently, states may
value trade differently depending on the circumstances within which it exists. That is not
to say, of course, that interdependence is not relevant to conflict between members and
non-members. Rather, interdependence is only one aspect of economic relationships that
influence conflict behavior. In other words, it is not sufficient to only identify the extent
of commercial exchange between states to accurately understand their propensity to
coerce. One must also understand how they value their commercial relationship and in
what context it exists.
Overall, to the extent my findings contradict or challenge the liberal peace, they
are not completely confirmatory of the logic I posit in Chapter 3. In particular, I argue
that relative gains concerns between members and non-members of agreements are likely
to be witnessed in trade asymmetry and diversion. These factors, in turn, are likely to
increase conflict between members and non-members due to relative gains concerns.
What I find, however, is that trade diversion and asymmetry may actually decrease
conflict and the use of military force. Likewise, I argue that FDI dependence should
reduce conflict between agreement members, as conflict introduces uncertainty that
drives businesses away from states. I present some possible explanations in Chapters 5
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and 6 for these results. A common theme extends across these results, however, that
warrants discussion.
My argument in Chapter 3 may mischaracterize, or at least misstate, the ways in
which relative gains concerns and vulnerability manifest between states. Relative gains
concerns as related to economic exchange are likely to emerge in instances where states
have the opportunity for cooperation (Powell 1991; Snidal 1991). That is, two states that
do not anticipate commerce, due to geographic or political factors for instance, have no
need to concern themselves with their hypothetical gains from trade. It stands that
relatively close, competitive economic relationships are the most prone to the influence
of relative gains. This is analogous to rivalries in various sports. Ohio State is unlikely
to be concerned with the recruiting class of the University of South Carolina. While
hypothetically they may be well matched and play a close game, they are highly unlikely
to face each other in competition. Ohio State is much more concerned, however, with the
University of Michigan’s recruiting class given they face each other annually. A recruit
that goes to South Carolina is unlikely interested in Ohio State, whereas a recruit for
Michigan is likely a lost prospect for Ohio State.
The translation to economic agreements is more straightforward than one might
initially think and relates specifically to the FDI findings. A firm that decides to invest in
Brazil is implicitly a decision not to invest in Argentina. In the abstract, this is a relative
loss for Argentina as it sacrifices manufacturing capacity and revenue that Brazil now
gains. If the competition for FDI is sufficiently fierce, as might be expected when both
states are highly dependent on FDI, relative gains concerns may manifest that influence
conflict. Economic agreements may actually increase competition over resources and
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expose vulnerabilities by institutionalizing these competitive commercial relations
through a codified structure. In other words, competition may increase as agreements
bring states into closer and fiercer competition for investment.
A similar process may take place between agreement members and non-members
with respect to trade diversion. States with relatively mild levels of trade creation may
simply be the most competitive commercial relationships. Economic agreements may
provide certain exporters with sanctuary profits collected from the trade bloc, which in
turn permits them to compete more fiercely with other regions. Trade may actually be
created between members and non-members by different economic agreements as a
result. Instead of highlighting absolute gains in trade, however, states may grow
concerned about who gains more as competition over markets and resources develops.
This includes both direct competition between trade blocs and competition for third-party
markets and resources. As businesses from different trade blocs compete, states may
become more acutely aware of being potentially disadvantaged by the success of
competitors. Concern about vulnerabilities may develop in ways that encourage states to
act more aggressively. Indeed, relative gains concerns are likely to manifest when the
use of force is a potential issue (Powell 1991). Relative gains concerns may still apply to
my analysis, therefore, but may require a different theoretical construct to explain my
puzzling empirical results.

7.3

Implications for Policymakers, or What Do We Do?
Given the extensive use of economic agreements in today’s global economy, my

results have potentially important implications for policymakers. Many agreements (the
early incarnations of the European Union, the Gulf Cooperation Council, ASEAN, etc.)
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are formed with the specific goal of encouraging peace between member states.
Likewise, many alliances contain an economic component aimed to deepen cooperation
and ties. This strategy may or may not be wise depending on the economic relationship
between members. My results suggest deep, hierarchical agreements with a dominant
economic power are least likely to result in conflict. This is because hierarchical
agreements likely generate asymmetry, intra-agreement trade from complementary
economies, and less FDI competition (as the dominate state likely attracts most FDI).
Such agreements create a hub-and-spoke system of economic relations revolving around
one economically central country. Fortunately, this type of agreement is relatively
common, as evident in NAFTA (United States dominant), the South African
Development Community (South Africa dominant), Commonwealth of Independent
States (Russia dominant), MERCOSUR (Brazil dominant), and others.
Agreements between equals, however, may not purchase the security states
expect. Trade relations are likely symmetric with intense competition for FDI. This type
of agreement is most likely to exist between less developed states in the global south.
Ironically, the proliferation of agreements between developing states is an attempt to
break dependence on more developed countries (Mayda and Steinberg 2007; UNCTAD
2008). Caution should be taken when pursuing such agreements, however, as they may
bring states into tighter competition that can exacerbate tensions and result in conflict.
The case of the East African Community in Chapter 5 is an example of an agreement
between equals that resulted in conflict.
States considering economic agreements may also need to consider their broader
impact on conflict with non-members. Exclusion from economic agreements, I argue,
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reduces the salience of trade ties and reduces interdependence. That is, agreements sever
the pacifying mechanisms of trade. Agreements should be structured such that trade with
the external world receives limited negative disruption. At a minimum, newly formed
agreements should avoid raising barriers to the outside world. This reduces the
likelihood of adverse effects from disengagement. A better solution is to create economic
agreements that lower barriers to trade with non-members (i.e., agreements that create
areas more open to global trade). Such agreements are more likely than other types to
generate trade creation and in turn peace. Alternatively, creating highly discriminatory
agreements that completely marginalize the outside world by generating high levels of
trade diversion are also likely to encourage peace. The overall welfare effects of
discriminatory agreements are quite high, however, and represent a less compelling
solution to potential conflicts between members and non-members.
Although I do not test the effectiveness of coercive policies in this paper, my
analysis casts doubt on the ability of sanctions to do the work of military force. Highly
interdependent states, as we might expect with agreement members, should be the best
poised to use economic sanctions. This is not the case, however, given the paucity of
sanctions between members. Likewise, the partial severing of interdependence between
members and non-members intuitively should reduce the use of sanctions. As my
analysis indicates, however, sanctions are more likely between states with presumably
limited interdependence due to differing economic agreements. This suggests sanctions
are employed to address a separate set of issues than military force. Indeed, sanctions
may symbolically used to express anger or disgust without intention of successfully
compelling or coercing targets.
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When all is taken into consideration, it is prudent to ask whether economic
agreements are an overall advisable policy. The answer to this question is complicated
and highly contextually. If nothing else, the results of my analysis point to the highly
conditional relationship between economics and security. Some relationships encourage
peace and others war between members. Others do not affect relations between
members, but instead encourage or discourage conflict with non-members. The most
important point is that economic agreements are not a ready-made solution to security
issues. While it can be argued that economic agreements succeeded in encouraging peace
in Europe, it would be foolish to assume identical results in other areas given the
complexity of possible economic and political relationships compared to Europe. States
must consider their most likely partners and competitors in determining the net impact –
in both economic and security terms – before forming agreements.

7.4

Implications for Scholars, or Where Do We Go From Here?
My analysis has implications for several different veins of literature in

international relations. Overall, I link diverse literatures that include conflict processes,
economic statecraft, international organizations, and foreign policy analysis. I also
explore methodological issues concerning imputed trade data in my statistical analysis.
Many of these efforts contribute to the growth of the literature. Perhaps more
importantly, however, they identify new puzzles for future exploration and research.
First, I contribute to the growing body of literature exploring the effects of
economic relationships on interstate conflict. The proximate literature to which I speak
concerns the relationship between economic agreements and interstate conflict. While
agreements may foster peace, the effect is largely dependent on the structure of

242

commercial relationships between members. More work is needed to help resolve the
puzzle I identify concerning the conflict inducing tendencies of FDI for certain agreement
types. This finding contradicts a broad body of research showing the opposite effect. I
presented brief case illustration in Chapter 5 to help identify potential causal pathways.
More careful case study analysis may aid in identifying the processes at work.
Alternatively, additional statistical research into the conditional nature of FDI’s influence
on interstate conflict may be useful. Identifying relationships that encourage competition
and relative gains concerns is particularly important in this vein. Another avenue of
future research linking economic relationships to conflict behavior involves the pacifying
influence of intra-agreement trade. This finding suggests trade networks have a role in
constraining the behavior of actors. A more thorough look at trade networks using actual
social network analysis techniques may reveal interesting relationships at the global or
regional level.
Second, I consider the empirical validity of policy substitution in coercive
situations. While economic sanctions have long been posited as alternatives to war, few
studies bring empirical results to bear. My analysis fails to find compelling evidence that
economic sanctions substitute for military force in disputes. Indeed, my evidence
suggests two different decision-making processes are at work between economic
sanctions and military force. More research is required to identify the underlying
linkages between disputes and coercive strategies. While economic sanctions may not
substitute for military force, it is more likely I have yet to identify the appropriate
circumstances in which they are successful in doing so. In particular, a range of issues
may exist for which economic sanctions are likely and military force less so. Military
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force may be likely in certain disputes for which economic sanctions are unlikely.
Finally, a range of issues may exist where both sanctions and military force are viable. If
substitutability is to be found, these are the most likely issue areas. Alternatively, the
choice between sanctions and military force may deal more with domestic than
international politics. Exploring the influence of regime type on strategies, for example,
may prove more fruitful regarding substitutability.
Third, my analysis addresses a generally neglected area of international relations.
Specifically, how might the existence and operation of finite international institutions
influence states excluded from membership? State decisions to seek integration are
strategic choices that necessarily exclude certain parties. It follows, therefore, that
institutions may have as profound consequences for non-members as they do members.
My analysis looks specifically at economic agreements and institutions. However, there
is no reason to believe the effects of exclusion from institutions are limited to the
economic realm. For example, omission from particular alliances may alter the conflict
behavior of the excluded state. Other types of agreements may also produce changes in
the security environment within which states exist. My work here provides one piece of
what might be a dynamic and interesting research program.
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Table 7.1: Summary of Statistical Findings for Economic Agreements and Conflict
Basic Logit
General
Economic
Conflict
Sanctions
Military Force
Economic Agreement Members (Intra-Agreement Conflict)
+

Interdependence
FDI Dependence

-

Institution
Asymmetry
Intra-Agreement

+

⃝

-

Asymmetry
Intra-Agreement

Shallow

Strategic Probit
Economic
General Conflict
Sanctions

Military Force

⃝

Interdependence
FDI Dependence

-------

-------

-------

Institution

Institution
Asymmetry
Intra-Agreement

-------

-------

-------

⃝

-------

-------

-------

Asymmetry
Intra-Agreement

-------

-------

-------

⃝

⃝

⃝

Deep
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Institution

Members and Non-Members (Extra-Agreement Conflict)
+

-------

Mild Trade
Creation
⃝

-

-------

Institution
Diversion/Creation
⃝

+

-------

⃝

One
Agreement

Opposing
Agreement

Mild Trade
Creation

Asymmetry

Asymmetry

Asymmetry
Mild Creation

Asymmetry
Trade Diversion

Asymmetry

⃝

Institution

Table 7.1: Continued
Basic Logit
Economic
General Conflict
Sanctions
Military Force
Members and Non-Members (Extra-Agreement Conflict)
Opposing
Agreement

-

-------

⃝ Indicates nonsignificant findings

⃝

Strategic Probit
Economic
General Conflict
Sanctions

Institution
Institution
Interdependence
Institution
Diversion/Creation
Diversion/Creation

Military Force

Asymmetry
Trade Diversion
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Table 7.2: Summary of Findings for Hypotheses
H1: Economic agreements decrease the likelihood of conflict between member states.
Conditional - Asymmetry and intra-agreement trade reduce conflict (particularly MIDs) for both shallow and deep agreement
members. Interdependence and FDI increase conflict for shallow agreement members, however.

H2: Economic agreements increase the likelihood of conflict between members and non-members of the agreement.
Conditional - Per the strategic probit results, asymmetry and mild trade creation increases conflict for opposing agreement dyads.
Institutional structures and high trade diversion/creation decreases conflict for opposing agreement dyads. Asymmetry decreases
conflict for one agreement dyads.

H3: Less economically dependent agreement members are more likely to use economic sanctions against other members as a tool of
coercion.
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No Support - States in the same economic agreement use sanctions with much less frequency than states without an agreement.

H4: More economically dependent agreement members are more likely to use military force against other members as a tool of
coercion.
No Support - Asymmetry decreases MID initiation for members of both shallow and deep agreements.

H5: Symmetrically dependent agreement members are less likely to use military force against other members as a tool of coercion
than asymmetrically dependent members.
No Support - Symmetric trade relations increase the probability of MID initiation for members of both shallow and deep agreements.

H6: Economic agreements increase the likelihood of militarized conflict between members and non-members.
Conditional - Per the strategic probit results, asymmetry increases the use of MIDs in dyads with one agreement. Institutional
structures increase the use of MIDs in opposing agreement dyads. Asymmetry and trade diversion reduce MID initiation in opposing
agreement dyads.
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APPENDIX A – EQUILIBRIUM CALCULATIONS
Challenger’s decision of sanctions over war:
pλ q + (1 − p )λ q − γ c ≥ p q + (1 − p ) q − θ c

pλ q + λ q − pλ q − γ c ≥ p q + q − pq − θ c
p λ q − pλ q − pq + p q ≥ q − λ q + γ c − θ c
p (λ q − λ q − q + q ) ≥ q − λ q + γ c − θ c
p≤

(θ c − γ c ) + (λ q − q )
(q + q ) − λ (q − q)

ξ = p≤

(θ c − γ c ) + q (1 − λ )
( q − q )(1 − λ )

Challenger’s decision between x E and x E demand when p ≤ ξ:
λ q + γ D ≥ p ( λ q + γ D ) + (1 − p )( λ q − γ c )

λ q + γ D ≥ pλ q + pγ D + λ q − γ c − pλ q + pγ c
γ D + γ c ≥ p (λ q − λ q + γ D + γ c )
γc +γD
p≤
λ (q − q ) + γ c + γ D
Challenger’s decision between x M and x M demand when p > ξ:
q + θ D ≥ p ( q + θ D ) + (1 − p )( q − θ c )
q + θ D ≥ p q + pθ D + q − θ c − pq + pθ c

θ D + θ c ≥ p (q − q + θ D + θ c )
θc + θ D
p≤
q − q + θc + θ D
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APPENDIX B – MISSING DATA AND MULTIPLE IMPUTATION
Given this inherent difficulty in imputing trade data, I first tested the quality of
imputed trade values against available data. I used the following procedure to evaluate
how closely imputed trade data resembled actual trade reported between countries.
Specifically, I:
1. Created a dataset containing only observations for which trade data is available
(using Correlates of War data developed by Barbieri and Keshk (2011).
2. Randomly deleted trade values for 20% of observations (approximately 81,000).
3. Using Amelia II, imputed missing trade data using the recommendations of King
et al (2001), which includes:
a. Include all variables to be used in the final statistical model.
b. Adding additional variables to help estimate missing values.
c. Accounting for temporal and cross-sectional continuity statistically using
Amelia.
4. Performed various diagnostic tests comparing the imputed trade data against
actual trade data to determine the adequacy of fit.
A complete list of the variables I used in the imputation model is included in
Table B.1 (along with the percentage missing in my analysis). Table B.2 briefly
compares the summary statistics between the imputed and actual trade data. The
summary statistics – particularly the mean, median, and standard deviation – seem to
suggest the imputed values roughly follow the distribution of the actual trade data with
one notable exception. The imputed values do not perform well at particularly low levels
of actual trade. That is, the imputation model struggles to report actuate values when the
expected level of trade is low. This is evident in the scores for first quartile. The actual
first quartile value is
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4.605 (zero trade) while the imputed first quartile is 6.324 – a difference of 37%.26
Consequently, the imputation imposes trade relationships in dyads where none exist.
Figure B.1 graphically represents several important relationships between
imputed trade values and key predictors. The top left panel of Figure B.1 plots
histograms of the actual and imputed trade values along with kernel density lines.27 As
the summary statistics indicate, the imputation model performs remarkably well if an
actual trade relationship exists, given the nearly identical kernel density lines between
logged values of 10 and 20. However, the imputed model vastly underestimates the
proportion of zeros in trade data. Indeed, while approximately 30% of actual trade values
are zero, only 11% of imputed trade values are zero or less. As I will discuss later, this
may prove problematic for statistical analysis.
While the overall distribution of imputed values is an important consideration, my
unit of analysis is the dyad-year. It is therefore important that the imputed values not
only match a general pattern but also perform well in predicting the trade occurring
between specific states. To evaluate the imputation model’s performance in this respect,
I focus on the variance between actual and imputed trade values. I calculate this by
subtracting imputed trade from actual trade such that positive (negative) values reflect
overestimation (underestimation) by the imputed model. The top right panel of Figure
B.1 is a scatterplot of variance against actual trade values. From this figure, the only
discernible pattern to the variance is a tendency for the imputation model to overestimate
trade at low values, as might be expected given my analysis of the summary statistics.
26

In order to impute trade values, which are logged, I added $100 to the trade variable for all observations.
Because the data are logged, zero trade in my analysis is actually a trade value of $100 (or a logged value
of 4.605). In other words, it is impossible for an actual trade value to be less than 4.605. Approximately
10% of imputed values, however, are less than 4.605. The difference between 4.605 and anything less,
however, is marginal and by definition less than $100.
27
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Closer inspection of the variance metric, however, reveals two major influences
on the accuracy of the imputation model. First, observations where GDP is missing for at
least one state in the dyad result in greater differences between imputed and actual
values. The mean variance for observations missing GDP is 0.488 compared to 0.011 for
observations possessing valid GDP scores. The bottom left panel of Figure B.1
graphically represents this relationship using histograms and kernel density plots for
observations according to whether they are missing GDP or not. As can be seen from the
histograms, observations with valid GDP scores cluster around zero variance. Those
missing GDP values, however, are more diffuse and result in relatively higher variance.
The second noteworthy influence on variance, as might be expected, is whether an
actual trade relationship exists or not. That is, as I have indicated prior, the imputation
model struggles to accurately estimate trade when two states do not trade (i.e., when trade
is zero). The mean variance for observations where trade is zero is 0.704 compared to 0.255 for observations where trade is non-zero. The bottom right panel of Figure B.1
includes histograms for 1) non-zero trade relationships and 2) zero trade relationships
along with kernel density plots. Two items are noteworthy from this panel. First, the
peak distribution of dyads with zero trade is above zero variance, indicating that the
imputation model tends to fit trade relationships even when none exist. Second, the tail
of the zero trade distribution is fatter than for non-zero trade dyads. This suggests a
greater proportion of the high variance observations are zero trade dyads. In other words,
dyads where the actual trade is zero are more likely to be inaccurately estimated
(potentially egregiously) by the imputation model.
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Before exploring the potential impact of missing GDP and zero trade dyads on my
analysis, Figure B.2 summarizes these relationships. The top left quadrant of Figure B.2
plot the difference between actual and imputed trade values over time according to
whether the dyad contains GDP scores for both states (black dots) or is missing at least
one GDP value (grey Xs). Likewise, the top right quadrant plots differences for dyads
with non-zero and zero trade (black dots and grey Xs respectively). From these plots, the
highest variances in my analysis appear to be dyads with zero-trade. In this light, GDP
does not appear as problematic. The bottom left quadrant reflects dyads both missing
GDP and possessing zero trade. As might be expected, this results in consistently and
relatively severe differences between actual and imputed values. In other words, missing
GDP and possessing zero trade is highly likely to skew imputation values. Finally, the
bottom right quadrant plots variance for dyads missing data on any other variable. The
black dots reflect observations without any missing data and positive trade scores while
the grey Xs are observations missing data on at least one variable, but possessing GDP
scores and non-zero trade values. I provide this plot as a comparison for the others. As
can be seen, variances are generally less pronounced and erratic if a variable other than
GDP is missing or trade is zero between states in a dyad.
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Table B.1: Imputation Model Variables
Variable
Measure
% Missing
Primary Imputed Variable
Trade (logged)
Dyadic exports + Imports
26.8%
Gravity Variables
Dichotomous, shared border or separated by 150
Contiguity
0.0%
miles of water or less
Distance
Capital to Capital
0.0%
Regional Dummies UN definitions (9 total regions)
0.0%
Same Region
Dichotomous, two states in the same region
0.0%
GDP, high (logged) Real GDP for both states
16.0%
GDP, low (logged) Lowest GDP score in dyad
16.0%
Common Language Dichotomous, two states share the same language
0.0%
Dichotomous, coded 1 if one states in the dyad is a
Major Power
0.0%
major power
Major Powers
Sum of major powers in dyad
0.0%
Population (high,
Sum of population in dyad, highest score in dyad
5.5%
logged)
Population (low,
Sum of population in dyad, lowest score in dyad
5.5%
logged)
Political Variables
Affinity
Gartzke political affinity scores
1.8%
Alliances
Dyad shares a defense pact, neutrality pact, or entente 0.0%
POLITY IV composite measures (-10 to 10), highest
Democracy, high
23.3%
score in dyad
POLITY IV composite measures (-10 to 10), lowest
Democracy, low
23.3%
score in dyad
POLITY IV (0 to 20), absolute difference in
Regime Similarity
20.0%
democracy scores
National trade as a share of GDP, highest score in
Openness, high
21.0%
dyad
National trade as a share of GDP, lowest score in
Openness, high
21.0%
dyad
Count of organizations of which both states are
IGO Membership
4.18%
members
Trade Agreement,
Ordinal variable (0 to 5) indicating the depth of
0.0%
level
economic integration
Predicted probability of a trade relationship between
Trade Probability
states in a dyad (based on a gravity model used to
10.6%
predict trade diversion values)
Dichotomous, a MID initiates between states in the
MID Initiation
0.0%
dyad
Dichotomous, a MID initiates between states in the
Fatal MID Initiation
0.0%
dyad where at least one fatality occurs
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Table B.1: Continued
Variable
Political Variables

Measure

% Missing

Dichotomous, a sanction between states in the dyad
for political reasons
Sum of MIDs
Rolling sum of MIDs in dyad, 1950 to 2001
Sum of Fatal MIDs
Rolling sum of fatal MIDs in dyad, 1950 to 2001
Sum of Political
Rolling sum of political sanctions in dyad, 1970 to
Sanctions
2001
Years since last MID (cubic polynomial term for
Peace Years (cubic)
temporal dependence)
Fatal Peace Years
Years since last fatal MID (cubic polynomial term for
(cubic)
temporal dependence)
Sanction Years
Years since last sanction (cubic polynomial term for
(cubic)
temporal dependence)
Spatial lag variable for MID initiation using
Spatial Lag, MID
contiguity as connector
Spatial Lag,
Spatial lag variable for sanction initiation using
Sanctions
contiguity as connector
Variables Used in Statistical Analysis
Only one state in the dyad is a member of any
One Agreement
economic agreement
Opposing
Both states in the dyad are members of different
Agreements
economic agreements
Shallow Agreements Shallow economic agreements
Deep Agreements
Deep economic agreements
Trade
Total bilateral trade as a share of GDP, dyadic score
Interdependence
Absolute difference in trade interdependence scores,
Trade Asymmetry
higher values indicating greater asymmetry
FDI, high
Total inward FDI, highest score in dyad
Political Sanctions

0.0%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.3%
0.3%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
36.7%
36.7%
34.3%

FDI , low

Total inward FDI, lowest score in dyad

34.3%

FDI Dependence
One Agreement
*Interdependence
One Agreement
*Asymmetry
Opposing
Agreements
*Interdependence
Opposing
Agreements
*Asymmetry

Total inward FDI as a share of GDP, dyadic score
Interaction between dyads with one agreement only
and trade interdependence
Interaction between dyads with one agreement only
and trade asymmetry

34.3%
38.4%

Interaction between dyads with separate agreements
and trade interdependence

38.4%

Interaction between dyads with separate agreements
and trade asymmetry

38.4%
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38.4%

Table B.1: Continued
Variable

Measure

% Missing

Variables Used in Statistical Analysis
Shallow*Dependence
Shallow*Asymmetry
Shallow *FDI
Deep*Dependence
Deep *Asymmetry
Deep *FDI

Interaction between dyads with shallow agreements
and trade dependence
Interaction between dyads with shallow agreements
and trade asymmetry
Interaction between dyads with shallow agreements
and FDI dependence
Interaction between dyads with deep agreements and
trade dependence
Interaction between dyads with deep agreements and
trade asymmetry
Interaction between dyads with deep agreements and
FDI dependence
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27.2%
27.2%
34.3%
27.2%
27.2%
34.3%

Table B.2: Actual and Imputed Trade Data Comparison
Actual

Imputed

% Difference
(Imputed – Actual)

Mean

12.100

12.129

0.2%

Median

13.415

13.110

-2.3%

5.513

5.286

-4.1%

Minimum

-1.595

4.605

-388.7%

Maximum

26.651

28.827

8.2%

1%

4.605

3.005

-34.7%

25%

4.605

6.324

37.3%

50%

13.415

13.110

-2.3%

75%

16.490

16.266

-1.4%

99%

21.995

22.036

0.2%

Standard Deviation
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APPENDIX C – ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
In this appendix, I present variations on the models in Chapters 5 and 6 to address
potential concerns and qualify my results. I separate the robustness tests by chapter,
beginning with Chapter 5 concerning intra-agreement conflict.

A.1

Intra-Agreement Conflict
Chapter 5 analyzes conflict between states in the same economic agreement using

basic and imputed logit analysis. I also offer a robustness test in-chapter addressing
potential endogeneity concerns using a Heckman selection model. In this section, I
elaborate on my analysis of intra-agreement conflict presented in Chapter 5 by: pooling
sanctions and MIDs as the dependent variable, limiting the dependent variable to fatal
MIDs only, and disaggregating agreements into five categories based on finer criteria
than that used in Chapter 5.28
A.1.1 Pooling Sanctions and MIDs
Hypothesis 1 argues that two states in the same economic agreement are less
likely to engage in conflict than states that do not share an agreement. My analysis
showed that agreement members tend to avoid sanctions, but still use military force with
some frequency. It is difficult, therefore, to evaluate their overall propensity to engage in
disputes given the paucity of sanctions. I address this by pooling sanctions and MIDs

28

In addition to the tests in this appendix, I also conducted several others that I do not report. These
include rare-events logits, transformations of the primary variables (i.e., logs), simultaneous equations, and
samples using only politically relevant dyads. The results of these tests were identical to those included in
Chapter 5, and are therefore omitted for space and clarity.
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into one dependent variable. This effectively treats the two strategies as one decision,
thereby allowing me to evaluate whether agreement members are more or less likely to be
involved in disputes compared to states that do not share membership in an agreement.
All other aspects of the research design remain constant, to include control variables and
use of basic logit estimation techniques.
Table C.1 contains the logit results of the pooled sanction/MID model. Overall,
the results for shallow agreements are identical to those reported in Chapter 5. The
agreement variable, the interaction with asymmetry, and intra-agreement trade tend to
reduce the use of a coercive instrument in a dispute. The interactions between
agreements and interdependence and FDI (separately) tend to increase the probability of
two states in a shallow agreement using a coercive instrument. Given these results, I
have greater confidence in the conclusions I draw from my primary analysis in Chapter 5.
The results of the deep agreements model differ from my primary analysis in one
respect. While intra-agreement trade achieves statistical significance in my Chapter 5
analysis, it fails to do so in the pooled sanctions/MID model. Intra-agreement trade
therefore reduces the likelihood of MIDs between deep agreement members, but does not
influence the overall use of coercion when compared to dyads without agreements. In
other words, as states in an agreement grow more reliant on trade with other agreement
members, they are neither more nor less likely to experience disputes or use coercive
instruments. They are less likely, however, to use militarized force if viewed in isolation.
The overall impact of this finding, therefore, is to add nuance to my analysis. In
particular, intra-agreement trade does not appear to influence the overall rate of disputes
between deep agreement members. It does, however, dissuade them from militarization.
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The decision to use military force is likely a function of other factors, such as relative
capabilities, the ability to project power, and neighboring disputes.
A.1.2 Fatal Militarized Interstate Disputes
Militarized Interstate Disputes set a relatively low threshold for entry into the
dataset. Any threat, display, or use of force is coded as a MID. In particular, threats and
displays can be relatively innocuous and involved more posturing than serious intent (see
Downes and Sechser 2012 for an analysis of MID types). Fishing disputes, for example,
often result in observed MIDs without actual violence taking place. Including such lowlevel incidents in analyses of conflict can be problematic, as they may not reflect true
intent to engage in full-fledged hostilities. One means of remedying this supposed
problem is limiting the dependent variable to MIDs where at least one individual has
died. This washes out low-level disputes and focuses only on meaningful conflicts.
My analyses in Chapters 5 and 6 uses the full sample of MIDs and are not
restricted to only ones with fatalities. This is a conscious choice in my research design
made with sound reason. One of my focuses is on the decision to use either economic
sanctions or military force. Consequently, I theorize that states choose between using
economic or military coercion as strategies in a dispute. It follows that even low-level
disputes reflect a conscious choice to use military force instead of economic sanctions.
Fishing disputes that result in militarization reflect a set of national policies that allow for
such actions instead of economic ones. Even if threats are cheap talk, leaders choose
between militarized or economic cheap talk. Allowing for even the slightest difference in
cost between threatening the two strategies justifies the inclusion of all MIDs and
sanctions episodes. In other words, I am truly testing the decision between instruments
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and not necessarily the use of those instruments. This requires a full sample of MIDs and
sanctions to include threats, displays, and uses of instruments.
It is still theoretically interesting and important, however, to consider the higher
threshold of MIDs as it is influence by economic agreements. To do this, I use MIDs in
which at least one fatality occurs as my dependent variable. I use the same primary
explanatory and control variables as my primary analysis in Chapter 5. In total, 156 fatal
MIDs occurred between shallow agreement members (1.16% of observations) compared
to 475 for no agreement dyads (0.28% of observations). A total of 32 MIDs occurred
between deep agreement members (1.26% of observations). Given the infrequency of
fatal MIDs, I am required to use rare-events logit for estimation.29
Table C.2 contains the results of the fatal MIDs estimation. Looking first at the
shallow agreements model, several differences are evident between the all and fatal MIDs
estimations. In particular, while intra-agreement trade, the interaction between shallow
agreements and asymmetry, and the interaction between agreement and interdependence
are statistically significant with respect to all MIDs, they fail to achieve significance with
fatal MIDs. Consequently, while these asymmetry and intra-agreement trade reduce the
overall use of MIDs, they do not influence the occurrence of fatal MIDs. Likewise,
interdependence may increase the likelihood of a MID, but does not impact the actual use
of violence.
The two remaining primary explanatory variables impact both all and fatal MIDs
models. The agreement variable, indicating that two states are in an economic
agreement, is negative and significant in line with the all-MIDs model. Two states that

29

Significant differences are evident between the regular and rare-events logit, suggesting the rare-events
specification is the appropriate estimator.
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share membership in a shallow agreement are less likely to experience a MID or see it
escalate to violence by virtue of their association. In contrast, the interaction between
agreements and FDI is positive and significant. Greater FDI dependence between
shallow agreement members both increases the occurrence of MIDs and the likelihood
they escalate to actual fighting.
Turning to the deep agreements model, notable differences are evident. First,
intra-agreement trade fails to achieve significance in the fatal MIDs model, suggesting
that members that trade with other agreement members are less likely to have a MID, but
are neither more nor less likely to see it escalate. Second, the agreement variable is
positive and significant such that two states in a deep agreement are more likely to
experience a fatal MID. This stands in contrast to the all MIDs model where it failed to
achieve significance. The intangible aspects of deep agreements, therefore, do not
influence MID initiation, but tend to increase the likelihood that MIDs will tend towards
the use of force. Third, both interactions between agreements and interdependence and
FDI are negative and significant. Deep agreement that trade heavily and rely on FDI are
less likely to experience fatal MIDs, but neither more nor less likely to experience overall
MIDs. Finally, the interaction between asymmetry and agreements actually switches
signs between the all and fatal MIDs specifications. While asymmetry between
agreement members reduces the likelihood of a MID, it actually increases the likelihood
of fatal MIDs. This suggests asymmetric dyads have less but bloodier MIDs than no
agreement dyads.
The overall impact of these results on my analysis is to provide addition context
and raise puzzles for future research. My analysis focuses in large part on the choice
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between militarized and economic coercion. This necessitates a broad view of both
instruments to include threat and use. To the extent I am modeling the decision and not
the outcome, my analysis of fatal MIDs is therefore suggests useful context and
limitations to my analysis. Certain factors influence threats and “cheap talk” that may or
may not impact the actual implementation of policies. Increased trade interdependence
between shallow agreement members, for example, appears to result in more bluster and
threat, but not necessarily more action by states. In contrast, FDI dependence between
shallow agreement members results in both bluster and action. Likewise, asymmetry
between deep agreement members may reduce overall incidents, but makes it more likely
those incidents escalate to violence. These are important considerations even if they are
not necessarily appropriate for my broader research design.
Perhaps as important as providing context, however, are the practical implications
for scholarly and policy work. It is interesting to note, for example, that FDI dependence
promotes both the threat and use of force between shallow agreement members. This
suggests a truly interesting and robust puzzle that contradicts extant literature. Likewise,
the interplay of threats and actual use of violence between deep agreement members is
interesting. Some economic relationships do not influence the overall rate of disputes,
but might make those disputes more or less bloody in the end. On the scholarly side, it is
important to give effort to the conditional nature of these effects and determine the
circumstances under which conflict occurs and how it escalates. On the policy side, it is
perhaps more important to understand when and under what circumstances violence
occurs compared to how decisions are made. Future research in these areas is warranted.
A.1.3 Disaggregating Agreements
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In Chapter 4, I discussed the coding of economic agreements according to a fivetier scale. For use in my statistical analysis, however, I collapse the five tier scale into
two dichotomous variables capturing shallow and deep agreements. I do this for several
reasons. First, there are strong reasons to believe a threshold effect exists with respect to
economic agreements. Partial scope agreements (PSAs) and free trade areas (FTAs) are
qualitatively different from customs unions, common markets, and economic unions
because they deal exclusively with intra-agreement dynamics. They remove barriers to
trade between members without addressing the external world beyond the agreement. In
other words, only negative cooperation is necessary in the sense that removing obstacles
is the limits of collaboration. Deep agreements, on the other hand, go beyond PSAs and
FTAs by requiring cooperation vis-à-vis the external world. All deep agreements require
a common external tariff. Hence, member states must actively coordinate broader trade
policy. This suggests a clear threshold of cooperation above and below which we might
expect different outcomes.
Second, there exists a degree of conceptual slippage with respect to economic
agreements. Drawing the line between shallow and deep is easy given the
aforementioned common external tariff requirement. Distinguishing common markets
from customs or economic unions is more challenging, as it is difficult to distinguish
when “free movement of labor” is truly achieved. Likewise, the standard for most
economic unions (and my coding) is a common market with the addition of a common
currency, yet it can be argued that many agreements possess a common currency without
the free movement of labor. The distinction between shallow and deep, therefore, may
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actually be more informative and accurate than between common markets and economic
unions.
It is still empirically interesting and important, however, to evaluate the
differences between different, more specifically defined agreement types.30
Consequently, I conducted the same statistical analysis from Chapter 5 (basic logit
specifications) using the full five-tier classification of economic agreements in separate
models. First, however, consider the distribution of MIDs by agreement type given the
disaggregated typology. Figure C.1 depicts the relative frequency of MID initiation
broken down by agreement type. For dyads without an agreement, there are 443 MIDs
for a frequency of 0.27%. PSAs and FTAs experienced MIDs at a rate of 0.60% and
0.80% respectively. Although customs unions (CU) and common markets (CM) have
MIDs at higher rates, 1.27% and 1.39% respectively, there are only 23 and 7 occurrences
respectively. Likewise, economic unions (EU) have a frequency of 0.58%, but only 2
instances of MIDs. For common markets, all MIDs are related to the East African
Community and the actions of Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania. For the economic unions,
both MIDs involve the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and
specifically the Central African Republic, Cameroon, and Chad. Here the conceptual
difficulties are evident. The ECCAS has a customs union and a common currency in the
central Africa franc, but labor movement is suspect. The overall point is simply that
relatively few agreements achieve common market or economic union status, thereby
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I also created an ordinal variable scaled 1 to 5 (shallow to deep, PSA to EU) according to the five levels
of integration for analysis. The results show that each increase in agreement level decreases MID
initiation. In addition, the interactions with asymmetry and intra-agreement trade reduce MIDs. FDI
dependence interacted with agreements increases conflict. These results are generally consistent with my
analysis, but are largely driven by shallow agreements given they possess the majority of observed
agreements.
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reducing the number of unique cross-sectional units drastically. With the reduction in
cross-sectional units is a proportional decrease in observed MIDs, which potentially
complicates statistical analysis. The infrequency of MIDs, an already uncommon event,
in deep agreements means caution should be taken in analyzing these results.
Table C.3 contains the logit results for shallow, PSA, and FTA agreements. The
shallow agreement results are reproduced from Chapter 5 for convenience and
comparison. First, note the similarity in estimates for my primary explanatory variables
between the PSA and FTA models. The agreement variable, indicating joint membership
in a PSA or FTA, is negative and significant such that membership reduces militarized
conflict. The interaction with FDI dependence, however, is positive and significant.
Dyads with a PSA or FTA are more likely to experience a MID as their dependence on
FDI increases. Both these results are consistent with the pooled shallow agreement
model and suggest relatively robust findings.
The remaining variables deviate from the pooled shallow agreement model.
Trade asymmetry, interdependence, and intra-agreement trade do not influence MID
initiation between members of a PSA or FTA. The difference in statistical significance
between the pooled and disaggregated models suggests a threshold effect is indeed in
effect. States that cooperate to lower trade barriers (and avoid deeper cooperation)
experience pacifying influences from asymmetry and intra-agreement trade, but may
exacerbate conflict as trade interdependence increases. These effects are a consequence
of cooperation on trade and not necessarily the degree of cooperation. Consequently,
when shallow agreements are broken out the effect is not immediately evident.
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Table C.4 displays the deep agreement results. The results from Chapter 5 for the
pooled model are again included for comparison. The results of the disaggregated
models are less consistent with the pooled deep agreements model. First, in the pooled
model, trade asymmetry and intra-agreement trade both reduce MIDs between deep
agreement members. However, in the disaggregated models, asymmetry fails to achieve
statistical significance. This again suggests a threshold effect. Cooperation vis-à-vis
external tariffs triggers the influence of asymmetry, which then washes out once
disaggregated. This effect might reflect animosity between asymmetric members.
Strong, economically powerful states in an agreement may force self-serving external
tariffs on junior partners, thereby exacerbating asymmetries and dependence. Second,
intra-agreement trade achieves significance only in the economic union model. This
might suggest unions are the primary driver behind the influence of intra-agreement trade
in the pooled deep agreement model.
Third, despite failing to achieve statistical significance in the pooled deep
agreements specification, the interaction between agreements and FDI dependence is
statistically significant and positive in both the customs and economic union models. The
lack of significance in the pooled model suggests the relatively strong influence of
common markets, for which no primary variables achieves statistical significance. It may
also simply reflect the paucity of dyads that share membership in economic unions. It is
also noteworthy that four of the five agreement types indicate FDI dependence increases
conflict. Fourth, the agreement variable in the customs union model is negative and
significant. This lends credence to the presence of threshold effects, as it is the
institutional arrangement of an external tariff that the agreement variable captures.
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Finally, it is noteworthy that none of my explanatory variables achieve significance in the
common market model. Again, this may reflect the relatively small number of states
sharing membership in such agreements.
The results of the disaggregated agreement models suggest several points for my
broader analysis. First, differences between the pooled and disaggregated models suggest
the role of threshold effects in conflict between agreement members. The effects of
asymmetry, interdependence, and intra-agreement trade are only evident if PSAs and
FTAs are considered jointly in a pooled variable. I believe this is an appropriate
approach, as the two agreement types represent fundamentally similar institutional
frameworks. Cooperation on trade, but not external tariffs, is the key component to
identifying the influence of these particular economic relationships. Likewise,
asymmetry and intra-agreement trade are only influential in the pooled deep agreement
model, suggesting the common external tariff is key to recognizing these effects. Second,
the disaggregated results bolster some of the key findings in my analysis. In particular,
shallow agreements reduces MID initiation while FDI dependence exacerbates it in
almost all models. This provides strong supporting evidence for one of the more
counterintuitive findings in my analysis. Overall, these results add richness to my overall
theoretical and empirical story without necessarily refuting or contradicting my primary
statistical analysis.

A.2

Extra-Agreement Conflict
Chapter 6 analyzes conflict between members of economic agreements and non-

members states using basic logit, imputed logit, and strategic probit analyses. In this
section, I elaborate on my analysis of extra-agreement conflict presented in Chapter by:
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limiting the dependent variable to fatal MIDs only and using Heckman selection models
to address selection into different agreements.31
A.2.1 Fatal Militarized Interstate Disputes
In section 1.2 of this appendix, I discuss the use of all MIDs in my primary
statistical analysis of intra-agreement conflict. Because Chapter 6 also deals with the
decision between military force and economic sanctions, the all MIDs approach is
appropriate for my primary statistical tests. I offer an analysis of fatal MIDs here to
embellish on the results of Chapter 6 and offer greater insight into the influence of
economic agreements.
Table C.5 contains the results of the fatal MIDs model for extra-agreement
conflict. None of my primary explanatory variables achieve statistical significance in
either the one or opposing agreement model. Hence, economic relationships neither
increase nor decrease the likelihood of fatal militarized force. This can be viewed two
ways. First, economic relationships between agreement members do not exacerbate
tensions and increase conflict. Hence, little support exists for the notion that relative
gains concerns as they relate to trade between members and non-members increase
violent conflict. Second, economic relationships fail to restrain violent conflict between
members and non-members. In this way, the pacifying influence of economic interaction
that much of the literature finds fails to function with members and non-members. To be
sure, however, none of the economic variables achieve statistical significance in either

31

In addition to the tests in this appendix, I also conducted several others that I do not report. These
include rare-events logits, transformations of the primary variables (i.e., logs), simultaneous equations, and
samples using only politically relevant dyads. The results of these tests were identical to those included in
Chapter 6, and are therefore omitted for space and clarity.
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model. The overall impact of these results for my analysis, therefore, is negligible given
my justification for the use of the all MIDs design.
A.2.2 Selection Into Separate Agreements
In Chapter 5, I address the tendency for states with strained political relations to
avoid cooperation and economic agreements in my analysis of intra-agreement conflict.
The same logic holds for my analysis of extra-agreement conflict. Specifically, states
with a propensity for conflict are unlikely to join the same economic agreement and,
indeed, may form other economic agreements to isolate potential enemies. Given that
states may select out of joint economic agreement membership, I offer a series of
Heckman selection models accounting for the potential selection effect. The selection
criterion is creation of a one or opposing agreement dyad. That is, dyads either select
into a situation where one only state is in an agreement or both form different
agreements. Predictors for the selection equation are identical to those used in the
selection models for intra-agreement conflict - interdependence, asymmetry, alliances,
contiguity, democracy, GDP, major power status, peace years and WTO membership,
inter-capital distance, common language, the geometric mean of logged population,
political affinity, and the cumulative total of dyadic MIDs since 1950. The outcome
equation includes all my primary explanatory variables as well as allies, contiguity,
capabilities, democracy, GDP, IGO membership, major power status, WTO membership,
and both spatial and temporal controls.
Table C.6 contains the selection model results for MID initiation. The outcome
equation is show in the top half of the table. Overall, the results are identical to those of
the basic logit model presented in Chapter 6. None of my primary explanatory variables
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achieve statistical significance in the one agreement model. With respect to opposing
dyads, however, trade interdependence tends to reduce the occurrence of MIDs. Again, a
curvilinear relationship is evident with trade diversion. The opposing agreement dyads
least likely to engage in conflict are those with high degrees of trade creation or
diversion. Dyads with relatively neutral values of trade diversion are the most conflict
prone. Finally, the ρ statistic for the opposing agreement model is statistically
significant, indicating a selection effect may indeed be taking place. The results of the
selection model are identical to those of the basic logit, however, suggest my primary
analysis using basic logit is likely acceptable.
The results of the selection model for economic sanctions is contained in Table
C.7. The outcome equation is show in the top half of the table. Again, the results of the
outcome equation are identical to those of the basic logit. A curvilinear relationship
exists between one agreement dyads and trade diversion. Dyads with high trade creation
and diversion are the least likely to experience a sanction while neutral values are the
most likely. For dyads with membership in separate economic agreements, trade
asymmetry tends to increase the likelihood of observing economic sanctions. Both ρ
statistics are statistically significant for the one and opposing agreements model. While
this might imply basic logit is biased by selection into different agreements, the similarity
of results suggests the similar basic logit specification is preferable.
Finally, while it is not the focus of my analysis, the selection equation predicting
exclusion from joint economic agreement membership is interesting. Overall, the results
of the one and opposing agreement selection equations (both sanctions and MID
specifications) are nearly identical. First, trade asymmetry increases the likelihood of

290

exclusion. This may reflect the disadvantaged partner attempting to form agreements to
break its trade dependence on one state through preferential arrangements. Second, trade
interdependence increases the likelihood of one agreement dyads, but has no relationship
with opposing agreement dyads. Again, this may reflect one state in the dyad attempting
to diversify trade partners by forming agreements.
Third, several variables predict both one and opposing agreement dyads.
Interestingly, geographic contiguity and major power status increase exclusion from
agreements. Contiguity may predict exclusion because geographically proximate
partners may not need agreements to generate trade. Close neighbors, furthermore, are
those most likely to be adversaries. The result of the major powers variable is more
logical, as powerful states likely form their own exclusionary trade blocs. GDP and
population also predict exclusion, which likely reflects the same logic as major powers.
Large states likely form their own exclusionary blocs. Fourth, two variables – affinity
and WTO membership – decrease the likelihood of exclusion. Both make sense, as states
with similar policies and global trade agreement membership are more likely to join the
same agreement.
The remaining variables are mixed in nature. First, alliances positively predict
one agreement dyads, but negatively predict opposing agreement dyads. In other words,
dyads that are allies are somewhat more likely to have only one agreement, but less likely
to form separate agreements. This suggests they either form joint agreements or avoid
membership rather than divorce security and economic interests. Second, the more
democratic the dyad, the less likely they are to be one agreement dyads. They are more
likely, however to be in opposing agreements. This may simply reflect the propensity of
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democracies to form organizations and institutions. Third, inter-capital distance only
influences opposing agreement dyads (negatively). Finally, the total number of conflicts
between dyads negatively predicts one agreement dyads but positively predicts opposing
agreements. This indicates that states with past conflict tend to form different economic
blocs. Given that one agreement dyads are less likely, it also points to the domino theory
of regionalism; if a state’s competitor forms an agreement, that state is likely to form its
own agreement.
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Table C.1: Agreements and Intra-Agreement Conflict, Pooled Coercion
Shallow Agreements
Deep Agreements

Agreement
Agreement*Asymmetry
Agreement*Interdependence
Agreement*FDI
Intra-Agreement Trade
Asymmetry
Interdependence
FDI
Alliance
Contiguity
Capabilities
Democracy
GDP
IGOs
Major Power
WTO
Spatial Lag (Alliances)
Spatial Lag (Contiguity)
Constant
N
λ2
Pseudo-R2
Log Pseudolikelihood

Standard
Coefficient
Error
-14.798***
2.804
-12.815**
3.275
27.913***
10.596
14.779***
2.767
-7.201***
1.890
3.416***
1.027
-23.759***
6.509
-3.988**
1.432
0.075
0.112
3.361***
0.122
0.087*
0.038
-0.051***
0.009
0.235***
0.040
0.023***
0.005
1.153***
0.149
-0.317**
0.107
-10.897
16.572
35.239***
7.639
-6.518***
1.601
182,708
3,596.64***
0.347
-2,748.87

Standard
Coefficient
Error
-0.566
3.844
-52.092**
19.891
-2.994
16.637
0.946
3.741
-2.615
1.989
1.949
1.418
-21.975***
6.528
3.005
2.519
0.088
0.110
3.361***
0.122
0.086*
0.038
-0.052***
0.009
0.235***
0.042
0.024***
0.005
1.112***
0.152
-0.309**
0.106
-11.268
16.555
35.789***
7.475
-13.584***
2.759
182,708
3,696.13***
0.344
-2,761.70

The dependent variable is the use of either a Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) or threat or
imposition of economic sanctions. The "agreement" variable indicates dyads stats share membership in
either a shallow or deep economic agreement. Temporal control variables (peace years3) omitted for
space Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
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Table C.2: Agreements and Intra-Agreement Conflict, Fatal MIDs
Shallow Agreements
Deep Agreements

Agreement
Agreement*Asymmetry
Agreement*Interdependence
Agreement*FDI
Intra-Agreement Trade
Asymmetry
Interdependence
FDI
Alliance
Contiguity
Capabilities
Democracy
GDP
IGOs
Major Power
WTO
Spatial Lag (Alliances)
Spatial Lag (Contiguity)
Constant
N

Standard
Coefficient
Error
-24.303**
8.017
-25.963
25.020
17.809
48.046
24.156**
7.897
2.156
3.290
-3.450
16.748
-11.418
35.786
-15.328*
6.794
0.017
0.357
5.155***
0.696
0.152
0.136
-0.050
0.036
0.144
0.137
0.008
0.018
0.579
0.826
0.343
0.428
-9.879
32.228
45.513
33.310
4.143
7.823
182,621

Standard
Coefficient
Error
35.319***
6.942
402.032***
28.231
-637.868*
258.180
-34.137***
6.865
3.081
2.601
-15.901
16.958
3.616
25.797
5.419
5.084
0.109
0.362
5.249***
0.710
0.174
0.129
-0.052
0.035
0.189
0.148
0.007
0.018
0.613
0.753
0.347
0.416
-7.698
31.869
42.663
32.749
-17.881
6.530
182,708

The dependent variable is Fatal Militarized Interstate Disputes (Fatal MIDs). The "agreement" variable
indicates dyads stats share membership in either a shallow or deep economic agreement. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Temporal control variables (peace years3) omitted for space *p < .05 ** p < .01
*** p < .001
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Table C.3: Agreements and Intra-Agreement Conflict, Disaggregated Shallow Agreements
Shallow Agreements
(FTA and PTA)
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Agreement
Agreement*Asymmetry
Agreement*Interdependence
Agreement*FDI
Intra-Agreement Trade
Asymmetry
Interdependence
FDI
Alliance
Contiguity
Capabilities
Democracy
GDP
IGOs
Major Power
WTO
Spatial Lag (Alliances)
Spatial Lag (Contiguity)
Constant

Coefficient
-14.935***
-13.14***
25.676*
14.902***
-8.842***
2.627**
-17.307**
-5.126***
0.243*
3.111***
0.125***
-0.053***
0.183***
0.018***
1.366***
-0.126
-9.41
34.655***
-3.715***

Standard Error
2.710
3.359
10.194
2.667
1.882
0.986
6.251
0.921
0.115
0.130
0.038
0.010
0.040
0.005
0.156
0.109
15.676
8.185
1.132

PSA
Coefficient
-12.809***
-2.582
12.641
12.668***
-3.647
2.168
-17.637*
-5.333***
0.108
3.072***
0.118**
-0.063***
0.177***
0.035***
1.442***
-0.180
-4.467
31.205***
-3.870**

Standard Error
2.939
4.286
14.296
2.891
2.490
1.316
7.229
1.069
0.127
0.135
0.041
0.009
0.044
0.006
0.173
0.116
14.097
9.040
1.293

FTA
Coefficient
-16.797***
-7.250
0.688
16.098***
-0.954
1.921
-11.309
-5.963***
0.184
3.001***
0.121**
-0.061***
0.198***
0.027***
1.467***
-0.123
-9.271
31.388***
-3.519**

Standard Error
4.339
4.570
18.224
4.253
3.262
1.175
7.148
0.906
0.140
0.148
0.043
0.010
0.048
0.006
0.186
0.128
16.642
9.639
1.209

Table C.3: Continued
N
λ2
Pseudo-R2
Log Pseudolikelihood

182,708
3,811.54***
0.3457
-2752.54

175,562
3,556.64***
0.351
-2,475.15

159,628
3,020.26***
0.339
-2,152.91

The dependent variable is the use of a Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs). The "agreement" variable indicates dyads stats share membership in either a
particular agreement (contained in the header). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Temporal control variables (peace years3) omitted for space *p <
.05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
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Table C.4: Agreements and Intra-Agreement Conflict, Disaggregated Deep Agreements

297

Agreement
Agreement*Asymmetry
Agreement*Interdependence
Agreement*FDI
Intra-Agreement Trade
Asymmetry
Interdependence
FDI
Alliance
Contiguity
Capabilities
Democracy
GDP
IGOs
Major Power
WTO
Spatial Lag (Alliances)
Spatial Lag (Contiguity)
Constant

Deep Agreements
(CU, CM, and EU)
Standard
Coefficient
Error
-3.827
3.870
-56.429**
21.632
6.802
16.515
4.020
3.783
-4.384*
2.061
1.494
1.368
-17.557**
6.187
0.208
2.626
0.249*
0.115
3.121***
0.130
0.126***
0.038
-0.052***
0.010
0.175***
0.042
0.019***
0.005
1.329***
0.159
-0.117
0.109
-9.773
15.727
35.200***
8.036
-8.934***
2.739

CU
Coefficient
-13.210***
-43.768
-20.353
13.128***
-1.125
2.244
-17.742*
-5.462***
0.110
3.008***
0.128**
-0.056***
0.200***
0.031***
1.350***
-0.153
-5.461
30.846**
-4.141**

CM
Standard
Error
3.266
24.410
19.900
3.107
3.402
1.303
7.240
1.047
0.144
0.149
0.044
0.011
0.049
0.006
0.191
0.131
15.227
9.948
1.336

Coefficient
196.778
-207.349
46.638
-192.984
-64.022
2.219
-17.478***
-5.502***
0.057
3.004***
0.135**
-0.066***
0.192***
0.034***
1.478***
-0.157
-4.943
30.814**
-3.982**

EU
Standard
Error
223.284
248.442
69.036
222.593
42.139
1.316
7.300
1.063
0.151
0.152
0.045
0.011
0.050
0.006
0.198
0.134
14.820
10.062
1.359

Coefficient
-11.697
32.357
-306.060
12.980*
-81.174***
2.219
-17.512*
-5.479***
0.064
3.010***
0.137**
-0.065***
0.190***
0.034***
1.489***
-0.158
-5.607
31.036**
-3.940**

Standard
Error
6.475
131.062
344.747
6.140
13.848
1.313
7.289
1.060
0.150
0.152
0.045
0.011
0.049
0.006
0.198
0.134
15.206
10.085
1.356

Table C.4: Continued

N
λ2
Pseudo-R2
Log Pseudolikelihood

182,708
3,884.23***
0.3420
-2768.06

156,947
3,083.22***
0.344
-2,092.95

155,645
2967.53***
0.347
-2,018.90

155,486
2,945.16***
0.341
-2,017.21

The dependent variable is the use of a Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs). The "agreement" variable indicates dyads stats share membership in either a
particular agreement (contained in the header). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Temporal control variables (peace years3) omitted for space *p <
.05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
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Table C.5: Agreements and Extra-Agreement Conflict, Fatal MIDs
One Agreement

Opposing Agreements

Shallow Agreements
Standard
Error
1535.796

Agreement

Coefficient
-1753.575

Agreement*Asymmetry
Agreement*Interdependence
Agreement*Diversion
Agreement*Diversion2
Asymmetry
Interdependence
Trade Diversion
Trade Diversion2
Alliance
Contiguity
Capabilities
Democracy
GDP
IGOs
Major Power
WTO
Spatial Lag (Alliances)
Spatial Lag (Contiguity)
Constant
N
λ2
Pseudo-R2
Log Pseudolikelihood

-146.034
82.715
87.933
119.296
3640.476
3095.051
-1887.134
1561.241
9.029
13.895
-65.295
49.194
96.719
132.352
-40.488
56.829
-0.044
0.423
6.387***
0.873
0.515**
0.168
-0.052
0.042
0.273
0.148
-0.015
0.016
-0.068
0.834
0.506
0.441
0.378
17.286
57.547*
22.507
-70.379
74.695
191,828
243.95***
0.448
-204.61

Standard
Coefficient
Error
-1491.660
1220.390
7.519
24.150
-37.416
122.565
3112.217
2520.294
-1620.237
1300.1
1.144
16.869
-59.303
43.186
3.876
66.472
-2.374
26.894
0.459
0.468
5.262***
0.698
0.402*
0.162
-0.105*
0.046
0.398**
0.142
-0.005
0.016
1.264
0.859
0.848*
0.427
18.709
17.521
28.241
32.726
-17.842
39.695
194,782
478.61***
0.4342
-224.368

The dependent variable is Fatal Militarized Interstate Disputes (Fatal MIDs). The "agreement" variable
indicates dyads where one state is in an agreement (one agreement) or separate agreements (opposing
agreements). Temporal control variables (peace years3) omitted for space Robust standard errors in
parentheses. *p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
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Table C.6: Economic Agreements and External MIDs, Heckman Selection
One Agreement

Opposing Agreements

Militarized Interstate Disputes
Coefficient
0.400
-5.038
11.421
-7.663
0.063
1.032
0.091***
-0.002
0.047
0.008*
0.133
-0.141

Asymmetry
Interdependence
Trade Diversion
Trade Diversion2
Alliance
Contiguity
Capabilities
Democracy
GDP
IGOs
Major Power
WTO
Spatial Lag
(Alliances)
1.243
Spatial Lag
(Contiguity)
11.975*
Constant
-6.512
Exclusion from Economic Agreements

Asymmetry
Interdependence
Affinity
Alliance
Contiguity
Democracy
Distance
GDP
Language
Major Power
Population
Total Dyadic MIDs
WTO
Constant

Coefficient
1.419***
2.188***
-0.056**
0.103***
0.229***
-0.016***
0.001
0.164***
0.067***
1.074***
0.204***
-0.020*
-0.378***
-8.050***

Standard
Error
1.539
5.075
13.969
7.458
0.172
0.435
0.025
0.020
0.229
0.004
1.066
0.330

Coefficient
-0.070
-16.702*
367.799**
-189.948***
0.180*
0.683***
0.062*
-0.025***
-0.032
0.011*
0.136
-0.123

Standard
Error
2.035
7.246
117.329
59.084
0.088
0.157
0.026
0.006
0.041
0.004
0.171
0.075

5.925

-26.41*

11.143

5.243
9.256

8.552
-177.514**

5.765
58.730

Standard
Error
0.151
0.682
0.019
0.019
0.029
0.000
0.000
0.005
0.016
0.015
0.005
0.009
0.009
0.109

Coefficient
0.481***
-0.015
-0.353***
-0.144***
0.149***
0.006***
-0.000***
0.165***
0.201***
0.639***
0.104***
0.026***
-0.090***
-6.301***

Standard
Error
0.148
0.624
0.013
0.016
0.025
0.000
0.000
0.004
0.013
0.016
0.005
0.004
0.008
0.091
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Table C.6: Continued
N
Censored
Uncensored
λ2
Log Pseudolikelihood
ρ

208,979
188,743
13,235
596.54***
-53208.53
0.040

211,949
188,743
23,206
569.79***
-64,072.08
15.450***

The dependent variable is the initiation of a Militarized Interstate Dispute (MIDs). The "agreement"
variable indicates dyads where one state is in an agreement (one agreement) or separate agreements
(opposing agreements). Temporal control variables (peace years3) omitted for space. *p < .05 ** p <
.01 *** p < .001
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Table C.7: Economic Agreements and External Sanctions, Heckman Selection
One Agreement

Opposing Agreements

Economic Sanctions
Coefficient
1.385
2.373
153.133*
-77.134*
0.186
-0.042
-0.003
0.000
0.126
-0.005
-0.642**
0.394***

Asymmetry
Interdependence
Trade Diversion
Trade Diversion2
Alliance
Contiguity
Capabilities
Democracy
GDP
IGOs
Major Power
WTO
Spatial Lag
(Alliances)
-21.158
Spatial Lag
(Contiguity)
-5.863
Constant
-79.720*
Exclusion from Economic Agreements

Asymmetry
Interdependence
Affinity
Alliance
Contiguity
Democracy
Distance
GDP
Language
Major Power
Population
Total Dyadic MIDs
WTO
Constant

Coefficient
1.414***
2.219***
-0.060***
0.104***
0.227***
-0.016***
0.001
0.164***
0.067***
1.073***
0.204***
-0.019***
-0.378***
-8.043***

Standard
Error
1.805
6.102
76.648
38.318
0.120
0.188
0.033
0.009
0.093
0.004
0.228
0.095
14.128

-40.631

10.505
39.346

18.000***
-11.287

Standard
Error
0.150
0.680
0.016
0.019
0.028
0.000
0.000
0.004
0.016
0.014
0.005
0.005
0.009
0.101
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Coefficient
2.817*
-10.501
17.191
-6.677
0.081
-0.636*
0.022
-0.018**
0.014
-0.000
-0.216*
0.155*

Coefficient
0.477***
0.039
-0.357***
-0.142***
0.148***
0.006***
-0.000***
0.164***
0.202***
0.637***
0.105***
0.026***
-0.091***
-6.301***

Standard
Error
1.266
10.066
14.387
7.067
0.107
0.274
0.021
0.006
0.053
0.004
0.110
0.067
25.350
3.469
7.804
Standard
Error
0.148
0.624
0.012
0.016
0.025
0.000
0.000
0.004
0.013
0.016
0.005
0.004
0.008
0.091

Table C.7: Continued
N
Censored
Uncensored
λ2
Log Pseudolikelihood
ρ

208,979
188,743
13,235
202.74***
-52,918.78
10.30**

211,949
188,743
23,206
112.67***
-63,760.15
35.91***

The dependent variable is the threat or imposition of an economic sanction. The "agreement" variable
indicates dyads where one state is in an agreement (one agreement) or separate agreements (opposing
agreements). Temporal control variables (peace years3) omitted for space. *p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p
< .001
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42*
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Frequency of MIDs
1.0%

No Agrements: 443 MIDs (0.27%)
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*Total Number of MIDs

Figure C.1: MIDs by Agreement Type
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